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Chapter 1
Introduction
The essays to be comprised in this thesis are approaches to the problem
of modelling the notion of aggregate liquidity as a potential driver of asset
returns and of macroeconomic dynamics. The main thrust of this work is
empirical, using methods ranging from econometric studies of the intercon-
nection between asset returns and their degree of liquidity to estimating
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models with Bayesian methods to
establish evidence for the e¤ectiveness of quantitative easing policies.
In general, liquidity refers to the ease of trading an asset and to an as-
sets ability to be sold without having to accept a considerably large drop in
the price or value. Therefore, bid-ask spreads are a common measure for an
assets degree of market liquidity. Authors like Canzoneri et al. (2013) point
out that U.S. Treasuries might carry a liquidity premium which is induced
by nonpecuniary returns to investors. Specically, U.S. Treasuries are used
to facilitate transactions in a number of ways: they serve as collateral in
nancial markets, banks hold them to manage the liquidity of their port-
folios, individuals hold them in money market accounts that o¤er checking
services, and importers and exporters hold them as transaction balances.
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) formalize the notion that the
investors obtain such liquidity services by assuming that holding U.S. Trea-
sury securities directly contributes to their utility.
The essays presented in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 of this thesis inves-
tigate whether there is empirical evidence for household preferences where
liquidity services are gained not only from U.S. Treasuries but from a variety
of liquid assets. Chapter 2 investigates whether an asset pricing model which
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is based on such investorspreferences can contribute to explain observed
corporate-U.S. Treasury yield spreads. Chapter 3 seeks to provide a com-
plete specication and parameterization of a utility function with liquidity
services. This is done by providing a set of microfoundations, ranging from
nonparametric hypothesis tests of revealed preference conditions for utility
maximization, to parameter estimates for suitable specications of utility
functions. Chapter 4 (coauthored with Andreas Schabert and Roland Win-
kler) employs a monetary dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
model to identify the e¤ects of the U.S. Federal Reserves (Fed) large-scale
longer-term Treasury purchase program (LSAP 2) on the U.S. economy. In
this model a bank sector relies on liquidity services which are gained from
holdings of government bonds when providing nancial intermediation be-
tween households and rms. Chapter 5 investigates whether liquidity pre-
mia can explain deviations from uncovered interest parity (UIP). For that
purpose forward premium regression models are modied by assuming that
investors value U.S. Treasuriesliquidity services which are induced by the
U.S. dollars role as a key currency. Chapter 6 concludes the thesis.
Empirical studies on determinants of corporate-U.S. Treasury bond yield
spreads commonly rely on measures for default risk and the securitiesdegree
of market liquidity (Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001)). A
large number of contributions to the corporate nance literature nd that
these determinants have a rather limited explanatory power (e.g. Elton et
al. (2001), Delianedis and Geske (2001), Huang and Huang (2003), Eom,
Helwege, and Huang (2004)).
Chapter 2 investigates whether the unexplained share within corporate-
U.S. Treasury bond yield spreads is related to an investorsvaluation for
liquidity services. Accordingly, this valuation should be priced separately
from common measures for assetsmarket liquidity. The analysis builds on
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) who show that changes in the
supply of U.S. Treasury securities have a strong e¤ect on corporate-Treasury
bond yield spreads. In this model investors value certain features of U.S.
Treasury securities, namely their liquidity and "absolute security of nominal
return" as they directly contribute to investorss utility. This a¤ects prices
of Treasuries and hence, drives down their yields compared to assets that
do not to the same extent share these features.
Chapter 2 presents an asset pricing model which is modied accord-
ing to Poterba and Rotemberg (1986). In particular, investorsutility is a
function of consumption and liquidity services which depend on the level of
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holdings of a set of liquid assets. The model is estimated using regression
analysis while controlling for commonly employed measures for default risk
and assetsdegree of market liquidity (as summarized by Collin-Dufresne,
Goldstein, and Martin (2001), Pueger and Viceira (2012) and Longsta¤
(2004)).
Estimation results provide evidence in favor of the modied asset pricing
model. Specically, the unexplained share within corporate-U.S. Treasury
bond yield spreads is to a signicant extent driven by investorss valuation
for liquid assets. While explanatory power remains low in previous studies,
the model presented in Chapter 2 provides an improved empirical t. Fur-
ther, results point towards the existence of a demand function for liquidity
services.
The model presented in Chapter 2 does not provide a complete spec-
ication of the investors utility. In particular, in an ad hoc manner it
is assumed that liquidity services are valued by some aggregator function
which is a separate argument of the preference function. Chapter 3 seeks
to provide a complete specication and parameterization of a representa-
tive agents utility function which can rationalize the investorsbehavior
observed by Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) and the study
presented in Chapter 2.
The study presented in Chapter 3 checks Varians (1982) necessary and
su¢ cient revealed preference conditions for observed data on investorsliq-
uid asset holdings and on the assetsprices. Consistency of the data with
these conditions implies non-rejection of the hypothesis that investors are
maximizing a utility function which is nonsatiated, continuos, concave and
monotonic. The procedure proposed by Fleissig and Whitney (2003) is
applied to test whether the data satisfy necessary and su¢ cient revealed
preference conditions for weak separability between consumption and liq-
uidity services. With the revealed preference tests done the question for
a suitable specication of the representative investors objective function
arises. As the nonparametric testing routines applied in this essay do not
provide guidance for that, Chapter 3 follows authors like Stock and Wright
(2003), Hall (2005), and Holman (1998) by employing Generalized Method
of Moments (GMM) to estimate coe¢ cients of Euler equations which are
derived from the investors optimization problem under several proposed
utility specications.
Chapter 3 provides evidence from the nonparametric testing routines
that necessary and su¢ cient conditions for utility maximization and weak
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separability are obtained for the dataset. However, results from GMM esti-
mations imply rejection of almost all proposed utility specications. More-
over, estimation results imply parameter values for the preferences which
are not rejected that indicate misspecication.
The purpose of the essay presented in Chapter 4 is to identify the macro-
economic e¤ects of LSAP 2. This nonstandard monetary policy measures
was introduced by the U.S. Fed in response to the persistent negative e¤ects
of the 2008/2009 nancial crisis. As outlined by Bernanke (2012), obtaining
precise estimates of the e¤ects of these operations on the broader economy
is inherently di¢ cult, as the counterfactual - how the economy would have
performed in the absence of the Federal Reserves actions - cannot be di-
rectly observed.
Recent studies on unconventional central bank balance sheet policies rely
on non-monetary macroeconomic models (see Chen, Curdia, and Ferrero
(2012), Del Negro et al. (2013), Gertler and Karadi (2013), and Gertler and
Kiyotaki (2010)). To develop a framework for the macroeconomic analysis
of the LSAP 2 program Chapter 4 extends a monetary DSGE model by
Christo¤el and Schabert (2013) which provides an explicit specication of
the central banks balance sheet options and its impact on nancial inter-
mediation. The model accounts for the specic role of government bonds to
provide liquidity services to commercial banks. This is considered by mod-
eling central bank monetary supply by an asset exchange in open market
operations. Central bank money and reserves resp. are demanded by banks
for liquidity management purposes when they provide intermediation be-
tween households and rms. In particular, costs of nancial intermediation
are specied in a stylized way following Curdia and Woodford (2011). The
model is estimated for U.S. data using Bayesian techniques.
The analysis presented in Chapter 4 employs the model address the fol-
lowing questions: First, to what extent did shocks to nancial intermedia-
tion and the Feds unconventional balance sheet policy measures contribute
to the volatility in real activity following the 2008/2009 nancial crisis?
Second, what are the macroeconomic e¤ects of the LSAP 2 bond purchase
program? To address the second issue, Chapter 4 follows Del Negro et al.
(2013) by using the model to conduct a counterfactual policy simulation
experiment.
Chapter 4 nds that shocks to nancial intermediation signicantly con-
tribute to the evolution of U.S. key macroeconomic variables following the
2008/2009 crisis. In particular, the estimated model implies that in 2010:Q4,
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which is the quarter when LSAP 2 was initiated, roughly one third of the
negative U.S. real per capita GDP trend deviation was attributed to the
shock to nancial intermediation. Further, the central bank can signicantly
alleviate adverse e¤ects to the economy by easing the supply of reserves in
exchange for log-term government bonds. The counterfactual policy sim-
ulation suggests that in the absence of LSAP 2 U.S. real per capita GDP
would have dropped by additional 2:75 percentage points.
Chapter 5 addresses the empirical failure of UIP which has been doc-
umented by various evidence from forward premium regressions (see the
survey article by Engel (2013)). The widely quoted result by Froot (1990)
implies that the forward premium predicts future changes in the spot ex-
change rate which are inconsistent with UIP, in terms magnitude and in
terms of the direction of the movement. This result is known as the forward
premium puzzle.
Chapter 5 investigates whether liquidity premia can explain deviations
from UIP, and can contribute to explain international interest rate di¤er-
entials, namely the U.S.-U.K. Treasury yield spread. The analysis follows
Canzoneri et al. (2013) by relaxing the assumption that risk-free U.S. domes-
tic bonds and foreign bonds are perfect substitutes. Specically, due to the
role of the U.S. dollar as a key currency it is assumed that U.S. Treasuries
provide unique liquidity services. Therefore, U.S. Treasuries will be held at
a discount. To formalize this idea, following Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2012) a representative agent asset-pricing model is modied by
allowing investors to derive utility directly from holdings of U.S. Treasuries.
From that model no-arbitrage conditions are derived for the international
bond market which take into account for foreign exchange risk and price
risk. Chapter 5 employs regression analysis to empirically test whether the
model-implied no-arbitrage conditions can explain deviations from UIP for
U.S. data and U.K. data. By following Fuhrer (2000) it is assumed that
the householdsforecasts regarding the dynamics of consumption, ination,
and the depreciation rate of the domestic currency can be described by an
unconstrained vector autoregression.
Estimation results imply that investorsvaluation for U.S. Treasuries
liquidity services contributes to explain deviations from UIP. Further, es-
timation results imply a positive association between the expected depre-
ciation rate of the U.S. currency relative to the U.K. currency and the
U.S.-U.K. Treasury yield spread or forward premium. However, the point
estimate of the coe¢ cient still is below unity.
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Chapter 2
InvestorsValuation for Asset
Liquidity and the Corporate-
U.S. Treasury Yield Spread
2.1 Introduction
The study of determinants of corporate-U.S. Treasury bond yield spreads
has been the subject of a large number of contributions to the corporate -
nance literature. Some recent papers by Elton et al. (2001), Delianedis and
Geske (2001), Huang and Huang (2003), and Eom, Helwege, and Huang
(2004) nd that variables, i.e. default risk and measures for assetsmar-
ket liquidity, that should in theory determine spreads between corporate
bond yields and U.S. Treasury bond yields, have rather limited explanatory
power. Longsta¤, Mithal, and Neis (2005) use information from credit de-
fault swaps to estimate the share of corporate-Treasury yield spreads being
explained by default risk, which they label as the default component. The
residual is then labeled as nondefault component. The latter is found to
be time-varying and strongly related to macroeconomic measures of bond
market liquidity.1 Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) (KVJ) pro-
vide evidence that the nondefault component within the corporate-Treasury
bond yield spread is to a signicant extent driven by the total amount of U.S.
Treasuries outstanding. They argue that investors value certain features of
1For example ows into money market mutual funds.
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U.S. Treasury securities, namely their liquidity and "absolute security of
nominal return" as they directly contribute to investorsutility. This af-
fects prices of Treasuries and hence, drives down their yields compared to
assets that do not to the same extent share these features.
In the present chapter2 I investigate whether investors value liquidity
only as a U.S. Treasury-specic feature, or whether investors value liquidity
independently from the underlying asset. In particular, I ask whether there
is evidence for a systematic pattern in investorsvaluation for liquid assets
which reects the distinct degree to which that feature is prevalent. Empir-
ical evidence for such a pattern being priced within the corporate-Treasury
yield spread would point to the existence of a demand function for liquidity.
Further, I check for robustness of the results presented by KVJ. For this
purpose I modify a standard asset pricing model to allow for holdings of
a certain group of liquid assets to directly contribute to investorsutility.
Theoretical implications of that asset pricing model are then tested by em-
ploying regression analysis. Specically, I compare the e¤ects of changes in
the aggregate holdings of assets which di¤er in their respective degree of
perceived liquidity on alternative yield spread measures, while controlling
for commonly employed measures for default risk and assetsmarket liquid-
ity. Note that the study presented in this chapter is an extension of the
approach by KVJ.
U.S. Treasuries are of high liquidity and are considered to be default-
free. From a theoretical point of view this should be reected in the interest
di¤erential between Treasuries and any other debt security with the same
maturity length. As pointed out by Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Mar-
tin (2001) the standard empirical approach to explain corporate-Treasury
bond yield spreads is to nd suitable controls proxying for spread deter-
minants which are implied by Asset Pricing Theorys Consumption Capital
Asset Pricing Model (CCAPM). Following Chen, Lesmond, and Wei (2007),
those determinants are generally denoted as credit risk factors. Specically,
they are the expected loss in case of default on a corporate bond and the
degree to which default states covary with the business cycle, commonly
named as "expected default loss" and investorsdemanded "risk premium"
(see Elton et al. (2001)). Furthermore, authors like Amihud, Mendelson,
and Pedersen (2005) and Acharya and Pedersen (2005) use controls which
proxy for securitieslevel of market liquidity.3 They argue that time-varying
2The chapter is based on Niestroj (2012).
3Following Amihud, Mendelson, and Pedersen (2005) market liquidity refers not only
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di¤erences in an assets degree of market liquidity contribute to make re-
turns, i.e. future expected payment streams, risky and therefore, induce an
additional "liquidity-risk premium". For example, in times when investors
would like to sell and the market liquidity of a corporate bond deteriorates,
risk averse investors will demand an additional premium for holding these
bonds, i.e. a market-liquidity induced risk premium. Chen, Lesmond, and
Wei (2007) show that measures which control for CCAPM-implied spread
determinants as well as for securitiesdegree of market liquidity can improve
the ability of credit spread regressions to explain observed levels and vari-
ability of yield spreads. However, explanatory power still remains relatively
low.4
KVJ nd for U.S. data a strong negative correlation between corporate-
Treasury bond yield spreads and the government Debt-to-GDP ratio (i.e.
the ratio of the market value of publicly held U.S. government debt to U.S.
GDP) over the period from 1926 to 2008. They argue that this reects an
investorsvaluation for certain features of U.S. Treasury securities, i.e. a
high degree of liquidity and a high degree of perceived safety. This val-
uation by the investors is further found to be priced separately from the
commonly analyzed spread determinants, such as credit risk and assets
market liquidity. As theoretical rationale for the observed behavior KVJ
assume that the holder of a U.S. Treasury security obtains some services
and gains to the subjective level of well-being.5 Those benets are summa-
rized as "convenience yield" which directly contribute to investorsutility
and lead Treasuries to have signicantly lower yields than they otherwise
would have in a standard asset-pricing framework. The strong negative
correlation they nd, therefore reects a Treasury demand curve, or more
specically an investorsdemand for a certain feature of Treasuries. If the
supply of Treasuries is low, the value that investors assign to the services
o¤ered by Treasuries is high. As a result the yields on Treasuries are low
relative to the yields on corporate bonds. The opposite applies when the
to the ease of trading an asset but also to an assets ability to be sold without having
to accept a considerably large drop in the price or value. Therefore, in empirical studies
bid-ask spreads are the commonly employed measures for an assets degree of market
liquidity.
4For an overview of regressions including standard controls see Collin-Dufresne, Gold-
stein, and Martin (2001).
5The assumption of an assets feature providing specic services which are valued
by investors is reminiscent of the money-in-the-utility-function model. For a complete
elaboration of the rationale for investorsvaluation for liquidity see KVJ.
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supply of Treasuries is high.
In this chapter I test the hypothesis whether only U.S. Treasury-specic
liquidity services are valued by investors, or whether investors have a gen-
eral valuation for liquidity services which is independent from the underly-
ing asset. The latter would point to the existence of a demand function for
liquidity. For this purpose, I extend the asset pricing model developed by
KVJ. Specically, I employ a representative investors utility function where
not only Treasury holdings contribute directly to utility but also money bal-
ances as well as corporate debt security holdings. In particular, by following
Poterba and Rotemberg (1986), utility is assumed to be a function of con-
sumption and liquidity services which depend on the level of holdings of
the assets under consideration. I analyze the modied asset pricing models
implications with regard to the e¤ects of changes in the holdings of liquidity
services providing assets on corporate-Treasury yield spreads. These impli-
cations are empirically tested by employing regression analysis. In addition
to evaluating the e¤ects of factors which should implied by the model drive
corporate-Treasury yield spreads, the study presented in this chapter is also
intended to conduct an exploratory analysis. This is done by regressing
bond spreads on measures that capture the investors perceived market-
liquidity risk of corporate debt securities relative to U.S. Treasuries, and
so called "ight-to-liquidity" episodes, where I follow Pueger and Viceira
(2012) and Longsta¤ (2004).
I nd a signicant negative association between changes in measures
for aggregate money balances and near money holdings, measures for U.S.
Treasury holdings, as well as measures for the holdings of corporate debt
securities and corporate-U.S. Treasury yield spreads. Results indicate that
yield spreads react the stronger, the higher the respective measures degree
of liquidity. Further, I nd that this observation is robust across di¤erent
model specications including common measures for credit risk and assets
market-liquidity risk. Results imply that there is a systematic pattern in
investorsvaluation for liquidity services which points to the existence of a
demand curve for liquidity.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 de-
scribes the model set-up and derives yield spread regression models. Section
2.3 provides results for empirical tests of model-implied hypotheses. Section
2.4 o¤ers concluding remarks.
9
2.2 Theoretical framework
Testable corporate-Treasury yield spread regression models are derived from
a theoretical framework which extends the standard asset pricing model by
the concept of convenience yields. This approach is proposed by KVJ which
is based on a the notion of a money-in-the-utility preference specication.
Specically, it is assumed that convenience yields as a function of Treasuries
and some broad measures for the economys wealth enter the utility function
as a separate argument. I extend the asset-pricing model derived by KVJ by
allowing for holdings of money, Treasuries and corporate debt securities to
contribute to households utility.6 In a next step a theoretical asset-pricing
model is derived from the households optimization problem.
2.2.1 Utility function
Under the assumption that investors value liquidity services a representative
agents utility function, fullling the Inada conditions, is of the form:
ut=u (ct;  (t; Xt; t)) ;
with t=(mt;bt; st) :
The argument ct is the agents consumption at date t and  () denotes
the agents gained convenience yield which is a function of a set of macro-
economic factors, denoted as Xt, and (), a jet unspecied aggregator
function of the real holdings of money mt, Treasuries bt, and corporate
debt securities st. The term t is a preference shock which is intended to
capture level-e¤ects on the utility derived from asset holdings during times
when exogenous shocks like a nancial crisis, temporarily changes investors
valuation for liquidity services.7
Following KVJ the convenience yield function  () is assumed to capture
unique services provided by liquid assets and a set macroeconomic factors
6This idea is based on Poterba and Rotemberg (1986) who use a utility function
where so called liquidity services directly contribute to households utility. The functions
argument "liquidity services" is assumed to be a CES aggregate of demand deposits plus
currency, short term savings deposits, and Treasury bill holdings.
7Longsta¤(2004) nds evidence for what he calls ight to liquidity/qualitypremium
episodes by examining the spread between government agency bonds and U.S. Treasury
bonds. In a ight to liquidity episode market participants suddenly prefer highly liquid
securities, such as Treasuries, rather than less liquid securities.
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which are valued by investors, where  () is concave with  0 () > 0; and

00
() < 0. For the purposes of the study presented in this chapter I follow
KVJ by assuming that Xt is mainly driven by the U.S. Gross Domestic
Product (GDP). Further,  () shall be homogeneous of degree one in GDPt
and t. Hence,  () can be transformed in the following manner:
 (t; GDPt; t)  

t
GDPt
; t

GDPt:
For simplicity, I further assume that for the unknown liquidity services
aggregator function ():
t
GDPt
= 

mt
GDPt
;
bt
GDPt
;
st
GDPt

:
The liquidity services function is concave as well, as I assume that ()
is increasing in t
GDPt
, with t = fmt;bt; stg, but the marginal benet from
holding another unit of liquid assets is decreasing in t
GDPt
. This captures
the idea that holding more liquidity services providing assets reduces the
marginal value of an extra unit of such assets. Further,  () shall have
the property of lim t
GDPt
!1 
0

t
GDPt
; t

= 0. Hence, the marginal value
of a unit of t
GDPt
approaches zero if the agent is holding a large amount
of liquidity services providing assets. Moreover, under the hypothesis that
investors value liquidity, holding one more unit of an asset that is more
liquid compared to another asset should c.p. generate more utility than
holding one more unit of the latter, therefore
@()
@mt
>
@()
@bt
>
@()
@st
:
KVJ point out that Treasuries with a high maturity length carry a higher
interest rate risk and default risk compared to Treasuries with a short ma-
turity length. Further, one could argue that Treasury bonds are less liquid
than Treasury bills which is the reason for the interest rate on the latter
to carry a liquidity premium. Therefore, the investorsperceived benet in
terms of utility from holding "short-term" Treasuries might di¤er from the
benet of holding "long-term" Treasury bonds. Hence, the marginal liquid-
ity services of holding an additional unit of Treasury bonds will di¤er from
the additional liquidity services of holding an additional unit of Treasury
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bills. This should be reected in the true but unspecied parameteriza-
tions of  (), and (). However, for the study presented in this chapter
it is su¢ cient to use this general specication to motivate the empirical
analysis.
2.2.2 Households problem
A representative household is assumed to maximize the expected sum of a
discounted stream of utilities
E0
1X
t=0
tu (ct;  ( (mt;bt; st) ; GDPt; t)) ; (2.1)
subject to the budget constraint
Ptct + P
M
t mt + P
T
t bt + P
S
t st
Ptyt + PMt mt 1 + P Tt bt 1 + P St st 1 (1  t) ; (2.2)
where E0 is the expectation operator conditional on the information set in
the initial period and  2 (0; 1), is the subjective discount factor. The
household earns a real endowment income yt and can carry wealth into the
next period by investing into nominal holdings of money PMt mt, Treasuries
P Tt bt; and corporate debt securities P
S
t st. Assume for simplicity that the
agent buys zero coupon discount bonds which pay out one unit of currency
when being held to maturity.8 The aggregate price level at date t is denoted
by Pt. The nominal prices for one-period investments into money balances,
Treasuries, and corporate debt securities are PMt , P
T
t , and P
S
t . Note that for
the price of one unit ofmt it should hold that PMt = 1, which is one nominal
unit of currency. An investment increases real holdings of convenience assets
t by 
0
() P t
Pt
, where P t = fPMt ; P Tt ; P St g. For a corporate debt security
with face value of one the expected repayment is (1  t) where t is the
expected default rate, which is t = 0; in the absence of default and t > 0;
if there is default on the bond.
Maximizing the objective function (2.1) subject to the budget constraint
(2.2) leads for given initial values and non-negativity constraints for mt,
8Derivation of pricing expressions takes place for zero-coupon Treasury bonds and
corporate bonds. In the empirical part coupon bonds are examined. However, KVJ argue
that the impact of Treasury supply on coupon bond spreads is qualitatively similar to
the e¤ect on zero-coupon bond spreads.
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bt, and st, to the following rst order conditions for consumption ct, and
investments into money balances mt, Treasuries bt, and corporate bonds st:
u0 (ct;  ()) = t; (2.3)
t
1
Pt
= u0 (ct;  ())  0

t
GDPt
; t

@()
@mt
1
Pt
+ Et

t+1
1
Pt+1

; (2.4)
t
P Tt
Pt
= u0 (ct;  ())  0

t
GDPt
; t

@()
@bt
P Tt
Pt
+ Et

t+1
P Tt+1
Pt+1

; (2.5)
t
P St
Pt
=u0 (ct;  ())  0

t
GDPt
; t

@()
@st
P St
Pt
+Et

t+1
P St+1
Pt+1
(1  t+1)

; (2.6)
and (2.2) holding with equality, and the transversality conditions
limj!1 
jEt
 
t+jP
M
t+jmt+j

= 0, limj!1 
jEt
 
t+jP
T
t+jbt+j

= 0, and
limj!1 
jEt
 
t+jP
S
t+jst+j

= 0. Dene the stochastic discount factor for
nominal payo¤s as Mt+1 = 
u0(ct+1;())
u0(ct;())
Pt
Pt+1
; so that, similar to KVJ, equa-
tions (2.4) - (2.6) can be expressed as
PMt = 1 =
Et [Mt+1]
1   0 (t=GDPt; t) @()@mt
; (2.7)
P Tt =
Et

Mt+1P
T
t+1

1   0 (t=GDPt; t) @()@bt
; (2.8)
P St =
Et

Mt+1P
S
t+1 (1  t+1)

1   0 (t=GDPt; t) @()@st
: (2.9)
Equations (2.7) - (2.9) require that under the assumption of liquidity ser-
vices being an argument of the investors utility function, increasing the
amount of liquidity services providing assets held, will decrease their prices
PMt , P
T
t and P
S
t . Specically, increasing the holdings of liquidity services
providing assets will lower the investors willingness to pay for another unit
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of such assets. This is basically due to the assumption of  () and ()
being concave functions of mt, bt, and st. Further note, that by assuming
@()
@mt
> @()
@bt
> @()
@st
, increasing the amount of mt held should decrease
liquidity services providing assetsprices PMt , P
T
t , and P
S
t stronger than
increasing the amounts of bt and st held. As a unit of money balances is
assumed to provide more liquidity services than a unit of Treasuries or cor-
porate debt securities, increasing the holdings of money lowers the investors
willingness to pay for another unit of liquidity services to a stronger extent,
than increasing the holdings of Treasuries and corporate debt securities by
the same amount. The same reasoning analogously holds for increasing the
amount of bt compared to increasing st. Therefore, one can interpret 0 ()
as a demand function for a certain feature of assets, namely their degree
of liquidity. Further, the model implies that PMt = 1 > P
T
t > P
S
t , if c.p.
holdings of mt, bt, and st are of the same size. Actually one would expect to
nd exactly this pattern for the assetsprices for most of the observations
within the time period under consideration.
2.2.3 Corporate-Treasury yield spread model
In the following section the asset pricing model which was derived under
the assumption that liquidity services are valued by investors is employed
to explain spreads between the yields of corporate debt securities and U.S.
Treasuries. This is done along the lines of KVJ. The goal is to obtain
a model of spread determinants which can be empirically tested for its
ability to explain observed corporate-U.S. Treasury yield spreads by using
regression analysis.
Following KVJ and Elton et al. (2001)9 the  -period yields for U.S. Trea-
sury debt securities iTt; , and for corporate debt securities i
S
t; are computed
by:
iTt; =  
1

lnP Tt , and i
S
t =  
1

lnP St ;
where  is the number of periods to maturity. By this, the price of a zero
coupon bond is converted into a continuously compounded zero coupon
9This is a simplied version of Du¢ e and Singleton (1999). Specically, I neglect the
"recovery of market value" in case of default. Therefore, I do not account for losses in
case of default as a fractional reduction of the bonds market value. Further, KVJ point
out that the method of Du¢ e and Singleton (1999) reects the standard approach in the
corporate bond pricing literature.
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bond yield. Therefore, for discount bonds with P T = P
S
 = 1, the corporate-
Treasury yield spread for securities with any number of periods to maturity
 , can be expressed as:
iSt;   iTt; =
1

 
lnP Tt   lnP St

:
Now plug in (2.8) for P Tt , and (2.9) for P
S
t
=
1

 
ln
 
Et [Mt+ ]
1   0 () @()
@bt
!
  ln
 
Et [Mt+ (1  t+ )]
1   0 () @()
@st
!!
 1


Et [Mt+ ] + 
0 () @()
@bt
  Et [Mt+ (1  t+ )]   0 () @()
@st

:
This approximation uses that ln (1 + x)  x, for small x. This approxima-
tion is regarded as su¢ ciently accurate to describe the corporate-Treasury
yield spread model. Dene the corporate-Treasury yield spread as it; =
iSt;   iTt; , and rearrange
it; =
1

Et [Mt+ ]Et [t+ ] +
1

covt (Mt+ ; t+ )
+
1

 0

t
GDPt
; t

@()
@bt
  @()
@st

: (2.10)
As Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) point out, most em-
pirical studies on determinants of corporate-Treasury bond yield spreads
seek to nd suitable proxies for the rst two terms on the right hand side
of equation (2.10). These models are generally derived from the standard
approach of the Asset Pricing Theorys CCAPM. The rst and the second
term on the right hand side of (2.10) account for the factors that should
implied by the CCAPM model drive corporate-Treasury yield spreads. The
rst term on the right-hand side of (2.10) reects the expected losses in case
of default on commercial papers and corporate bonds. The common label
for this expression is "expected default losses". A higher expected proba-
bility of default in the business sector, leads investors to demand a higher
premium and discount on prices resp. for corporate debt securities, and
hence to a higher yield spread relative to Treasuries. The second term on
the right-hand side reects the so called "risk premium" which is related to
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variation in default probabilities. This premium investors demand, reects
in how far expected default rates covary with expected levels of the agents
marginal utility of consumption. The third term on the right hand side of
(2.10) appears due to the modication of the standard asset pricing model
by the assumption of investors to value assetsliquidity services. This term,
which captures the marginal utility of holding another unit of money mt,
Treasuries bt, and corporate bonds st; is a spread determinant which is not
implied by the CCAPM. Due to the assumption that an additional unit of
mt o¤ers more liquidity services than holding an additional unit of bt and
st, and that an additional unit of bt o¤ers more liquidity services than st,
increasing the investorsholdings of mt, bt, and st should decrease bond
yield spreads with the ordering of marginal impacts by@it ()@mt
 > @it ()@bt
 > @it ()@st
 :
For this model I assume that the shock parameter t captures so called
"ight-to-liquidity" episodes and a securitiesmarket-liquidity related risk
premium. The term "ight-to-liquidity" was coined by Longsta¤ (2004)
who denes this as an episode where one can observe on the markets, that
some participants suddenly prefer to hold highly liquid securities, such as
U.S. Treasuries rather than less liquid securities like corporate bonds and
commercial papers. Therefore, in a ight-to-liquidity episode, investors will
have an increased willingness to pay for another unit of bt which will drive
up Treasury prices and in turn decrease their yields and hence, decrease
spreads relative to yields on corporate debt securities. Following Amihud,
Mendelson, and Pedersen (2005) time-varying changes in an assets mar-
ket liquidity, like an increase of the time span of a transaction, as well
as increasing bid-ask-spreads, contribute to make future expected payment
streams risky. This is denoted as "liquidity risk" which would lead to a
market-liquidity induced risk premium. For example, in times when in-
vestors would like to sell and the market liquidity of a corporate bond
deteriorates, risk averse investors will demand a liquidity-risk premium for
holding these bonds. Flight-to-liquidity episodes and market-liquidity re-
lated risk premia can therefore be interpreted as temporary shocks a¤ecting
investorsmarginal convenience yields  0 ().
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2.2.4 Estimation strategy
The empirical part of this chapter follows the lines of KVJ by estimating
regression models derived from equation (2.10). This is done by using Or-
dinary Least Squares (OLS).10 As pointed out by Longsta¤, Mithal, and
Neis (2005), empirical studies relying on regression models derived from the
standard CCAPM approach nd an unexplained share, the so called "non-
default" component, within corporate-U.S. Treasury yield spreads. The
purpose of this analysis is to investigate whether the third term on the
right-hand side of equation (2.10), can explain the observed nondefault com-
ponent. Further, the present analysis poses a test of the hypothesis that
liquidity services, which are assumed to be provided by a certain group of
assets, are valued by investors. Specically, I investigate whether investors
valuation for liquidity services is priced within corporate-U.S. Treasury yield
spreads while controlling for proxies of spread determinants which are com-
monly used in the literature. On the one hand, these measures are basically
intended to proxy for the spread determinants implied by the standard
CCAPM model. These are namely the risk premium and the premium
required to compensate for expected losses in case of default.11 On the
other hand, I employ proxies which have been used in recent studies to
capture market-liquidity related risk premia and ight-to-liquidity episodes
(see Pueger and Viceira (2012) and Longsta¤ (2004)).12 This is done for
di¤erent yield spread measures as dependent variables, namely for a spread
between yields on corporate debt securities and Treasuries with short ma-
turities and a spread between yields of such securities with long maturities.
In the following, I will refer to the former as the short-term spread and to
the latter as the long-term spread.
The rst part of the empirical analysis employs regression models based
on the following specication:
is;lt = + 1 log

t
GDPt

+ 2V olat + 3Slopet + "t: (2.11)
10OLS estimations are the common approach to analyze determinants of credit spreads
in the empirical nance literature. See e.g. Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin
(2001), Chen, Lesmond, and Wei (2007), Eom, Helwege, and Huang (2004), Longsta¤
(2004), Longsta¤, Mithal, and Neis (2005).
11For the choice of proxies for the risk premium and the expected default losses I follow
KVJ and the survey of Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001).
12Note that due to data availability for these proxies the empirical study has to be
divided into two parts.
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Following KVJ the regression model (2.11) is estimated for a long-term
spread and a short-term spread as dependent variables. The dependent vari-
able is;lt in each of the corporate-Treasury spread regressions, is a monthly
yield spread measured in percentage points and "t denotes an error term.13
The long-term spreadilt is the di¤erence between an index number on Aaa-
rated long maturity corporate bond yields and an index on long maturity
Treasury yields. The short-term spread ist is the spread between a com-
mercial paper yield index and a Treasury bills yield index. The third term
on the right hand side of (2.10) is for the regression model (2.11) captured
by the log of (t=GDPt), with t = fmt;bt; stg. The variable mt=GDPt is
proxied by the empirical measure for the holdings of money balances, which
is the monetary base aggregate, scaled by U.S. GDP. The respective proxy
is denoted as (MBt=GDPt). Following KVJ the variable bt=GDPt is proxied
by the face value of the outstanding stock of U.S. Treasuries, which is scaled
by U.S. GDP, and is named as Debtt=GDPt. The face value of corporate
bonds and commercial papers outstanding, scaled by U.S. GDP, is the proxy
for st=GDPt. It is denoted as (CDt=GDPt). Following KVJ a log functional
form is used because it provides a good t and requires estimation of only
one parameter.14 Further, the interpretation of a regression coe¢ cient for
a log independent variable, which is expressed as a share, on a dependent
variable denoted in percentage points is more convenient.
To control for the premium associated with the expected default losses,
which is captured by the rst term on the right-hand side of (2.10), I fol-
low KVJ and use a measure for stock return volatility, named V ola. The
volatility measure for a given month is computed as the standard devia-
tion of weekly log returns on the value-weighted S&P 500 index up to the
end of a month. Then, this is multiplied by the square root of 4 to derive
the standard deviations on a monthly basis. The proxy V ola is commonly
used in the corporate nance literature as a measure for aggregate expected
default losses as Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) point out.
An increased stock market volatility is generally regarded as implying an in-
creasing probability of defaults in the economys private rms sector. Hence,
investors will demand a higher premium for holding corporate debt securi-
ties. Therefore, one can expect corporate-Treasury yield spreads to increase
with V ola:
13See Appendix A.1 for data description.
14For quarterly and monthly time series data the Debt-to-GDP ratio is non-stationary
but the log of the variable is stationary.
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To proxy for the risk premium, which is captured by the second term
on the right-hand side of (2.10), I follow KVJ by employing the slope of the
yield curve. The proxy Slope is measured as the spread between the 10-
year Treasury yield and the 3-month Treasury yield. As Collin-Dufresne,
Goldstein, and Martin (2001) point out, the slope of the yield curve is
regarded as a measure for the state of the business cycle. KVJ assert that
the slope of the yield curve is known to predict the excess returns on stocks
and captures time-varying risk premia on corporate bonds. For example,
if investors are more risk averse in a recession, when Slope is high, they
will demand a higher risk premium for holding corporate bonds. Thus, the
slope of the yield curve serves as a measure for the variation in the risk
premium component of the bond spread, i.e. the term involving covt () in
(2.10). Further, KVJ note that to the extent that corporate default risk is
likely to vary with the business cycle, the Slope variable can furthermore
contribute to control for the default risk in the yield spread.
By estimating (2.11) for the two regression model specications the
study presented in this chapter is intended to test the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 The yield spread model (2.10) requires that an increase in
the proxies for the holdings of liquidity services providing assets,MBt=GDPt,
Debtt=GDPt, and CDt=GDPt decreases the observed spread measures.
Hence, the regression results would provide support in favour of the yield
spread model (2.10) if point estimates for the coe¢ cients would imply that
1 < 0.
A priori, one can assume that the three groups of assets under considera-
tion can be ordered by their postulated degree of liquidity services provision
in the following manner:
MBt=GDPt most liquid
Debtt=GDPt
CDt=GDPt least liquid
Hypothesis 2 Further, the yield spread model (2.10) implies that c.p.
increasing the proxy for the holdings of the most liquid asset will decrease
spreads to a larger extent than increasing the proxy for the holdings of the
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least liquid asset. Therefore, empirical evidence in favour of the yield spread
model (2.10) would require j1mj > j1bj > j1sj.
Testing both hypotheses is done by estimating whether changes in the
aggregate holdings of assets that are presumed to bear less or more liquidity
services than Treasuries will drive spreads in the predicted way. Therefore, I
test whether an increase in the holdings of assets that are more (less) liquid
than Treasuries reduces observed spreads to a stronger (weaker) extent than
an increase in the holdings of Treasuries.
The second part of the empirical analysis employs regression models
based on the following specication:
is;lt =+ 1 log

t
GDPt

+ 2V olat + 3Slopet
+4ASWt + 5Agencyt + "t: (2.12)
Longsta¤ (2004) provides evidence for a "ight-to-liquidity" premium in the
prices for U.S. Treasuries. This is captured by the spread between yields of
bonds issued by Resolution Funding Corporation (Refcorp), a U.S. govern-
ment agency which is guaranteed by the Treasury, and U.S. Treasury bonds.
By full repayment being guaranteed, Refcorp bonds therefore have literally
the same default risk as Treasuries. Since Treasuries are more liquid and
more popular than Refcorp bonds, a widening (deterioration) of this yield
spread reects investorspreference to hold more (less) highly liquid assets.
The reason behind such changes in preferences lies in changing conditions
of nancial markets, e.g. nancial market turmoil would suddenly increase
investorspreference for highly liquid assets. Therefore, I use the spread
between Refcorp bond yields and U.S. Treasury bond yields to control for
ight-to-liquidity episodes. This variable is named Agency.
To proxy for market-liquidity related risk premia I follow Pueger and
Viceira (2012) by employing the di¤erence between asset-swap spreads (ASW )
for corporate debt securities and Treasury securities. Consider an investor
owning a bond and entering into an an asset swap contract. The payer
of the bond cash ows can hedge by holding the bond and nancing the
position on the short term debt market. Hence, the asset-swap spread re-
ects the current and expected nancing costs of holding the long bond
position. Therefore, the di¤erence between the asset-swap spreads for cor-
porate bonds, and commercial papers resp., and Treasuries, is a measure for
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the relative cost of nancing a long position in the corporate debt securities
market versus nancing a long position in the Treasuries market. A widen-
ing of this di¤erence indicates a decreasing relative liquidity of corporate
debt securities. Hence, an increase in ASW should have a positive impact
on corporate-Treasury yield spreads.
Inclusion of those two proxies to the estimation model is actually not
backed by the theoretical yield spread model (2.10). Both covariates are
intended to measure an assets degree of market liquidity. Therefore, they
are in a certain way di¤erent from the proxies for the holdings of liquidity
services providing assets which are derived within the present asset pric-
ing model setting. The purpose of including those two new controls into
the regression model is to investigate whether estimations are robust across
the specications (2.11) and (2.12) with regard to the coe¢ cients on the
measures for the holdings of liquidity services providing assets. If Hypoth-
esis 1 and Hypothesis 2 are not rejected for estimation model (2.12) this
would provide further support in favour of the modied asset pricing model
which assumes investors to value liquidity services. Hence, the following
hypothesis can be derived:
Hypothesis 3 Adding proxies to the estimation model which control for
securitiesmarket-liquidity risk and ight-to-liquidity premia (ASW,Agency),
will not change the model-implied restrictions on the estimated coe¢ cients
and their required ordering: 1 < 0 and j1mj > j1bj > j1sj.
To retain comparability of empirical results, the same data as in KVJ
are used for construction of model variables.15 Di¤erently from KVJ, for
the study presented in this chapter I use data at a monthly frequency. In-
creasing the number of observations within the data set will make regression
results more precise and more sound. Further, the use of monthly data is
expected to lead to a stronger emphasis of coe¢ cients measuring market
volatility. Therefore, if the estimated impact of the U.S. Debt-to-GDP ra-
tio on corporate-Treasury yield spreads is robust across annual and monthly
data, this would pose evidence in favor of the present approach to modify
the standard asset pricing model. Further to note is that short-term and
long-term spreads might not be in the same way a¤ected by changes of
the proxies described above. Hence, estimated coe¢ cients on the logs of
15Except for MBt=GDPt; CDt=GDPt Agency; and ASW as those proxies do not
appear in KVJ.
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(t=GDPt) might di¤er between the regressions with ist and i
l
t as depen-
dent variables. Note that short-term and long-term spreads can be regarded
as di¤erent price measures. This reects a distinct investorsvaluation for
the spread determinants with regard to the respective long-term and short-
term assets to be priced. Therefore, di¤erent estimated coe¢ cients on the
logs of (t=GDPt) for short-term and long-term spreads, point to the ex-
istence of a di¤erently priced value of short-term and long-term liquidity
services. Note that the present asset pricing model still leaves open the
possibility for such a specication of  () and ().
2.3 Empirical results
Since data on the securitiesmarket-liquidity related risk measure ASW and
on the measure for ight-to-liquidity episodes Agency are only available
from 1987 onwards, the empirical results are split into two parts: In the
rst part the standard CCAPM implied credit spread regression model is
augmented by the measures for the holdings of liquidity services providing
assets. The dependent variables are long-term and short-term bond yield
spreads. For that estimation monthly time series data are employed ranging
from April 1971 to September 2008. This data sample is chosen for the
estimation as it covers a period with a presumably constant pattern in
investors tastes and as it leaves out the recent nancial market turmoil. In
the second part of the empirical study the covariates ASW and Agency are
included where only a short-term yield spread is the dependent variable.16
To derive monthly GDP data I used a cubic spline interpolation on the time
series of quarterly U.S. GDP.
Further note that for Tables 2.1-2.4 report t-statistics with adjusted
standard errors, after nding an AR(1), AR(2), and AR(3) error structures
in most regressions. Following KVJ the AR(n) structure is motivated by a
standard Box-Jenkins analysis of the autocorrelation function and partial
autocorrelation function of the error terms. The rst-order AR coe¢ cients
for each estimation are presented in the respective tables. Serial correlation
is especially pronounced in the long-term spread regressions. I use the
Newey-West estimator to correct the t-statistics and standard errors for
autocorrelation in the error terms.
16The covariates Agency and ASW are expected to capture e¤ects which only a¤ect
asset prices in the short-run. In fact, regression results do not show a signicant impact
on long-term spreads.
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2.3.1 Impact of liquid asset supply changes on price measures
Table 2.1 presents results for estimating (2.11) with the long-term spread
and the short-term spread being regressed on the measure for Treasury
holdings, log (Debtt=GDPt), the measure for expected default losses, V ola,
and the proxy for the risk premium, Slope. A constant term is included
as well. This estimation model basically reproduces KVJ. However, the
study presented in this chapter uses monthly data. Panel A summarizes the
coe¢ cient estimates for the long-term spread as dependent variable, which is
in this case the spread between the yields on Aaa-rated corporate bonds and
the yields on U.S. Treasury bonds. The mean value of the Aaa-Treasuries
spread is at 96 basis points (bp) for the period from April 1971 to September
2008. The coe¢ cient of  0:784 on the log (Debtt=GDPt) variable implies
that a decrease of one standard deviation in the Debt-to-GDP ratio, from its
mean value of 0:498 to 0:364, increases the Aaa-Treasury spread on average
by 25 bp. This is consistent with Hypothesis 1 and statistically signicant.
From the perspective of the asset pricing model (2.10) one would argue that
such a decrease in liquid asset holdings increases the investorsvaluation, or
willingness to pay resp. for liquidity services. Note that KVJ nd for the
same time period with annual data an average increase of 22 bp. Further,
V ola is found to be signicantly related to the spread. The magnitude of
the respective regression coe¢ cient 2 implies that expected default losses
are an important driver of long term bond spreads. While KVJ estimate for
a one standard deviation increase in their default risk measure an increase
of 10 bp in the Aaa-Treasuries spread, the present study nds an increase
by 13 bp and a regression coe¢ cient of 5:588.17 Though, evidence presented
in Panel A of Table 2.1 indicates that Slope does not exhibit a signicant
impact on the Aaa-Treasuries spread.
In Panel B of Table 2.1 results are shown for estimating the regression
model (2.11) with a short-term bond spread as dependent variable. This
spread is the di¤erence between the yields of highest rated commercial pa-
per and Treasury bills, both with 3-month maturity length. Changing hold-
ings of liquidity services providing assets might be priced di¤erently within
short-term and long-term spreads. Hence, it should not be expected to nd
estimated coe¢ cients on log (Debtt=GDPt) to be the same across the two
panels. Nonetheless, the e¤ect of changes in aggregate Treasury holdings
17For the sample of 1971-2008 this study nds a mean value of 0:035 and a standard
deviation of 0:023 for V olatility:
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on the short-term spread is estimated to be of fairly similar magnitude as
the e¤ect on long-term spreads. The mean value of the commercial paper-
Treasury bills spread is at 62 bp for the period from April 1971 to September
2008. A decrease of one standard deviation in the Debt-to-GDP ratio from
its mean, is found to increase the commercial paper-Treasury bills spread
an average by 22 bp. Compared to that KVJ estimate an average increase
of 23 bp. Further, this study nds evidence for a statistically signicant
impact of V ola on short-term spreads. An increase of V ola by one standard
deviation increases the respective spread by 13 bp. KVJ however, nd no
signicant e¤ect of their default risk measure on short-term spreads for an-
nual data within the period from 1969 to 2007. Panel B further shows that
the measure for the risk premium Slope exhibits a signicant but rather
small impact on the commercial paper-Treasury bills spread.18
The estimation results presented in Table 2.1 imply that Hypothesis 1
can be regarded as being not rejected. This poses evidence in favor of the
predictions made by the theoretical pricing model (2.10). Prior results by
KVJ are found to be conrmed. Increasing the number of observations,
by changing the data frequency from an annual basis to a monthly basis,
leads for the same sample period to similar results regarding the estimated
coe¢ cients on log (Debtt=GDPt), and V ola: Note that for monthly data
the nondefault component proxied by the Debt-to-GDP ratio, as well as
the default risk component proxied by stock market volatility, play a more
pronounced role compared to the respective measures estimated on annual
data.
Table 2.2 presents results for estimating (2.11) with the long-term spread
as the dependent variable. In the rst column estimated coe¢ cients for the
regression of the AAA-Treasury yield spread on log (CDt=GDPt), V ola and
Slope are shown. In the second column estimation output is shown for the
regression model where the log (Debtt=GDPt) regressor replaces the proxy
for the holdings of corporate debt securities. Note that for reasons of com-
parability of results, here the same information as in Table 2.1, Panel A
is provided. Results presented in the third column refer to the estima-
tion where the proxy for money balances, log (MBt=GDPt), replaces the
18These regressions were also conducted for quarterly data but are not provided for
reasons of brevity. Results imply that a decrease in the Debt-to-GDP ratio by one
standard deviation increases the long term spread by 26 bp and the short-term spread
by 21 bp. An increase in V olatility by one standard deviation increases the long-term
spread by 14 bp and the short-term spread by 17 bp.
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former proxies. The corporate-Treasury yield spread model described in
Section 2.2 implies that under the hypothesis of liquidity services being a
priced attribute, estimated coe¢ cients would be in absolute terms ordered
by j1mj > j1bj > j1sj. This is basically outlined by Hypothesis 2.
In Table 2.2 the coe¢ cient on the proxy for the aggregate holdings of
corporate debt securities is estimated to be in absolute terms smaller than
the coe¢ cient on the proxy for the aggregate Treasuries holdings. This
result is in line with Hypothesis 2. The respective coe¢ cient implies an
increase of 7 bp in the Aaa-Treasuries yield spread due to a decrease of
the corporate debt-to-GDP ratio by one standard deviation from its mean
value. However, the coe¢ cient on log (MBt=GDPt) is found to be insignif-
icant while the regression model has a relatively low R2. Finding an in-
signicant coe¢ cient on the proxy for money balances does not seem to
support the model implication that changes in the holdings of assets that
should deliver more liquidity services than Treasuries will cause a stronger
impact on long-term bond spreads than changes in holdings of the latter.
However, Treasury bond holdings and corporate bond holdings are with
regard to their long runtime generally motivated by matching investors
long-term objectives. In contrast to that the investors decision regarding
holdings of money balances is a¤ected by short-term investment objectives.
Hence, for those two groups of assets there are di¤erent underlying invest-
ment motives. As pointed out by KVJ, assets do not only may provide
liquidity services to a di¤erent degree, there might also be a di¤erence be-
tween short-term and long-term liquidity services. Therefore, it should not
be surprising that the estimated e¤ect of changing money holdings on the
long-term spread is insignicant. Including a di¤erent measure for the most
liquid assets, namely the di¤erence of M3-M2 scaled by GDP, instead of
monetary base scaled by GDP, yields a regression coe¢ cient which is in line
with Hypothesis 2. Column 4 of Table 2.2 reports an estimated coe¢ cient
of  1:718 on the measure log ((M3t  M2t)=GDPt) which implies an aver-
age increase in the Aaa-Treasuries spread by 75 bp following a decrease in
the M3-M2-to-GDP ratio by one standard deviation from its mean value.19
Note that M3-M2 covers the positions of large time deposits, institutional
money market funds, repurchase agreements and other larger liquid assets.
Investors hold these highly liquid near money assets mostly for long-term
investments horizons. Hence, the insignicance of log (MBt=GDPt) seen
against the background of evidence presented in the fourth column of Ta-
19The last available observation on the M3 aggregate is January 2006.
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ble 2.2 points to a di¤erence between long-term and short-term liquidity
services. Further, this would imply the existence of market segmentation
for long-term and short-term liquidity services providing assets. All other
variables included in the regression models, but the four discussed hare,
provide roughly the same evidence as explained in the paragraph above.
Table 2.3 presents results for estimating (2.11) with the short-term
spread as the dependent variable. In Column 1 of Table 2.3 output is re-
ported for the regression of the short-term spread on the log (CDt=GDPt),
V olatility and Slope measures. In Column 2 the proxy for the aggregate
holdings of corporate debt securities is replaced by the proxy for the hold-
ings of Treasury debt, log (Debtt=GDPt), and in Column 3 by the proxy
for money balances, log (MBt=GDPt). Results presented in Table 2.3 are
in line with Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, and are statistically signi-
cant. Specically, it is found that j1mj > j1bj > j1sj. Expressed in
terms of basis points, coe¢ cients imply a 26 bp, 22 bp, and 5 bp increase of
the commercial paper-Treasury bills spread by decreasing of the respective
asset-to-GDP ratios by a one standard deviation from their means. Fur-
ther comparing the magnitudes of the coe¢ cients on the proxies for money
holdings in column 3 and 4 with the accordant results from Table 2.1, there
is further support for the implication of market segmentation and di¤er-
ently priced short-term and long-term liquidity services. Coe¢ cients on
log ((M3t  M2t)=GDPt) and log (MBt=GDPt) imply that changes in the
holdings of long-term near money assets do not cause such a strong impact
on short-term yields as changes in the base money measure. All other vari-
ables included here, again provide the same evidence as explained in the
paragraphs above.
Table 2.4 reports results for estimations of (2.12) which are including
the market-liquidity risk measure and the measure for ight-to-liquidity
episodes. The dependent variable here is only the short-term spread. The
data sample covers the period from April 1987 to September 2008. In Col-
umn 1 estimated coe¢ cients of the commercial paper-Treasury bills yield
spread regression on log (Debtt=GDPt), V ola, Slope and a constant are
shown. Column 2 reports results for an estimation where the covariates
Agency and ASW are added to the regression model. In the same manner,
regressions are estimated for specications of (2.11) and (2.12) that employ
log (CDt=GDPt) and log (MBt=GDPt) instead of log (Debtt=GDPt). Ac-
cordant results are summarized in Columns 3 and 4, and Columns 5 and
6.
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Comparison of estimated coe¢ cients on the proxies for money balances,
Treasury holdings and the holdings of corporate debt securities in columns
1, 3, and 5, indicates that the ordering of j1mj > j1bj > j1sj is preserved
for the shorter data sample. Including the liquidity-risk proxy ASW , and
the proxy for ight-to-liquidity episodes Agency, yields for all regression
models statistically signicant regression coe¢ cients 4, and 5, with the
expected signs. For the regression results reported in Column 2 of Table
2.4, where log (Debtt=GDPt) is included as a covariate, an increase of ASW
by one standard deviation from its mean of 0:441 to 0:644, increases the
short term yield spread on average by 22 bp. This conrms the view that
an investorsdemanded market-liquidity related risk premium is an impor-
tant driver of the commercial paper-Treasury bill spread. Further, if the
measure Agency increases by one standard deviation from its mean of 1:054
to 1:997, the short-term spread decreases by 20 bp, which provides evi-
dence for a ight-to-liquidity premium in the commercial paper-Treasury
bill spread. The corresponding estimated e¤ects implied by regression out-
put presented in the fourth column of Table 2.4 are 23 bp and 21 bp resp.,
and for the output depicted in Column 6 I calculate 20 bp and 15 bp resp.
Compared to the results shown in columns 1, 3, and 5, coe¢ cients of the
proxies for Treasury holdings, money balances and the holdings of corpo-
rate debt securities decrease sharply. The sizes of coe¢ cients now imply
that decreases of the respective measure by one standard deviation from its
mean value, increase spreads by only 3, 8, and 1 bp resp.20 This implies
that in regression models excluding measures for securitiesmarket-liquidity
risk and ight-to-liquidity episodes, the coe¢ cients on the proxies for liq-
uidity services providing assets capture sizeable information which should
actually be attributed to the former measures. However, seen against the
background of the commercial paper-Treasury bills spreads mean being at
46 bp for the period of April 1987 to September 2008, still priced liquid-
ity services can be regarded as a signicant driving force. In addition to
that, the model-implied ordering of estimated coe¢ cients is still preserved
with j1mj > j1bj > j1sj, while controlling for market-liquidity risk and
ight-to-liquidity episodes. Hence, one can regard Hypothesis 3 to be not
rejected. Further, R2 measures for all three regression models rise to val-
20For the time period April 1987 to September 2008 the mean of Debtt=GDPt is 0:603
with a standard deviation of 0:051: For the same period MB=GDP has a mean of 0:056
and a standard deviation of 0:005. The mean of CD=GDP is 0:225 and the standard
deviation is 0:031.
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ues of roughly 0:8, and Durbin-Watson statistics increase signicantly by
including market-liquidity risk measures and measures for ight-to-liquidity
episodes. This points to a better model t and a lager share of the spreads
variance being explained by the regression models. Therefore, one can ar-
gue that the study presented in this chapter yields a signicant contribu-
tion to explain the nondefault component which appears to be found within
corporate-Treasury yield spreads.
2.4 Conclusion
This chapter provides empirical evidence which is supporting the notion that
the nondefault component within the corporate-Treasury bond yield spread
is to a signicant extent driven by the investorsvaluation for liquid assets.
Estimation results imply that changes in the aggregate holdings of assets
that are presumed to bear less or more liquidity services than U.S. Trea-
suries will a¤ect corporate-Treasury yield spreads in the way predicted by an
asset pricing model which allows for holdings of liquid assets to contribute
to investorsutility. Specically, results imply that investors value liquidity
independently from the underlying asset. Finding this systematic pattern
points to the existence of a demand function for liquidity attributes. Several
regression model specications are estimated using di¤erent data samples
and datasets where results are found to be robust. Estimation results show
that investors price liquidity services separately from measures for credit
risk, market-liquidity related risk, and ight-to-liquidity episodes. More-
over, results imply market segmentation for long-term and short-term assets
as a di¤erence in the valuation for long-term and short-term liquidity ser-
vices points to the existence of di¤erent investment motives. Compared to
commonly employed corporate-Treasury bond yield spread regression mod-
els, the study presented in this chapter uses model specications which yield
a better empirical t and explain a lager share of the observed yield spreads
variation. Further, nding empirical evidence for liquidity services provision
being priced by investors poses a challenge to standard asset pricing theory
models.
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Chapter 3
An Empirical Study on
InvestorsPreferences for
Liquid Assets
3.1 Introduction
Recent empirical studies on determinants of corporate-U.S. Treasury bond
yield spreads nd that Investors value the liquidity of U.S. Treasury bonds.
At the same time U.S. Treasuriesdegree of liquidity, which might be per-
ceived as an inherent feature, or being driven by changing market conditions,
is found to be priced separately from commonly studied spread determinants
which are implied by the standard Asset Pricing Theorys Consumption
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CCAPM).21
A recent study by Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) (KVJ)
nds a signicant negative association between the aggregate supply of U.S.
Treasuries and corporate-U.S. Treasury bond yield spreads. They argue that
this reects a demand function for what they call U.S. Treasury-specic liq-
uidity services or "convenience yields". Therefore, the high level of liquidity
services o¤ered by Treasuries would drive down their yields compared to as-
sets that do not to the same extent share this feature. Further, when the
supply of Treasuries is low, the value that investors assign to the liquidity
21see Longsta¤ (2004), Longsta¤, Mithal, and Neis (2005), Amihud, Mendelson, and
Pedersen (2005), Acharya and Pedersen (2005), Chen, Lesmond, and Wei (2007), Pueger
and Viceira (2012).
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services o¤ered by Treasuries is high, implying increasing (decreasing) Trea-
sury prices (yields) and in turn, increasing corporate-Treasury bond yield
spreads. The same argument applies in the opposite direction when the
supply of treasuries is high. Moreover, Niestroj (2012) (NIE) nds evidence
that the notion of priced liquidity services is not only U.S. Treasury-specic.
In particular, it is shown that investors value liquidity services which can
be provided by a variety of assets - while each asset might be featuring this
attribute to a di¤erent degree. This does not only support the view that
investors in general value the attribute of liquidity services provision when
pricing assets, but also this points to the existence of a demand function for
liquidity.
However, both approaches derive asset pricing models under the ad
hoc assumption that asset holdings directly contribute to investors util-
ity. Specically, liquidity services are derived via an unknown aggregator
function which is a separate argument of investors utility. Neither ap-
proach provides a complete specication of the underlying preference and
aggregator functions but denes a set of requirements to them.
This chapter seeks to ll this gap by providing a complete specication
and parameterization of a representative agents utility function which can
rationalize the investorsbehavior observed by KVJ and NIE. For that pur-
pose in this chapter I rst use nonparametric testing routines to examine
whether a preference maximization model cannot be rejected where liquidity
services directly contribute to investors utility. Specically, I check Varians
(1982) necessary and su¢ cient revealed preference conditions for monthly
data on consumption, money holdings, Treasury holdings and prices, and
on corporate debt securities holdings and prices. Consistency of the data
with these conditions means non-rejection of the hypothesis that investors
are maximizing a utility function which is nonsatiated, continuos, concave
and monotonic.22 Further, I test whether the data satisfy necessary and
su¢ cient revealed preference conditions for weak separability between sev-
eral groupings of the liquidity services providing assets and consumption.
This is done by applying the procedure proposed by Fleissig and Whitney
(2003). The reason for employing this second nonparametric test is that
KVJ and NIE implicitly assume weak separability for their analyses. As
22The data used for the present analysis are basically the same as in KVJ and NIE,
while it is assumed that money, Treasuries, and corporate debt securities are providing
liquidity services. The reason for the choice of the data set lies in the intention of this
chapter to carry forward the analysis of the previous authors.
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pointed out by Swo¤ord and Whitney (1987) weak separability is a con-
venient feature as it keeps the subsequent theoretical analysis analytically
tractable and for the empirical part of the study, it reduces data require-
ments and conserves statistical degrees of freedom. If both hypotheses are
not rejected, the question for a suitable specication of the investors utility
function arises. As the nonparametric testing routines applied in this chap-
ter do not provide much guidance for that, Generalized Method of Moments
(GMM) is employed to estimate coe¢ cients of Euler equations which are
derived from the investors optimization problem under several proposed
utility specications. This further poses an indirect test of the asset pricing
models employed by KVJ and NIE. This is due to the fact that only a subset
of the proposed utility function specications meets the requirements which
are imposed on investorsdemand behavior by their modied asset pricing
model.
This chapter provides evidence from the nonparametric testing routines
that necessary and su¢ cient conditions for utility maximization and weak
separability are obtained for the dataset. However, results from GMM esti-
mations imply rejection of almost all proposed utility specications. Only
the model based on the specication proposed by Poterba and Rotemberg
(1986) is not rejected. Estimation results however, imply parameter values
which indicate misspecication.
Estimating parameters of utility functions which include consumption
and an aggregator function of near monies holdings, which is denoted as
"liquidity services", goes back to Poterba and Rotemberg (1986). The aim
of this study was to examine the impact of open market operations on short-
term interest rates. Analyzing the e¤ects of nonstandard monetary policy
operations such as large-scale asset purchase programs (LSAPs) has recently
become an active eld of macroeconomic research. These measures have
been introduced to provide liquidity in exchange for private sectorsassets.
From a theoretical perspective, it is generally expected that such nonstan-
dard open market operations in private assets do not exhibit an e¤ect on
real variables. In particular, as shown by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003),
this irrelevance result by Wallace (1981) applies to the canonical New Key-
nesian macroeconomic model approach. Hence, the model framework for
monetary policy analysis as summarized by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007) does not provide a suitable ap-
proach for the evaluation of the e¤ectiveness of this policy. Contributions
like Chen, Curdia, and Ferrero (2012), Gertler and Karadi (2013), Gertler
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and Kiyotaki (2010), and Del Negro et al. (2013) rely on investors het-
erogenous preferences and on nancial market frictions to make the relative
supply of liquid assets have an e¤ect on the equilibrium allocation. Sch-
abert and Reynard (2009), Schabert and Hörmann (2011), and Christo¤el
and Schabert (2013) assume for this purpose liquidity constraints and model
explicitly the central banks balance sheet policy options. Others like Kr-
ishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), Swanson (2011), and Peersman
(2011) employ econometric approaches by using event studies, and in the
last case, a VAR analysis.
So far, macroeconomic models that analyze the e¤ects of nonstandard
monetary policy measures do not rely on household preferences which ac-
count for assets liquidity services. In particular, such an approach would be
criticized as being ad hoc. The study presented in this chapter investigates
whether there is evidence in favor of such an approach by deriving a rst
proposal for a suitable utility function. This is done by providing a set of
microfoundations, starting with nonparametric hypothesis testing, and then
by moving on to parameter estimations.
Varians (1982) Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP) pro-
vides testable necessary and su¢ cient conditions for a nite number of
observations on consumer behavior to be consistent with the preference
maximization model. Varian (1982 and 1983) point out that the standard
approach is to postulate a possible parametric form for demand functions
and tting them to observed data, and then to test for the hypothesis under
consideration. In contrast to that, employing the test for GARP does not
require an ad hoc specication of functional forms and is therefore com-
pletely nonparametric. Specically, instead of testing the joint hypothesis
that demand behavior can be described by some parametric form and the
restriction one wants to test for, Varian (1982) provides a complete test of
the hypothesis in question alone. As further pointed out by Varian (1982
and 1983), this test relies on algebraic conditions on a nite body of data
to be consistent with the maximization hypothesis. These are denoted as
"revealed preference" conditions and provide a complete test on the restric-
tion imposed by maximizing behavior, in the sense that every maximizing
consumers demand behavior must satisfy these conditions, and that all
behavior that satises these conditions can be viewed as maximizing behav-
ior.23
23Note that revealed preference analysis was not only at the time of its introduction
a major contribution to the theory of consumer behavior but still is an active eld
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Under the assumption that assets are held for real nonpecuniary returns
from such attributes as their perceived liquidity, it is a convenient feature of
the utility function under consideration to be weakly separable in the argu-
ments of consumption and so called liquidity services which are derived from
liquid asset holdings. As pointed out by Swo¤ord andWhitney (1987), weak
separability implies two-staged budgeting. Households rst decide upon the
allocation of expenditures between consumption and asset holdings. In the
second stage Households allocate expenditures among the goods within each
subgroup based only on the relative prices of the goods in that group. Weak
separability has the necessary and su¢ cient condition that the marginal rate
of substitution (MRS) between any two goods within a group is independent
of the goods outside the group. Hence, for the determination of the util-
itys functional form it can be assumed that liquidity services are derived
by a jet unknown aggregator function of the liquid asset holdings, which
represents a separate argument of the utility function. To test for weak
separability I use the approach by Fleissig and Whitney (2003). Employing
this procedure comes with the advantage that in case of nonrejection of the
weak separability hypothesis one can easily revert to well known functional
forms for the aggregator like constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) and
Cobb-Douglas. If weak separability does not obtain, two stage budgeting
procedure is not an accurate description of consumer behavior. Moreover,
this would pose evidence against the asset pricing models proposed by KVJ
and NIE.
Swo¤ord and Whitney (1987) further point out, that the second stage
of the two-staged budgeting process is the focus of mainly microeconomists
examining how households allocate total consumption expenditure among
various categories of goods and services. In particular, this involves estimat-
ing parameters of demand functions and utility functions. Monetary econo-
mists like Barnett (1980), Feldstein and Stock (1996), and Drake and Mills
(2005) have used this approach to obtain estimates of elasticities of substi-
tution between narrow transaction balances and less liquid near monies in
attempts to clarify the appropriate denition for money balances. Nonpara-
metric tests to evaluate if groups of monetary assets are weakly separable
from other goods have been used, among others, by Barnett, Fisher, and
of research. E.g. see Blundell (2005), Blundell, Browning, and Crawford (2003), and
Andreoni and Miller (2002). The basic idea has been applied in a number of other areas
of economics. A recent application can be found in the eld of agricultural economics on
revealed preferences for organic and cloned milk. See Brooks and Lusk (2010).
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Serletis (1992), Belongia (1996), Swo¤ord and Whitney (1987, 1988), and
Drake and Chrystal (1994, 1997) while the construction of the monetary
aggregates is neglected.
With the revealed preference tests done the question for a suitable spec-
ication of the representative investors objective function arises. The ap-
proaches by KVJ and NIE impose several requirements to its unspecied
underlying utility function, whereas the nonparametric revealed preference
tests which are applied in this chapter provide support for a wide set of pos-
sible utility function specications. To nd the most suitable one, GMM
is employed which is frequently used to estimate and test asset pricing
models.24 In this chapter I estimate coe¢ cients of Euler equations which
are derived from the investorsoptimization problem under di¤erent utility
specications. In particular, I consider Cobb-Douglas and CES aggregator
functions for the liquidity services measure. The aggregator functions are
nested in utility functions with each displaying constant relative risk aver-
sion. As it can be shown, the investorsdemand behavior observed by KVJ
and NIE is consistent with the aggregator function to be CES, and the util-
itys arguments of consumption and liquidity services to be not additively
separable. Hence, this empirical analysis of di¤erent utility specications
can be regarded as an additional test of the models by KVJ and NIE.
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 describes the nonparametric
testing routines which are applied in the present chapter and the data.
Further, results from hypothesis testing are presented. Section 3.3 discusses
the representative agents utility maximization problem and derives Euler
equations under alternative specications of the investors utility function.
Results from GMM estimations are presented here as well. Section 3.4
concludes.
3.2 Nonparametric tests for utility maximization and
weak separability
3.2.1 Testing the maximization hypothesis
This analysis employs Varians (1982 and 1983) nonparametric approach
to demand analysis. Varian (1982) shows that observed demand behavior
can be rationalized by a nonsatiated, continuous, concave, monotonic utility
24For a theoretical treatment of this method see Hansen (1982). For recent empirical
studies employing GMM on asset pricing models see e.g. Stock and Wright (2003), Yogo
(2004), and Hall (2005).
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function if one of several equivalent conditions is met. The easiest one to
test is Varians (1982) GARP.25
To recover investorspreferences from a nite number of observations of
k-vectors of prices and quantities (pi; xi) ; i = 1; :::; n; with pi = (pi1; :::; p
i
k) ;
and xi = (xi1; :::; x
i
k) ; consider the following denitions:
Denition (1): A utility function rationalizes the data (pi; xi),
i = 1; :::; n; if u (xi)  u (x) ; for all x such that pixi  pix, for
i  1; :::; n.
Denition (2): An observation xi is directly revealed preferred to a
bundle x, written xiR0x, if pixi  pix. An observation xi is revealed
preferred to a bundle x, written xiRx, if there is some sequence of
bundles
 
xj; xk; :::; xl

such that xiR0xj; xjR0xk; :::; xlR0x. Then R
is the transitive closure of the resolution R0.
Denition (3): The data satises the Generalized Axiom of Revealed
Preference (GARP) if xiRxj implies pjxj  pjxi.
Varian (1982) points out that the third denition demands that there
are no cyclical inconsistencies if xi is preferred to all other a¤ordable bun-
dles. Then xi is better than any bundle xj chosen at all prices pj: It is
further pointed out, that the advantage of GARP is that it is an easily
testable condition, and as Afriats Theorem demonstrates it is a necessary
and su¢ cient condition for utility maximization:
Afriats Theorem (Afriat 1967, Diewert 1973, Varian 1982)
The following conditions are equivalent:
(1) there exists a nonsatiated utility function that rationalizes the data.
(2) the data satises GARP.
(3) there exist numbers U i; i > 0; i = 1; :::; n that satisfy the Afriat
inequalities: U i  U j + ipi (xi   xj), for i; j = 1; :::n.
(4) there exists a concave, monotonic, continuous, nonsatiated utility
function that rationalizes the data.
Where U i is the utility level and i the measure for marginal utility of
income at observed demands. Varian (1982) points out, that the equiva-
lence of conditions (1) and (4) shows that if some data can be rationalized
25The remainder of this subsection is taken from Varian (1982 and 1983).
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by any nondegenerate utility function at all, this utility function has desir-
able properties. Or put di¤erently, violations of continuity, concavity, and
monotonicity cannot be detected within a nite number of observations.
Further, conditions (2) and (3) give directly testable conditions that the
data must satisfy if it is to be consistent with the maximization model.
Condition (3) asks for a nonnegative solution to a set of linear inequali-
ties. Condition (2) is more convenient for computation. As pointed out by
Varian (1983), Afriat (1967) derived Afriats Theorem rst with a di¤erent
but equivalent version of condition (2) which demanded that data satis-
es "cyclical consistency" and Diewert (1973) provided a di¤erent proof,
omitting a consideration of condition (2). As further pointed out, Varian
(1982) showed that GARP is equivalent to Afriats (1967) cyclical consis-
tency condition. GARP is to be preferred as it is much easier to evaluate
in practice.26
To test whether GARP is satised Varian (1982) proposes to use the
dataset to construct an n by n matrix M; with the i  j entry is given by
mij =

1; if pixi  pixj; that is xiR0xj
0; otherwise.

The matrix M summarizes the relation R0: Hence, once R - the transitive
closure of the directly revealed preference relation R0 - is known one can
test whether GARP satised. For that purpose Varian (1982) proposes
Warshalls algorithm which operates onM to create the matrixMT , where
mtij =

1; if xiRxj
0; otherwise.

MT represents the relation R: Hence, to test for consistency with GARP
one has to look at each element mtij = 1, and check if pjxj > pjxi, for some
i and j. If that is the case then there is a violation of GARP detected.
3.2.2 Testing the weak separability hypothesis
To check whether goods can be either combined or have to be studied in-
dependently, a test for weak separability is performed. Fleissig and Whit-
ney (2003) propose a new method to evaluate the separability conditions
from the revealed preference theory of Varian (1983).27 Following Varian
26For a detailed discussion see Varian (1982).
27The remainder of this subsection is taken from Fleissig and Whitney (2003).
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(1983) partition the data in two sets of goods and prices (pi; xi), (qi; yi) with
i = 1; :::; n.
Denition (4): A utility function u(x) is (weakly) separable in the y
goods if there exists a subutility function (y) and a macro function
u(x; (y)) which is continuous and monotonically strictly increasing
in (y), such that u(x; y)  u(x; (y)):
Varian (1983) points out that the necessary condition for weak separabil-
ity demands that the subdata must satisfy GARP because each observation
must solve the problem
max (y) (3.1)
s:t: qiy qiyi: (3.2)
The necessary and su¢ cient conditions for separability are summarized by
the following theorem of Varian (1983):
Varians Separability Theorem (Varian 1983) The following
conditions are equivalent:
(i) There exists a weakly separable concave, monotonic, continuous
nonsatiated utility function that rationalizes the data.
(ii) There exist numbers U i; V i; i; i > 0; that satisfy separability
inequalities for i; j = 1; :::; n :
U iU j + jpj  xi   xj+ j=jpj  V i   V j ; (a)
V iV j + jpj  yi   yj : (b)
(iii) The data (qi; yi) and (pi; 1=i; xi; V i) satisfy GARP for some
choice of (V i; i) that satises the Afriat inequalities.
Fleissig and Whitney (2003) point out that condition (ii) provides a
direct way for testing the necessary and su¢ cient conditions. However,
one would need to check for a solution to a system of 2n (n  1) equations
of which half of them are nonlinear. Fleissig and Whitney (2003) assert
that condition (iii) is equivalent to evaluating GARP with 1=i as a "sub
group price index" and V i as a "sub group quantity index" for the separable
goods yi: Varians (1983) NONPAR algorithm is based on condition (iii),
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where indices are calculated to satisfy the inequality constraint (b). If the
data pass the test for GARP fullling condition (iii), then from condition
(i), it follows that the observed data are consistent with weakly separable
preferences. Fleissig and Whitney (2003) point out, if NONPAR does not
nd that the data on the y-goods pass the GARP test, weak separability
cannot be rejected since there might be other values for the quantity and
price indices that may satisfy the inequalities of (b).28 Hence, Varians
(1983) NONPAR approach tests the su¢ cient but not necessary conditions
for weak separability.
Fleissig and Whitney (2003) propose a new approach to evaluate Var-
ians separability condition (iii) by using an alternative method to estimate
V i and i: The aim is to nd an estimate of an unknown aggregator func-
tion (y; q) which is a function of prices and quantities of the y-goods. This
approach relies on Diewert (1976, 1978) who shows that a certain class
of statistical index numbers provides a second-order approximation to an
arbitrary or unknown, twice-di¤erentiable linear homogeneous aggregator
function. This class of index number is denoted as "superlative index".
Two of those Indices which posses the property of being superlative are for
example the Fisher Index and the Törnqvist-Theil Index. Therefore, Fleis-
sig and Whitney (2003) build on calculating superlative index numbers to
obtain estimates for V i and a corresponding range of i that satisfy Varians
conditions.
The rst step of the procedure proposed by Fleissig and Whitney (2003)
uses a superlative index number QV i = f (q; y) ; which is a function of
prices and quantities from the y-goods as an initial estimate for V i in the
inequality (b). The objective is to nd how close the superlative index QV i
is to providing a solution. By adding a positive number QV ip or a negative
number QV in to QV
i the superlative index number with error
QV i = QV i +QV ip  QV in;
will provide a solution if one exists. If QV ip = 0; and QV
i
n = 0; for i =
1; :::; n; the superlative index without error provides a solution. Under the
assumption that the superlative index number with error gives a solution
to the separability inequalities, (b) can be written as
28Fleissig and Whitney (2003) state that Barnett and Choi (1989) nd that for this
reason Varian (1983) fails to nd weak separability even for data generated by Cobb-
Douglas utility functions.
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QV i +QV ip  QV in  QV j +QV jp  QV jn + jpj
 
yi   yj : (3.3)
In the next step the deviations around the superlative index QV i are min-
imized by making QV ip and QV
i
n as small as possible. If there exists a
superlative index number with error QV i and corresponding i > 0, that
satisfy (3.3) then QV i can be regarded as the "group quantity index" and
1=i as the "group price index" for the separable goods y. These are used
by Fleissig and Whitney (2003) to solve the separability conditions (iii) of
Varian (1983). As a vector QV i might give a large range of values for
i that satisfy the separability conditions, the budget constraint from the
separable y-data is used to nd values for i without restricting the solu-
tion. Taking the group quantity index QV i and group price index 1=i, it
is required that  
1=i

QV i = incy;i;
where incy;i is the expenditure on the y-goods in period i. See equations
(3.1) and (3.2). Solving for i gives
i = QV i=incy;i: (3.4)
Hence, the aim is to keep i the inverse of the group price index as close as
possible to QV i=incy;i and thus to minimize deviations from adding up
i = QV i=incy;i + ip   in;
where ip are positive deviations and 
i
n are negative deviations around
QV i=incy;i. When QV ip , QV
i
n, 
i
p, 
i
n are close to 0, then the superlative
index (with some error) provides a solution to the Afriat inequalities with
adding up (closely approximated). Fleissig and Whitney (2003) note that
to nd a solution to the problem, Varians (1983) separability theorem re-
quires the inverse of the group price index to be nonnegative. Additionally
the group quantity indices with and without errors are required to be non-
negative to retain an economic interpretation of the solution.
Fleissig andWhitney (2003) use linear programming to nd a solution to
the problem described above. Under the constraints (3.3) and (3.4) as well
as the respective nonnegativity constraints the objective is to minimize the
deviations of QV i for the calculated superlative index QV i and to minimize
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the deviations of (1=i)QV i from the expenditures on the y-separable goods.
These equations can be represented in the form of a linear program (LP)
model
min fc0x Ax  b; x  0g ;
where A is the coe¢ cients matrix, c is the objective vector and b is
the right-hand side vector. Note that this approach requires conversion of
nonnegativity constraints to weak inequalities. The LP model by Fleissig
and Whitney (2003) nds a solution to the Afriat inequalities, if it exists,
by minimizing the deviations around QV i and QV i=incy;i:29
3.2.3 Data description
Aggregate time series data on four categories of goods are used for the study
presented in this chapter. These categories cover data on consumption,
money balances, corporate debt securities, and Treasury debt securities.
The latter two are divided into two subclasses, namely short-term securities
and long-term securities. In this chapter I use 474 monthly per capita
observations from January 1969 to June 2008. The goods and assets which
are subject to the testing procedures are labeled as:30
CnDUR: real average personal consumption of nondurables.
M: money balances, currency component of M1 plus demand deposits.
TrBi: holdings of Treasury bills.
TrBo: holdings of Treasury bonds.
CP: holdings of commercial paper, P1 rated.
CB: holdings of private sector issued bonds, Aaa rated.
The data series are deated using a 2005 price index and are calculated
as per capita values by dividing through total population. As pointed out
by Swo¤ord and Whitney (1987), the way per capita asset holdings are
calculated here, might be subject to some criticism. The "household sector"
in this study includes asset holdings by institutional investors, personal
trusts and nonprot organizations. These organizations probably hold little
cash and a small amount of demand deposits but holdings of corporate debt
securities and Treasuries are substantial. Further, deriving per capita data
29See Fleissig and Whitney (2003), pp. 135 - 136, 141.
30See Appendix B.1 for data and variables description.
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by dividing through total population may also cause problems. Of course
consumption is done by individuals under the age of eighteen acting on their
own behalf. However, here the six year old is treated as an independent
agent.
Securitiesprices are derived from returns on Treasury bills, Treasury
bonds, commercial paper, and corporate bonds. These are treated as hold-
ing period returns of zero coupon discount bonds. Returns on equity are
derived from Standard and PoorsS&P 500 Index.
3.2.4 Nonparametric tests: results
First, the tests to check for the utility maximization hypothesis are per-
formed. The data are not consistent with utility maximization if they vio-
late GARP. The approach I pursue in this chapter, is to rst check which
grouping of goods can be rationalized by a well behaved utility function
and then to test the feasible groupings for weak separability. I apply the
proposed test for violations of GARP by Varian (1982) on the following
groupings of goods:
A. CnDUR;M; TrBi; CP ,
B. CnDUR;M; TrBo; CB,
C. CnDUR;M; TrBi; TrBo.
To keep the study presented in this chapter close to the framework of
KVJ and NIE in each grouping only three liquid assets are included. Set A
includes Treasury bills and commercial paper which have a rather short ma-
turity length compared to the Treasury bonds and corporate bonds grouped
in B. Analyzing set A separately from set B reects the assumption that
investors have a di¤erent valuation of short-term and long-term liquidity
services. Set C captures the notion that an assets-in-the-utility specica-
tion might be suitable to explain a connection between changes in the slope
of the yield curve and household demand behavior.
Results from testing A, B, and C for consistency with GARP are pre-
sented in Table 3.1. For grouping A, 97.5 percent of the data, for B, 96.7
percent of the data, and for C, 96.3 percent of the data satisfy GARP. As
violations of GARP make up a very low share among the 474 observations,
I regard the testing results for all groupings as not rejecting the utility
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maximization hypothesis for the data sample.31 Hence, per capita data on
nondurable consumption and money balances, combined with U.S. Treasury
holdings and corporate debt security holdings can be regarded as rational-
ized by a well-behaved utility function. Violations of GARP among data
on asset prices and asset holdings might be found in times when unforeseen
price movements are strong enough to make the holding of a once preferable
portfolio to suddenly contradict the utility maximization principle.32
With the maximization hypothesis being not rejected for sets A, B, and
C, next is to test for weak separability using the procedure by Fleissig
and Whitney (2003). Under the assumption that Treasury bills, Treasury
bonds, commercial paper and corporate bonds yield nonpecuniary returns
to the investor, such as liquidity services, I test the hypotheses whether the
following sets of money and asset holdings can be regarded as an argument
of investorsutility which is weakly separable from consumption:
Ut=U [CnDUR;V (M;TrBi; CP )] ; (3.5)
Ut=U [CnDUR;V (M;TrBo; CB)] ; (3.6)
Ut=U [CnDUR;V (M;TrBi; TrBo)] : (3.7)
Results are presented in Table 3.2. For the case of assumed 1 percent
measurement error, among all of the groupings (3.5), (3.6), and (3.7) no vi-
olations of weak separability conditions are found. For the case of 5 percent
measurement error only for the most liquid grouping (3.5), no violations of
the separability conditions are detected. Testing (3.6) at 5 percent measure-
ment error nds violations of separability conditions for 28 percent of the
observations, and for testing (3.7) at 5 percent measurement error the share
of violations makes up 16 percent. However, I neglect the results for assumed
5 percent measurement errors as I regard U.S. data as being measured accu-
rately enough for the purposes of the present study. Hence, for the purpose
of the further empirical analysis I regard necessary and su¢ cient conditions
for weakly separable utility maximization as being obtained for nondurables
31Varian (1991) proposes a statistical test for the size and number of violations of
GARP. However, due to the very low share of violations in this chapter I refrain from
further investigation.
32During the Great Moderation there might have been few situations where nancial
markets saw such strong price movements. However, events like the Oil crisis, the Volcker
disination, or Black Monday 1987 might have had an e¤ect on securities prices which
was forceful enough.
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consumption and money balances, along with liquidity services associated
with Treasury bills and commercial paper holdings, Treasury bonds and
corporate bonds holdings, and Treasury bills and Treasury bonds holdings.
Further, note that the procedure by Fleissig and Whitney (2003) evaluates
separability conditions by using a superlative index to aggregate quantities
of separable goods. For the necessary and su¢ cient separability conditions
being met, this implies that the underlying unknown aggregator function
can be regarded as linearly homogeneous and twice-di¤erentiable. Hence,
for the second part of the empirical analysis it can be assumed that CES
or Cobb-Douglas aggregator functions might be suitable candidates for the
separate argument within the utility function which captures liquidity ser-
vices.
Table 3.1: Violations of the utility maximization hypothesis
Goods category (1) (2) (3)
CnDUR X X X
M X X X
TrBi X X
TrBo X X
CP X
CB X
Share of violations 0.025 0.033 0.037
Share consistent with GARP 0.975 0.967 0.963
Notes: This table presents results for testing sets A, B, and C for consistency with GARP.
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Table 3.2: Test for weak separability
Goods category (1) (2) (3)
CnDUR X X X
M X X X
TrBi X X
TrBo X X
CP X
CB X
Measurement error 1% 5% 1% 5% 1% 5%
Share of violations 0 0 0 0.28 0 0.16
Share consistent with GARP/Sep 1 1 1 0.72 1 0.84
Notes: This table presents results for the Fleissig and Whitney (2003) test for weak
separability.
3.3 Determination of the utilitys parametric repre-
sentation
With nonrejection of the hypotheses of utility maximization and weak sepa-
rability, this chapter now turns to estimating preference parameters for a set
of proposed utility functions. Nonparametric testing routines and evidence
from KVJ and NIE support a liquidity services-in-the-utility formulation for
empirical work on householdsasset demand. For the further proceeds of
the analysis utility functions are assumed which include as arguments both,
consumption, and liquidity services while the latter capture non-pecuniary
returns to the investor by holdings of a certain group of assets. Liquidity
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services are derived by an aggregator function which has holdings of money,
Treasuries and corporate debt securities as arguments. It is required that
those assets are not perfect substitutes in terms of utility. Otherwise there
would be no need for an aggregator function - a simple sum aggregate would
su¢ ce.
3.3.1 Modied asset pricing model
Following KVJ and NIE assume that under the premise that investors value
liquidity services a representative agents utility function which shall fulll
the Inada conditions is of the form:
ut = u (ct;  (mt; bt; st)) ; (3.8)
where ct is the agents consumption at date t and  () denotes the measure
for liquidity services which is an (unknown) aggregator function of the real
holdings of money mt, Treasuries bt; and corporate debt securities st: The
liquidity services function  () is assumed to capture unique services pro-
vided by liquid assets which are valued by investors, where 
0
() > 0; and

00
() < 0. The liquidity services function is concave as it is assumed that
 () is increasing in mt, bt and st, but the marginal benet derived from
liquidity services is decreasing in mt, bt and st. Further, it has the property
of limmt;bt;st!1 
0
() = 0: This reects the assumption that holding more
liquidity services providing assets reduces the marginal value of an extra
unit of such an assets. Further, this marginal value approaches zero if the
agent is holding a su¢ ciently large amount of liquidity services providing
assets. Moreover, under the assumption that investors value liquidity, hold-
ing one more unit of an asset that is the most liquid should c.p. generate
more utility than holding one more unit of the least liquid i.e.
@ ()
@mt
>
@ ()
@bt
>
@ ()
@st
:
From the rst order conditions of the households utility maximization
problem moment conditions for the GMM estimation are derived. These
will be used in section 3.3.3 to estimate parameters of the implied demand
functions. The representative household is further assumed to maximize the
expected sum of a discounted stream of utilities
E0
1X
t=0
tu

ct; 

Mt
Pt
;
Bt
Pt
;
St
Pt

; (3.9)
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subject to the budget constraint
Ptct +Mt +
Bt
Rbt
+
St
Rst
+
Dt
Rdt
 Ptyt +Mt 1 +Bt 1 + St 1 +Dt 1; (3.10)
where E0 is the expectation operator conditional on the information set in
the initial period and  2 (0; 1) ; is the subjective discount factor. The
price of one unit of consumption at date t is denoted by Pt. The household
gains a real endowed income yt and carries wealth into the next period by
investing in nominal holdings of money Mt, Treasuries Bt, and corporate
debt securities St. Nominal equity holdings Dt provide the numeraire asset
in dening preferences. Further, the agent is assumed to hold only zero
coupon discount bonds which pay out one unit of currency when being
held to maturity. The gross returns on money, Treasuries, corporate debt
securities, and equity are Rmt = 1, R
b
t , R
s
t , andR
d
t . Maximizing the objective
(3.9) subject to the budget constraint (3.10) leads for given initial values
and non-negativity constraints to the following rst order conditions for real
consumption and real holdings of money, equity, Treasuries, and corporate
debt securities:
@u
@ct
=t; (3.11)
@u
@mt
+ Et

Ptt+1
Pt+1

=t; (3.12)
Et

Ptt+1
Pt+1

=
t
Rdt
; (3.13)
@u
@bt
+ Et

Ptt+1
Pt+1

=
t
Rbt
; (3.14)
@u
@st
+ Et

Ptt+1
Pt+1

=
t
Rst
; (3.15)
and (3.10) holding with equality and the accordant transversality condi-
tions.33 Dene the stochastic discount factor for nominal payo¤s asMt+1 =
 @u=@ct+1
@u=@ct
Pt
Pt+1
, so that from (3.12), (3.14), and (3.15) the optimality condi-
tions for holdings of money, Treasuries, and corporate debt securities can
33The transversality conditions for holdings of Treasuries, corporate debt
securities, and equity are given by: limj!1 jEt
 
t+jbt+j=R
b
t+j

= 0;
limj!1 jEt
 
t+jst+j=R
s
t+j

= 0; and limj!1 jEt
 
t+jdt+j=R
d
t+j

= 0.
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be derived which can be interpreted as pricing equations:
@u
@mt
=
@u
@ct
+ Et [Mt+1] = 1; (3.16)
@u
@bt
=
@u
@ct
+ Et [Mt+1] =
1
Rbt
; (3.17)
@u
@st
=
@u
@ct
+ Et [Mt+1] =
1
Rst
: (3.18)
The rst term on the left hand sides of equations (3.16), (3.17), and (3.18)
captures the modication of the standard asset pricing model by the as-
sumption of liquidity services.34 The marginal utility from holding money
mt, Treasuries bt; and corporate bonds st induces a liquidity services pre-
mium on each assets price. Increasing the investorsholdings of mt, bt; and
st should decrease liquid assetsprices which is due to the assumption of
 () being concave. Hence, equations (3.16) - (3.18) reect that under the
assumption of liquidity services being an argument of the investors utility
function, increasing the amount of liquid assets held will lower the investors
willingness to pay for another unit of such assets.
Note that the assumed functional form of the aggregator  () is crucial.
KVJ and NIE do not fully specify the functional form of  () but implicitly
dene a set of requirements to it. It can be shown that employing a CES
aggregator nested in a CRRA utility would match those requirements.35
Specically, in this case each assets liquidity services premium is not only
driven by the level of holdings of the respective asset, but in addition to
that, it is driven by the total holdings of liquidity services providing assets.
Moreover, by assuming @()
@mt
> @()
@bt
> @()
@st
; increasing the holdings of mt
should c.p. decrease asset prices to a larger extent than increasing the
holdings of bt and st. Analogously, the same applies c.p. for increasing
the holdings of bt compared to increasing holdings of st: This requirement
can be fullled by making use of the CES aggregator. In contrast to that,
employing a Cobb-Douglas aggregator nested in a CRRA utility implies that
each assets liquidity services premium is driven by the level of holdings
of the respective asset but not by the total holdings of liquidity services
providing assets. E.g. the liquidity premium on Rst would be a function
of st; and not of mt and bt. This implication however, is not in line with
34Please note that for simplicity default risk is neglected.
35See Appendix B.2.
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KVJ and NIE. Further, assuming additive separability between the utility
functions arguments of consumption and liquidity services, as well yields
implications which are not in line with the investorsbehavior observed by
KVJ and NIE. Specically, for the case of a CES aggregator together with
additive separability, each assets liquidity services premium would not be a
decreasing function in total holdings of liquid asset. For the Cobb-Douglas
aggregator, the liquidity premium would be decreasing in holdings of the
asset under consideration but increasing in overall asset holdings. Note that
the CES function degenerates to a Cobb-Douglas aggregator if the elasticity
of substitution is unity. One could estimate the model under a parameter
restriction on the elasticity of substitution. However, the present chapters
approach is to rst estimate a broad variety of possible model specications
and then to select the most suitable one.
3.3.2 Moment conditions
Set (3.13) equal to (3.12), (3.14), and (3.15). Then plug in (3.11) for the
shadow price of income t  0, then
1=Et
"
@u
@ct
  Pt
 
1 + rdt

Pt+1
@u
@ct+1
#
; (3.19)
0=Et

@u
@mt
  Ptr
d
t
Pt+1
@u
@ct+1

; (3.20)
0=Et
"
@u
@bt
  Pt
 
rdt   rbt

Pt+1
@u
@ct+1
#
; (3.21)
0=Et
"
@u
@st
  Pt
 
rdt   rst

Pt+1
@u
@ct+1
#
; (3.22)
which yields Euler equations and implied demand functions for consump-
tion (3.19) money (3.20), Treasuries (3.21), and corporate debt securities
(3.22). Here I already used the representation of the equations as condi-
tional moment conditions. Equations (3.19) - (3.22) are now written in
terms of excess returns. Note that rdt , r
b
t , and r
s
t denote net returns on
equity, Treasuries, and corporate debt securities. The Euler equation for
consumption has the well known interpretation like in the standard case
without assets in the utility. The Euler equation for money holdings (3.20)
requires that in equilibrium utility cannot be increased by holding one unit
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of money less at time t, investing it in equities, and consuming the pay-
o¤ at time t + 1. The forgone utility associated with a one unit reduction
in money holdings is @u
@mt
1
Pt
: Transferring one unit of money to equities at
time t increases real wealth at t + 1 by rdt ; since money yields no nominal
return while equity does. The gain in utility if these higher proceeds are
consumed in period t+1 is Et
h
rdt
Pt+1
@u
@ct+1
i
: Equating this to foregone util-
ity yields (3.20). Analogously Euler equations (3.21) and (3.22) equate the
costs and benets in terms of utility of transferring one unit of currency
from Treasuries or corporate debt securities into equities for one period.
3.3.3 GMM estimation models
Methodologically, this chapter follows previous authors like Holman (1998).
For each proposed specication of utility function (3.8) correspondent sets of
Euler equations are derived from (3.19) to (3.22) which are then estimated
by using GMM. The Euler equations state that in equilibrium the represen-
tative agents expectations are orthogonal to all of the variables within the
information set at the time predictions are made. Specically, they imply
population orthogonality conditions which are a function of the observed
data and the preference parameters. The GMM estimator is a nonlinear
instrumental variable estimator of the population parameters that tries to
make the sample orthogonality conditions close to zero by minimizing a dis-
tance function.36 According to Verbeek (2000) there are several advantages
of this method when estimating asset pricing models. One is that GMM
does not require distributional assumptions or assumptions regarding data
generating processes. Further it can allow for heteroskedasticity of unknown
form which is a convenient feature when working with data on asset returns.
Importantly it can estimate parameters even if the model cannot be solved
analytically from the rst order conditions. This is especially useful for the
present asset pricing models which are comprised of the nonlinear Euler
equations (3.19) to (3.22).
I use the same time series data on consumption and holdings of money,
Treasuries and corporate debt securities, as well as the same data on prices
and returns as in Section 3.2.3 of this chapter. Further, three di¤erent
sets of instruments are employed, depending on whether Treasury bills and
commercial paper holdings, Treasury bills and Treasury bond holdings, or
36Hansen (1982) provides the conditions under which the GMM estimator is consistent,
asymptotically normal, and e¢ cient.
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Treasury bond and corporate bond holdings, are arguments of (3.8). Follow-
ing the approach of Hall (2005) each set of instruments includes a constant
term, two lagged values of the real returns on equity, and the real returns
on the correspondent assets included in each of the estimation models, as
well as the past two growth rates of real per capita consumption and real
per capita asset holdings. The reason for this choice is that lagged values
and lagged growth rates can be assumed to be uncorrelated with current
innovations.
Note that there are more instruments than parameters. Hence, the
system of Euler equations is overidentied. The J -test of overidentifying
restrictions by Hansen (1982) and Hansen and Singleton (1982) is used to
conduct a joint test of the specication of the asset pricing model and the
validity of the instrument set.
The following six specications of investors utility are proposed:
I. Poterba Rotemberg Utility: Poterba and Rotemberg (1986) use a
nested CES preferences specication:
u

ct; 

Mt
Pt
;
Bt
Pt
;
St
Pt

=
1

(
ct Lt

Mt
Pt
;
Bt
Pt
;
St
Pt
1 )
;
where Lt captures liquidity services derived from a CES aggregator function:
Lt =

M

Mt
Pt

+ B

Bt
Pt

+ (1  M   B)

St
Pt
 1
:
This utility function exhibits constant relative risk aversion. Further, utility
is Cobb-Douglas in consumption and liquidity services, ensuring that more
consumption raises the marginal utility of liquidity services and vice versa.
The liquidity measure is a CES function of real money balances, Treasuries
holdings and corporate debt securities holdings. It must be pointed out that
these preferences are quite restrictive. In particular, they impose homogene-
ity and require separability between its arguments. Further, the elasticity
of substitution between consumption and liquidity services is assumed to
be equal to one.
With these preferences, from equations (3.19) to (3.22) the following
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moment conditions can be derived:
1=Et
"

Pt
 
1 + rdt
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Pt+1
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24c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  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0=Et
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t L(1 ) 1t (1  M   B)StPt 1
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1 
Pt(rdt rst )
Pt+1
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 1t+1 L
(1 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t
35 :
I report estimates of the parameters f; ; ; ; M ; Bg in Section 3.3.4: For
a rst round of estimations I constrain the utility function parameters. I
require that M ; B; and (1  M   B) be positive and sum up to one. Fur-
ther, I require ; ; and  to be positive between zero and one, and  to be
less than zero. The validity of the model and the restrictions are checked by
using the J-test of overidentifying restrictions. The constraints are succes-
sively relaxed if the J-test rejects the model together with the restrictions
in place. If  was equal to one, convenience yields and liquidity services
can not be regarded as a source of utility. Note that if  was estimated
to be exactly zero, Lt would degenerate to a Cobb-Douglas aggregation. If
the elasticity of substitution  is close to one, linear aggregation would be
implied. In the latter case money, Treasuries, and corporate debt securities
would be close substitutes in terms of utility.
II. Nested CES Liquidity Services: In contrast to Poterba and Rotem-
berg (1986), in this case utility is not Cobb-Douglas in consumption and
liquidity services:
u
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where Lt captures liquidity services derived by the CES aggregator function
Lt =

M

Mt
Pt

+ B

Bt
Pt

+ (1  M   B)

St
Pt
 1
:
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This utility function as well exhibits constant relative risk aversion. These
preferences are less restrictive compared to Poterba and Rotemberg (1986)
as a unitary elasticity of substitution between consumption and liquid assets
is not demanded. Following (3.19) to (3.22) moment conditions are then
given by
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:
I report estimates of the parameters f; ; ; M ; Bg in Section 3.3.4. For
the estimation I constrain the utility function parameters. I require that
M , B; and (1  M   B) be positive and sum up to one. Further, I require
 and  to be positive and between zero and one, and  to be less than
zero.
III. Nested CES Liquidity Services, additively separable: Utility
is not Cobb-Douglas in consumption and liquidity services but assumed to
be additively separable in its arguments:
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where Lt captures liquidity services derived by the CES aggregator function
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Here equations (3.19) to (3.22) become
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I report estimates of the parameters f; ; ; M ; Bg in section 3.3.4. For
the estimation I constrain the utility function parameters. I require that
M ; B; and (1  M   B) be positive and sum up to one. Further, I require
 and  to be positive between zero and one, and  to be less than zero.
IV. Cobb-Douglas Utility with Cobb-Douglas liquidity services:
Utility is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas in consumption and liquidity ser-
vices.
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where Lt denotes liquidity services which are as well derived by a Cobb-
Douglas aggregator function
Lt =

Mt
Pt
M Bt
Pt
B St
Pt
(1 M B)
:
Again these preferences are quite restrictive. The utility function exhibits
constant relative risk aversion. It imposes homogeneity and separability.
Further, a unitary elasticity of substitution between consumption and liq-
uidity services is assumed.
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From (3.19) to (3.22) moment conditions are then given by
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I report estimates of the parameters f; ; ; M ; Bg in Section 3.3.4. For
the estimation I constrain the utility function parameters. I require M ; B;
and (1  M   B) to be positive and sum up to one, and  and  to be
positive between zero and one, and  to be less than zero.
V. Nested Cobb-Douglas Liquidity Services: Utility is not Cobb-
Douglas in consumption and liquidity services
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where Lt captures liquidity services derived from a Cobb-Douglas aggregator
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(1 M B)
:
Then equations (3.19) to (3.22) imply
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I report estimates of the parameters f; ; M ; Bg in Section 3.3.4: For the
estimation I constrain the utility function parameters. I require that M ,
B, and (1  M   B) be positive and sum up to one. Further, I require 
to be positive between zero and one, and  to be less than zero.
VI. Nested Cobb-Douglas Liquidity Services, additively separable:
Utility is additively separable in consumption and liquidity services:
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where Lt captures liquidity services derived from a Cobb-Douglas aggregator
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This utility function exhibits constant relative risk aversion. Equations
(3.19) to (3.22) imply the following moment conditions
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I report estimates of the parameters f; ; M ; Bg in Section 3.3.4. For the
estimation I constrain the utility function parameters. I require that M ,
B, and (1  M   B) be positive and sum up to one. Further, I require 
to be positive between zero and one, and  to be less than zero.
3.3.4 GMM estimation results
In the following subsections of this chapter GMM estimation results are
discussed for the moment condition sets I to VI. For each Table presenting
estimation results, in the rst column estimates are shown for the dataset
including nondurables consumption, money balances, and data on returns
and holdings of Treasury bills and commercial paper. Columns 2 and 3
present results for the sets including data on Treasury bills and Treasury
bonds, and on Treasury bonds and corporate bonds.
I. Poterba Rotemberg Utility: Table 3.3 presents the estimates of the
parameters from specication I. with corresponding moment conditions.
Three sets of estimates corresponding to each dataset are reported. For
all of the three data sets the J-test of overidentifying restrictions indicates
rejection of model I. at the 5 percent level with all constraints on , , , ,
M , and B in place. The model is rejected as well at the 5 percent level for
relaxing the restriction on  and subsequently relaxing the restriction on :
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The model is not rejected at the 5 percent signicance level if the restrictions
on , M , B; and (1  M   B) are in place for all data sets. The estimated
coe¢ cient values are remarkably similar across the three model estimations.
Further, in the fourth column I report results from Poterba and Rotemberg
(1986).37 Note that in this case liquidity services are derived from a di¤er-
ent set of assets. For their estimation the authors use quarterly data from
1959:Q1 to 1981:Q3 on nondurables consumption, money, time deposits,
and Treasury bills. Still, it is notable that estimation results of the present
study for the utility specication I. are close to the results of Poterba and
Rotemberg (1986). This is found in spite of employing di¤erent data sets,
di¤erent instrument sets, and a di¤erent data frequency. For the present
model the intertemporal elasticity of substitution  is expected to be larger
than zero in absolute terms. If  = 0; then the nested function degenerates
to a logarithmic function of consumption and liquidity services. Poterba and
Rotemberg (1986) estimate a range of  between  6:5 and  5:6, whereas
the present study nds a range between  7:7 and  6:0: Across all three
datasets the estimated discount rate  is greater than zero and below one.
However, unity is not excluded from the 95 percent condence intervals in
columns 1 and 2. Still the point estimates are slightly smaller than those
which are found in other studies.38 The estimated share of expenditures
devoted to consumption  is for all estimations signicantly greater than
zero at the 1 percent level and lies between 0:68 and 1:07: For the estima-
tions presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.3, results for  suggest that
liquidity services are not a direct source of utility. Only for the estimation
model including data on Treasury bonds and corporate bonds, the size of 
implies that convenience yield is a source of utility. However, the size of the
point estimate suggests that an implausibly large share of households ex-
penditures is devoted to Treasury bond and corporate bond holdings. The
main backdraw of the study presented in this chapter is that the nonpara-
metric testing procedures provide little guidance about the functional form
of the households utility and about the complete set of liquidity services
providing assets. Hence, the three data groupings considered for this study
37Poterba and Rotemberg (1986) further provide estimation results for tax adjusted
data and di¤erent sets of instruments. In Table 3.3 results are taken from an estimation
which is closest to the setting which is analyzed in this chapter.
38Hansen and Singleton (1983) estimate that  lies between 0:995 and 1:096: Poterba
and Rotemberg (1986) nd that for their utility specication the discount factor is larger
than unity.
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might leave out further assets which yield liquidity services.39 The inverse
of the elasticity of substitution between liquidity services yielding assets 
is signicantly larger than zero and lies between 0:5 and 0:58: If  was esti-
mated to be 1 a linear aggregator function would be implied. Assets would
be one for one substitutes in terms of utility. If  was equal to zero, the
aggregator would reduce to the Cobb-Douglas specication. The hypothe-
sis that  = 1 is rejected for all three estimations. Within the convenience
yield aggregator the coe¢ cients M , B, and (1  M   B) are estimated
with relatively wide condence intervals. Further, for the estimation model
presented in the second column of Table 3.3, B is not signicantly di¤erent
from zero at the 5 percent level. However, for all three estimations the fol-
lowing pattern of point estimates is observed: M > B > (1  M   B) :
Assuming that real asset holdings were of equal size, this result implies that
marginal utility of another unit of real money balances would exceed that
from another unit of Treasuries or corporate debt securities.
II. Nested CES Liquidity services The estimates of the parameters
from specication II are shown in Table 3.4. Notably the J-test only does
not reject the validity of the model which is estimated for data on Treasury
bills and Treasury bonds. For this estimation result presented here, only
the restrictions on , M , B; and (1  M   B) are in place. Note that
the estimated share of expenditures devoted to consumption  is larger that
unity implying that liquidity services are not a direct source of utility. The
estimation model including data on Treasury bills and commercial paper
as well as the estimation model including data on Treasury bonds and cor-
porate bonds are rejected. Further, point estimates for the three datasets
are not as similar among each other as for utility specication I. The most
striking di¤erence is that estimates for  range between  3:19 and  11:83
and estimates for  range between 0:09 and 1:00; implying perfect substi-
tutability of liquid assets for the latter case. Specication II. compared to
specication I. does not require the elasticity of substitution between con-
sumption and the liquid assetsaggregate to be unity. As this requirement
seems to be quite restrictive and there is no theoretical guidance about the
size of the elasticity of substitution for this model, one would not a priori
expect that estimating model II yields J-tests of overidentifying restrictions
which indicate rejection of two of the three estimation models.
39Note that for the study presented in this chapter three datasets were employed which
are intended to closely match the datasets used in KVJ and NIE.
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III. - VI. Specications The GMM estimation routine does not nd a
solution for the minimization problem. This is found for all of the three
di¤erent data sets with the corresponding instrument sets.
3.4 Conclusion
This paper presents a model of aggregate demand for consumption, money
balances, U.S. Treasuries, and corporate debt securities where the asset
holdings directly contribute to the investorsutility. The rst part of the
analysis applies Varians (1982) nonparametric testing procedure on monthly
per capita data on nondurable consumption, money balances, U.S. Trea-
suries, and corporate debt securities. As violations of GARP can only be
detected for a very low share of the observations, results for the nonpara-
metric testing routines can be seen as not rejecting the utility maximization
hypothesis. Therefore, all of the three groupings can be regarded as being
rationalized by a well-behaved utility function. Additionally, necessary and
su¢ cient conditions for weakly separable utility maximization are obtained
for monthly per capita data on nondurables consumption and money bal-
ances, along with liquidity services derived from Treasury holdings and cor-
porate debt securities holdings. In the second part of the analysis Euler
equations implied by the modied asset-pricing model are estimated under
alternative utility specications. Surprisingly, only the restrictive utility
specication proposed by Poterba and Rotemberg (1986) yields parame-
ter estimates which are relatively robust to the choice of data. Estimation
results however, imply parameter values which indicate misspecication.
In the presence of many assets which might provide liquidity services, a
more complete modelling of the nancial sector is needed. The paper makes
a step in that direction. However, the analysis su¤ers from several short-
comings. These are primarily limitations of the particular functional form
and parameterization of the utility function and the data choice. Eventu-
ally, the approach should be extended to incorporate a broader range of
assets. However, the nonparametric testing routines provide little guidance
about the true functional form and the true set of liquidity services pro-
viding assets. A second issue is that the menu of important assets changes
over time as Poterba and Rotemberg (1986) noted before. E.g. nancial
innovations like the increasing importance of money market mutual funds
allow assets to be repackaged to yield di¤erent degree of liquidity services.
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Chapter 4
The E¤ects of Large-Scale
Asset Purchases in an
Estimated DSGE Model of the
U.S. Economy
Coauthors: Andreas Schabert and Roland Winkler
4.1 Introduction
In response to the 2008/2009 nancial crisis the U.S. Federal Reserve (Fed)
conducted monetary policy operations that go beyond the standard inter-
est rate policies. Besides providing guidance about the likely future path
of key interest rates and the set up of new lending facilities, the Fed most
prominently embarked on quantitative easing measures which were imple-
mented by large-scale asset purchase programs (LSAP). By the means of
these unconventional policy measures the Federal Reserve Systems hold-
ings of domestic securities increased to approximately $2:6 trillion until the
end of 2012 (see Figure 4.1). To a large extent these increases were caused
by the Feds LSAP 1 and LSAP 2 programs. LSAP 1 embodied purchases
of mortgage-backed securities (MBS), agency securities, and U.S. Treasury
securities between late 2008 and early 2010.40 In contrast to that LSAP 2
40Further, reinvestment of principal payments from agency debt and MBS into longer-
term securities took place to keep constant the Feds holdings of securities at their current
level.
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Figure 4.1: Federal Reserves asset holdings
Notes: The Federal Reserve Systems holdings of domestic securities.
Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors.
was primarily established as a purchase program of longer-term U.S. Trea-
sury securities. From November 12, 2010 through June 30, 2011 the Federal
Reserves Open Market Trading Desk conducted $767 billion of purchases.41
LSAP programs expanded the monetary base by the provision of cen-
tral bank money in exchange for specied groups of commercial banksas-
sets, i.e. long-term U.S. Treasuries in the case of LSAP 2. As outlined
by Bernanke (2012) these nonstandard open market operations have been
introduced to enhance credit supply by alleviating nancial intermediation,
and to support the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Specically,
with the monetary policy rate at the zero lower bound (ZLB), large-scale
purchases of longer-term securities are intended to lower their interest rates.
These e¤ects should be transmitted to private borrowing rates, particularly
at longer maturities, and nally stimulate economic activity. However, as-
41After June 2011 principal payments on all domestic securities were reinvested in
Treasury securities to maintain the Feds holdings of domestic securities at approximately
$2:6 trillion.
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sessing the qualitative and quantitative e¤ects of LSAP programs on key
macroeconomic variables poses to be a rather complicated task, as further
pointed out by Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke at Jackson Hole Meeting 2012:
"While there is substantial evidence that the Federal Reserves
asset purchases have lowered longer-term yields and eased broader
nancial conditions, obtaining precise estimates of the e¤ects of
these operations on the broader economy is inherently di¢ cult,
as the counterfactual - how the economy would have performed
in the absence of the Federal Reserves actions - cannot be di-
rectly observed."
In this chapter it is our aim is to identify the e¤ects of the LSAP 2
longer-term Treasury purchase program on the U.S. economy. To develop
a framework for the macroeconomic analysis of the LSAP 2 program we
extend the monetary DSGE model by Christo¤el and Schabert (2013) which
provides an explicit specication of the central banks balance sheet options.
The model is estimated for U.S. data using Bayesian techniques. We employ
the model to simulate a crisis scenario which matches the deviation of real
per-capita output from its long-run trend in 2010:Q4, which was the quarter
when LSAP 2 was launched. Then we conduct a counterfactual policy
simulation to identify the e¤ects of this balance sheet policy measure.
Several contributions to the empirical literature nd evidence that LSAP
programs have indeed been e¤ective in reducing long-term U.S. Treasury
rates. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) estimate that LSAP
2 reduced the ten-year Treasury Note yield by 33 basis points, likewise
DAmico and King (2013) estimate a reduction of 55 basis points.42 How-
ever, the lack of experience with these balance sheet policies has raised
questions on the transmission to the real economy and fueled discussions
about possible inationary e¤ects (see Borio and Disyatat (2009)). Still,
there have been only few contributions to the academic research providing
theoretical guidance for the evaluation of the e¤ectiveness of this policy. As
Christo¤el and Schabert (2013) point out, one reason for this is that stan-
dard macroeconomic models which are typically used for monetary analysis,
assume that central banks directly control the private sector savings rate
(i.e. the consumption Euler equation rate). By this assumption, important
42For surveys of estimates regarding the impact of LSAP 1 on the ten-year Treasury
yield see Chen, Curdia, and Ferrero (2012) and Bernanke (2012).
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aspects of the monetary transmission mechanism are neglected and severe
limitations to the analysis emerge once the zero lower bound on interest
rates is reached.43 A recent study on the macroeconomic e¤ects of the U.S.
Feds LSAP 2 program by Chen, Curdia, and Ferrero (2012) assumes seg-
mented bond markets along the lines of Andres, Lopez-Salido, and Nelson
(2004) in a non-monetary macroeconomic model. Specically, investors are
assumed to have heterogenous preferences for assets of di¤erent maturi-
ties. This idea reects a "preferred habitat" motive similar to Vayanos and
Villa (2009). This analysis however, estimates that the LSAP 2 program
increased the growth of U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by only less
than half of a percentage point.
This chapter applies the macroeconomic model by Christo¤el and Sch-
abert (2013) which accounts for central bank asset acquisition and its impact
on nancial intermediation. Specically, monetary transmission is based
on nancial intermediation and an endogenous pass through of policy rate
changes. In this chapter we consider multiple assets that di¤er with re-
spect to their ability to be exchanged for central bank money. This leads
to a spread between interest rates on non-eligible and eligible assets, which
reects basically a liquidity premium. Central bank balance sheet policy
therefore can be e¤ective by inuencing the liquidity premium. The model
by Christo¤el and Schabert (2013) accounts for the specic role of gov-
ernment bonds to provide liquidity services to commercial banks. This is
considered by modeling central bank monetary supply by an asset exchange
in open market operations, as it is common practice (i.e. repurchase agree-
ments). Central bank money and reserves resp. are demanded by banks for
liquidity management purposes when they provide intermediation between
households and rms. In particular, costs of nancial intermediation are
43Further, by the irrelevance result of Wallace (1981) it is generally expected from a
theoretical point of view that nonstandard open market operations in private assets do
not exhibit an e¤ect on real variables. As shown by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003)
this result also applies for nonstandard open market operations conducted in models
with nominal frictions, money in the utility, and where the interest rate is at its ZLB.
In this regard Walsh (2010) points out that private agents will demand money up to
satiation if the ZLB is reached. In particular, by the assumption that assets are perfect
substitutes there is no portfolio-balance e¤ect. In case of LSAPs, market participants
will take advantage of arbitrage opportunities, which will make decisions about size and
composition of the central banks balance sheet irrelevant for the real variablesallocation.
This result even applies to New Keynesian models with credit frictions, such as Curdia
and Woodford (2011), as long as assets purchased (short-term bonds) by the central bank
will be perceived as equivalent to reserves.
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specied in a stylized way following Curdia and Woodford (2011). Banks
further hold government short-term bonds and long-term bonds where only
the former in absence of unconventional policy measures can be used to
acquire reserves in open market operations. LSAP 2 is implemented by
central bank purchases of a certain fraction of long-term bonds held by the
commercial banks. As the purpose of the analysis which is presented in this
chapter is to provide quantitative results, we estimate the model for the
U.S. economy.
The model is applied to address the following questions: First, to what
extent did shocks to nancial intermediation and central banks unconven-
tional open market operation measures contribute to the volatility in real ac-
tivity following the 2008/2009 nancial crisis? Second, what are the macro-
economic e¤ects of the U.S. Feds LSAP 2 large-scale long-term Treasury
bond purchase program?
We nd that shocks to nancial intermediation signicantly contribute
to the evolution of U.S. key macroeconomic variables following the 2008/2009
crisis. In particular, our estimated model implies that in 2010:Q4, which is
the quarter when LSAP 2 was initiated, roughly one third of the negative
U.S. real per capita GDP trend deviation was attributed to the shock to -
nancial intermediation. Further, the central bank can signicantly alleviate
adverse e¤ects to the economy by easing the supply of reserves in exchange
for log-term government bonds. Our counterfactual policy simulation nds
that in the absence of LSAP 2 real per capita U.S. GDP would have dropped
by additional 2:75 percentage points.
Besides the contributions by Chen, Curdia, and Ferrero (2012) and Cur-
dia and Woodford (2011) there are few recent studies on unconventional
central bank policies such as LSAPs which are employing macroeconomic
models with nancial market imperfections. However, these studies rely
on non-monetary macroeconomic models. Del Negro et al. (2013) incorpo-
rate credit market frictions a la Kiyotaki and Moore (2012) into a standard
DSGE model. Firms facing investment opportunities can issue own debt
securities only up to a certain fraction of illiquid assets on their balance
sheet in each period. In contrast to that, government securities are not sub-
ject to such resaleability constraints which gives government bonds the role
of liquidity in the model. Gertler and Karadi (2013) incorporate nancial
intermediaries within an otherwise standard macroeconomic model where
the condition of the intermediarys balance sheet inuences the overall ow
of credit. Non-conventional monetary policy is introduced in this environ-
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ment by the central bank acting as a nancial intermediary. Specically,
the central bank borrows funds from savers and lends them to investors in
times when private sector nancial intermediation is interrupted by a nan-
cial crisis. Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) assume that nancial intermediaries
face an endogenous balance sheet constraint and that rates of return on in-
vestments di¤er across a segmented market. This induces demand for funds
which are traded on an interbank market. It is shown that a disruption
in nancial intermediation together with nancial frictions can increase the
severity of a recession. Under this setting direct central bank lending can
be e¤ective as it targets the distressed interbank markets.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents
the model. Section 4.3 discusses empirical implementation, estimation re-
sults, and model-implied variablesdynamics. Specically, we discuss the
data and priors for the estimation and analyze the models empirical perfor-
mance in terms of implied business cycle moments, variance decomposition,
and forecasting performance, and calculate the model-implied contributions
of macroeconomic shocks to the historical variations of output. Further-
more, we analyze the models impulse responses to exogenous shocks. Sec-
tion 4.4 conducts a counterfactual policy experiment to analyze the e¤ects
of a LSAP 2 scenario on the estimated model. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 The model
The macroeconomic model employed in this chapter builds on Christo¤el
and Schabert (2013). The model contains ve sectors: The household sector
and the rm sector are close to the formulation of Smets andWouters (2007).
The nancial intermediation sector follows the formulation of Curdia and
Woodford (2011). The government and the central bank sectors are enriched
and modied to allow for balance sheet policies. Banks provide nancial
intermediation between households and borrowing rms. They further hold
short-term bonds and long-term bonds issued by the government, while the
former in the absence of unconventional monetary policy measures serve
as only eligible asset for an exchange against central bank money in open
market operations. Firms borrow from banks to nance the payment of
wages in the production process, are monopolistic competitive suppliers of
di¤erentiated goods, face price adjustment cost, invest into physical capital,
face investment adjustment cost a la Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(2005), and decide on the level of capital utilization. Households consume,
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are monopolistic suppliers of di¤erentiated labor, face wage adjustment cost,
exchange state contingent contracts in zero-net-supply among themselves,
and deposit funds at the nancial intermediaries. The government purchases
goods, raises lump-sum taxes, and issues short-term bonds and long-term
bonds, where the latter are modeled as perpetuities. The central bank sets
the main renancing rate according to a Taylor-type rule, supplies money
in exchange for eligible assets, and decides on the size and the composition
of its balance sheet.
4.2.1 Households
The household sector of the model economy is comprised of a continuum of
innitely lived and identical households, indexed with i 2 [0; 1]. Their util-
ity increases with householdsreal consumption and decreases with working
time. Further, it is assumed that beginning-of-period holdings of deposits
provide utility, which serves as a convenient short-cut for modelling transac-
tion services of deposits (just like the textbook specication of money-in-the-
utility function). Household i maximizes the expected sum of a discounted
stream of instantaneous utilities
E0
1X
t=0
ttu

ci;t; ni;t;
di;t 1
t

, (4.1)
where E0 is the expectation operator conditional on the time 0 information
set and  2 (0; 1); is the subjective discount factor. The term t is a
stochastic preference parameter.44 It is assumed that t evolves according
to a stationary AR(1) process in logs. The households real value of bank
deposits is denoted as di;t, with di;t =
Di;t
Pt
, and Pt representing the price of
the wholesale nal goods. Ination Pt
Pt 1
is labeled as t. The instantaneous
utility u is assumed to be increasing in household consumption ci;t and real
deposits di;t, and decreasing in working time ni;t. Household preferences
further allow for external habits in consumption. Under these assumptions
the householdsinstantaneous utility function is specied in the following
44Christo¤el and Schabert (2013) point out that stochastic preference parameters have
been used in several studies on policy options at the ZLB (see e.g. Eggertsson and
Woodford (2003), or Eggertsson (2011)).
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way:
u(ci;t; ni;t; di;t)=
1
1   (ci;t   h  ct 1)
1 
+%
1
1  'd

di;t 1
t
1 'd
   1
1 + 
n1+i;t ,
such that uc;i;t = (ci;t   hct 1) , ud;i;t = % 1t

di;t 1
t
 'd
, un;i;t =  ni;t,
with h > 0, % > 0,  > 0,   1, 'd  0, and   0, where uc;i;t denotes
household is marginal utility of consumption, ud;i;t denotes marginal utility
of services gained from deposit holdings, and un;i;t denotes marginal (dis-
)utility from working time. The ow budget constraint for each household
reads:
Ptwi;tni;t + Pti;t  Ptci;t + PtWACi;t + Pt i;t
+
Di;t
RDt
 Di;t 1 + Et['t;t+1Si;t]  Si;t 1. (4.2)
Household i supplies labor against the real wage rate wi;t, invests in deposits,
and state contingent claims Si;t, where RDt denotes the risk-free rate of
return on deposits, and 't;t+1 the stochastic discount factor. Prots from
the production sector i;t; are distributed to the households. The household
further has to pay a lump-sum tax which is denoted as  i;t. We assume that
households have to set their individual wage rate wi;t. Wage rigidities are
introduced by constraining the optimal choice of wi;t by wage adjustment
cost WACi;t which each household individually faces when adjusting the
nominal wage rate.45 These costs are specied in the following way:
WACi;t =
!W
2
 
Ptwi;t
Pt 1wi;t 1
 
1 wwt 1
   1!2 yt, (4.3)
where t 1 =
Pt 1
Pt 2
denotes past ination and  denotes the steady state
ination rate. The parameter !W > 0measures the degree of wage stickiness
and the degree of wage indexation to past ination is measured by w 2
(0; 1). Each household has to pay an increasing and convex cost which is
zero at the steady state. This cost is measured in terms of aggregate output
45The specication of wage adjustment cost we use here is similar to Kim (2000), and
Ireland (2007) which is based on Rotembergs (1982) quadratic cost of price adjustment.
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when the pace of its nominal wage changes deviates from an index number
of the steady state ination rate and the past ination rate.
Household i0s borrowing is restricted by the following no-Ponzi game
condition lims!1Et't;t+sSi;t+s  0; as well as by the non-negativity con-
straint for deposit holdings Di;t  0. Maximizing the objective (4.1) subject
the budget constraint (4.2) and the two aforementioned borrowing con-
straints, leads for given initial values Di; 1, Si; 1, ci; 1, wi; 1,  1 > 0; to
the following rst order conditions for consumption, investments in deposits,
and contingent claims,
tuc;i;t=i;t, (4.4)
i;t
RDt
= Et
i;t+1
t+1
+ Et
ud;i;t+1
t+1
, (4.5)
't;t+1=

t+1
i;t+1
i;t
, (4.6)
and the budget constraint (4.2) holding with equality, as well as the transver-
sality conditions, where i;t  0 denotes the multiplier on the budget con-
straint.
Households are assumed to be monopolistically supplying di¤erentiated
labor services ni;t. Perfectly competitive labor packers (or unions) buy
di¤erentiated labor input, aggregate it through the technology n1=
w
t
t =R 1
0
n
1=wt
i;t di, and supply the e¤ective labor units nt. Here, the elasticity
of substitution between di¤erentiated labor services is given by #t =
wt
wt  1 ;
and varies exogenously over time. Specically we assume that #t > 1, im-
plying that 0 < wt < 1; where 
w
t is driven by a wage markup shock. Labor
packers (unions) sell e¤ective units of labor to intermediate goods produc-
ing rms at price wt, which denotes the aggregate real wage rate. Prot
maximization then leads to the following labor demand46
ni;t =

wi;t
wt
 #t
nt. (4.7)
The rst order condition for the wage rate wi;t is derived from the house-
holds utility maximization problem where the labor demand function (4.7)
is taken into account for as an additional constraint. Due to the assumption
46See Appendix C.3 for derivation of the labor demand function.
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of wage adjustment cost we can derive a wage Phillips curve for the model
from the rst order condition47
wt
1 wwt 1
  1

wt
1 wwt 1
yt   nt
(
w
t  1)!w
(wt mrst   wt)
= Et

t+1
t

wt
1 wwt
  1

wt+1
1 wwt
yt+1

, (4.8)
where wt =
wt
wt 1
denotes the wage ination rate, and mrst denotes the rep-
resentative households marginal rate of substitution between consumption
and leisure, where
mrst =  un;t
t
. (4.9)
Here we already took into account that trade in contingent assets implies
that the marginal utility of consumption is the same across households, any
household who is permitted to optimize chooses the same supply of ni;t.
The rst order conditions (4.4) to (4.6), and (4.8) can then be summa-
rized as
1
RDt
= Et

1
t+1
t+1uc;t+1
tuc;t

1 +
ud;t+1
uc;t+1

, (4.10)
1
REt
= Et

1
t+1
t+1uc;t+1
tuc;t

, (4.11)
wt
1 wwt 1
  1

wt
1 wwt 1
yt   nt
(
w
t  1)!W
(wt mrst   wt)
= Et

t+1uc;t+1
tuc;t

wt
1 wwt
  1

wt+1
1 wwt
yt+1

, (4.12)
where the risk free consumption Euler equation rate REt is dened in the
usual way, REulert =
1
Et't;t+1
.
4.2.2 Production
The production sector consists of perfectly competitive intermediate goods
producing rms, monopolistically competitive retailers, and perfectly com-
petitive bundlers who supply the nal wholesale good.
There is a continuum of perfectly competitive intermediate goods pro-
ducing rms. Firm j 2 [0; 1] produces intermediate goods ymj;t with labor,
47See Appendix C.4 for derivation of the wage Phillips Curve.
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which is hired from labor packers, and with its own stock of capital kj;t.
The production technology is identical for all rms j and exhibits standard
neoclassical properties:
ymj;t = atn

j;t (uj;tkj;t 1)
1  , (4.13)
where  2 (0; 1); and at is a random productivity level with mean one,
and uj;t 2 (0; 1) governs the rm js level of capital utilization. A rm
j accumulates physical capital kj;t by investing xj;t; subject to adjustment
costs  I

xj;t
xj;t 1

associated with changes in the level of investment
kj;t   (1  )kj;t 1 = It

1   I

xj;t
xj;t 1

xj;t,
where  I

xj;t
xj;t 1

= I
2

xj;t
xj;t 1
  1
2
; with I > 0; and  2 (0; 1); denotes
the depreciation rate of investment expenditures. Investment-specic tech-
nology It is assumed to evolve as a stationary AR(1) process.
Demand for external funds is introduced in Christo¤el and Schabert
(2013) by assuming that wages have to be paid on a banking account before
goods are sold, such that rms have to borrow in terms of one-period loans
Lj;t from banks at the price 1RLt
:
Lj;t
RLt
 Ptwtnj;t. (4.14)
Christo¤el and Schabert (2013) abstract from asymmetric information is-
sues and limited commitment, and assume that rms fully repay one unit
of currency per unit of loan in the subsequent period, such that RLt denotes
a risk-free rate of return on loans. The budget constraint of rm j can then
be written as
Ptv
f
j;t   Ztatnt (uj;tkj;t 1)1  + Ptwtnj;t  

Lj;t
RLt

+ Ptxj;t  Lj;t 1, (4.15)
where Ptv
f
j;t denotes intermediate goods producing rm j
0s prots and Zt
denotes the price of the intermediate good. Firm j maximizes the present
value of prots subject to (4.14), and (4.15), and a no-Ponzi game condition:
max
fnj;t;lj;t;xj;t;kj;tg
Et
1X
k=0
t;t+kv
f
j;t+k; s.t. (4.14) and (4.15);
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where t;t+k, denotes a stochastic discount factor (see 4.2), and given that
kj; 1 > 0; and xj; 1 > 0. The rst order conditions for labor demand and
loan demand are
mct+kat+kn
 1
j;t+k (uj;t+kkj;t+k 1)
1  = wt+k 

RLt+k
REt+k

, (4.16)
lj;t
RLt
 wtnj;t, (4.17)
where we used Zt+k
Pt+k
= mct+k; and (4.17) is binding if t+k =

RLt+k
REt+k

 1 > 0,
where t is the multiplier on the constraint (4.17). The rst order conditions
for investment expenditures and physical capital read
1= qj;t+k
I
t+k

1   I

xj;t+k
xj;t+k 1

   0I

xj;t+k
xj;t+k 1

xj;t+k
xj;t+k 1

+Et+k
"
t+k+1
t+k
qj;t+k+1
I
t+k+1 
0
I

xj;t+k+1
xj;t+k

xj;t+k+1
xj;t+k
2#
,(4.18)
qj;t+k=Et+k
t+k+1
t+k
[qj;t+k+1(1  ) + rkj;t+k+1uj;t+k+1
  rk (ut+k+1   1) + {  rk
2
(ut+k+1   1)2], (4.19)
where qt denotes the standard Tobins q, and where rkj;t+k, which is the
rst derivative of (4.13) w.r.t. capacity utilization uj;t+k, is given by
rkj;t+k = mct+k(1  )at+knj;t+k (uj;t+kkj;t+k 1)  kj;t+k 1. (4.20)
Further rk denotes the steady state value of (4.20) and { denotes the inverse
of the steady-state elasticity of the capital adjustment cost function. Note
that the rms investment decision is distorted if the interest rate on loans
di¤ers from the Euler equation rate RLt 6= REt .
Monopolistically competitive retailers buy intermediate goods ymt =R 1
0
ymj;tdj; at the real price mct. A retailer k 2 [0; 1]; relabels the inter-
mediate good to yk;t and sells it at the price Pk;t to perfectly competitive
bundlers. Those bundle the goods yk;t to the nal consumption good yt
with the technology y
" 1
"
t =
R 1
0
y
" 1
"
k;t dk; where the elasticity of substitution
is dened as "t =
pt
pt 1 , with "t > 1; implying that 0 < 
p
t < 1. Further, 
p
t
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is driven by a price markup shock. The cost minimizing demand for yk;t is
therefore given by48
yk;t =

Pk;t
Pt
 "
yt. (4.21)
Further, we introduce price rigidities through price adjustment costs PACk:t
which are given by49
PACk:t =
!P
2
 
Pk;t
Pk;t 1
 
1 ppt 1
   1!2 yt, (4.22)
where !P > 0; measures the degree of price stickiness and p 2 (0; 1);
measures the degree of price indexation to past ination. Each retailer has
to pay an increasing and convex cost which is zero at the steady state. This
cost is measured in terms of aggregate output when the pace of its nominal
price changes deviates from an index number of the steady state ination
rate and the past ination rate. From the optimal price setting behavior of
the retailer we derive the price Phillips curve:50

t
1 ppt 1
  1

t
1 ppt 1
  
p
t
!p (
p
t   1)

mct   1
pt

= Et

t+1
1 ppt
  1

t+1
1 ppt
yt+1
yt

. (4.23)
4.2.3 Financial intermediaries
The basic role of the nancial intermediation sector is to provide loans to
rms which are required to pay wages before goods are sold. The model
allows for the propagation of monetary policy through a bank balance sheet
channel by including a banks balance sheet constraint and costs associated
with the supply of credit. Following Curdia and Woodford (2011) there
is a real resource cost related to the supply of credit from banks to rms.
These credit costs are increasing in the amount of loans and decreasing in the
amount of reserves. As pointed out by Christo¤el and Schabert (2013), while
48Which is derived analogously to the labor demand function (4.7).
49The specication of price adjustment cost we use here is taken from Ireland (2007)
which is based on Rotembergs (1982) quadratic cost of price adjustment.
50See Appendix C.5 for derivation of the wage Phillips Curve.
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lacking an explicit microfoundation this assumption allows to introduce the
relation between balance sheet items and the cost of providing credit.51 In
addition to this, we follow Curdia and Woodford (2011) by assuming that
banks face a balance sheet constraint which requires deposits holdings to
equal the expected payo¤ from the assets on the balance sheet.
There is a continuum of perfectly competitive nancial intermediaries,
which are called banks. They receive deposits from householdDt =
R
Di;tdi;
and invest in loans Lt =
R
Lj;tdj, and reserves Mt. Further, there are two
types of bonds which are held by the banks. Short-term government bonds
BSt are issued at the price
1
RSt
in period t and deliver the payo¤one in period
t + 1; where RSt denotes the short-term bonds gross return. Long-term
government bondsBLt are assumed to be perpetuities. Wemodel the stock of
long-term bonds in the same way as Chen, Curdia, and Ferrero (2012). The
perpetuitiesprice at time t is pLt . Perpetuities pay exponentially decaying
coupons st in period t+ s+1, with t 2 (0; 1]. We assume that the coupon
rate is following an AR(1) process. The price of a long-term bond in period
t, issued s periods ago, pLt s is a function of the coupon and the current
price pLt s = 
s
tp
L
t .
52 The gross yield to maturity Y TMt at time t on the
long-term bond perpetuity, is a function of its price and the coupon rate53
Y TMt =
1
pLt
+ t: (4.24)
Banks buy perpetuities at the period-t price pLt , which pay o¤ 1 + tp
L
t+1 =
pLt+1

1
pLt+1
+ t

= pLt+1Y TMt+1, units of currency in period t+ 1.
Following Curdia and Woodford (2011), in each period the banks bal-
ance sheet has to be satised. It requires the bank to acquire deposits in
the maximum amount that it can repay in the end of each period from the
expected payo¤s from its assets:
Dt =Mt +B
S
t + Et

pLt+1Y TMt+1B
L
t

+ Lt. (4.25)
Following Christo¤el and Schabert (2013) banks can use government bonds
51Christo¤el and Schabert (2013) compare Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Gertler and
Karadi (2013) for theoretical approaches with an explicit microfoundation and Kashyap
and Stein (2000) and Jimenez et al. (2012) for empirical studies on the relation between
credit costs and the bank balance sheet.
52See Appendix C.6 for the derivation of this expression.
53See Appendix C.7 for the derivation of this expression.
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in an asset exchange for additional central bank money It:
It  St
BSt 1
Rmt
+ Lt
pLt Y TMtB
L
t 1
Rmt
+ "t;Coll, (4.26)
where the value of the bond is discounted at the main renancing rate Rmt :
The parameters St and 
L
t are additional monetary policy instruments.
They allow the central bank to set the fractions of short-term bonds and
long-term bonds which are eligible for repo contacts, and therefore to control
the amount of extra reserves supplied to banks. Further, "t;Coll denotes
an i.i.d. exogenous money supply shock with zero mean which eases the
collateral constraint. Note that we assume that in the absence of LSAPs,
the parameter Lt = 0; implying that only short-term Treasuries are eligible
for repos.
Costs of nancial intermediation are specied in an implicit way, which
is particularly useful for calibration and estimation purposes. Banks face
real resource costs t  0; when they supply loans to rms. Following Cur-
dia and Woodford (2011), these costs are convex, increasing in the amount
of loans, with l;t  0, and decreasing in the amount of real reserves
Mt 1+It tDt 1
Pt
, with m;t  0. Christo¤el and Schabert (2013) consider
that the bank relies on reserves to manage deposits in accordance to the
relation tDt 1. Further, t evolves according to an AR(1) process. For the
quantitative analysis we follow Christo¤el and Schabert (2013) and employ
a specic form for the cost of nancial intermediation which is given by
t = t

Lt
Pt
rc Mt 1 + It   tDt 1
Pt
 rc
, (4.27)
where rc  0, rc  0, and t denotes a shock to the cost of nancial
intermediation. The parameter rc denotes the elasticity of the banking
cost function with respect to real loan provision and rc is the elasticity of
banking cost with respect to real reserves holdings.
Given that bonds are discounted at the rate Rmt (see 4.26) acquisition of
reserves It is associated with costs It (Rmt   1). The real prots of a bank
vIt are thus given by
Pt
I
t =
Dt
RDt
 Dt 1   B
S
t
RSt
+BSt 1   pLt BLt + pLt Y TMtBLt 1
  Lt
RLt
+ Lt 1  Mt +Mt 1   It (Rmt   1)  Ptt. (4.28)
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The banks aim at maximizing the present value of prots, subject to (4.25)
and (4.26). Equation (4.28) can be reduced to
Pt
I
t =
Dt
RDt
  B
S
t
RSt
  pLt BLt  
Lt
RLt
 Mt   It (Rmt   1)  Ptt,
by taking into account the bank balance sheet condition (4.25). Further,
a no-Ponzi game condition lims!1Ett;t+sDi;t+s  0; as well as Lt  0,
BSt  0, BLt  0, andMt  0 have to be satised.54 The banksoptimization
problem then reads
maxEt
1X
k=0
t;t+kv
I
t+k; s:t: (4.25) and (4.26),
The rst order conditions with regard to deposits, short-term bonds, long-
term bonds, loans, money holdings, and reserves It are given by
1
RDt+k
=
1
REt+k
Et+k [ tm;t+k+1] t+k,
1
RSt+k
=
1
REt+k
Et+k

t+k+1
S
t+k+1
 t+k,
1=
1
REt+k
Et+k

RLBt+k+1Y TMt+k+1t+k+1
L
t+k+1

 t+kEt+k

RLBt+k+1Y TMt+k+1

,
1
RLt+k
= l;t+k  t+k,
1=
1
REt+k
Et+k [ m;t+k+1] t+k,
m;t+k=1 
 
1 + t+k

Rmt+k.
Note that 't+k;t+k+1 =
t;t+k+1
t;t+kt+k+1
, and 1
REt+k
= Et+k

't+k;t+k+1

, andRLBt+k+1
=
pLt+k+1
pLt+k
, and t+k denotes the multiplier on the balance sheet constraint
(4.25), and t+k denotes the multiplier on the collateral constraint (4.26).
54Where the real values of the variables are given by mt = MtPt , it =
It
Pt
, dt = DtPt ,
bSt =
BSt
Pt
, bLt =
BLt
Pt
, and lt = LtPt :
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Note that real cost of nancial intermediation are given by
t = t (lt)
rc

mt 1
t
  tdt 1
t
+ it
 rc
, with the marginal cost of loan provi-
sion l;t = rc
t
lt
, and the marginal contribution of reserves to the reduction
of intermediation costs m;t =   rct(mt 1 1t  tdt 1 1t +it) .
By eliminating t the banksrst order conditions can be reduced to
1
RDt+k
=1 + (t   1)
1
REt+k
Et+k [ m;t+k+1] , (4.29)
1
RSt+k
=1 +
1
REt+k
 
Et+k

t+k+1
S
t+k+1
  Et+k [ m;t+k+1] , (4.30)
1=
1
REt+k
(Et+k

RLBt+k+1Y TMt+k+1t+k+1
L
t+k+1

 Et+k [ m;t+k+1]Et+k

RLBt+k+1Y TMt+k+1

)
+Et+k

RLBt+k+1Y TMt+k+1

, (4.31)
1
RLt+k
=1  l;t+k   1
REt+k
Et+k [ m;t+k+1] , (4.32)
m;t+k=1 
 
1 + t+k

Rmt+k. (4.33)
Further, the following complementary slackness conditions have to be sat-
ised
it+k  St+k
bSt+k 1
t+kRmt+k
+ Lt+k
pLt+kY TMt+kb
L
t+k 1
t+kRmt+k
, t+k  0;
t+k

St+k
bSt+k 1
t+k
+ Lt+k
pLt+kY TMt+kb
L
t+k 1
t+k
 Rmt+kit+k

= 0:
as well as the balance sheet constraint (4.25).
The condition for the optimal choice of deposit holdings (4.29) relates
the inverse rate of return on deposits to the payo¤ and the expected mar-
ginal reduction of banking costs implied by the acquisition of the last unit
of deposits. Condition (4.30) relates the inverse of the return on short-term
government bonds to the payo¤ adjusted by the expected marginal con-
tribution to the relaxation of the collateral constraint which is induced by
holding the last unit of short-term bonds and for the expected marginal
reduction of the banking costs. Note that the second term of the right-
hand side of (4.30) captures the liquidity premium on the short-term bond
rate which is induced by the short-term bond being eligible for an exchange
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against reserves (see 4.26). The condition for the optimal choice of a long-
term bond holdings (4.31) relates the perpetuitys price to the expected
payo¤s corrected for the expected marginal contribution on the banking
costs and the expected marginal relaxation of the collateral constraint. The
rst term on the right-hand side of (4.31) denotes the long term bonds ex-
pected liquidity premium. In absence of LSAP measures, which means that
the respective policy parameter is set Lt = 0; this premium will be equal
to zero. Condition (4.32) requires that the inverse of the return on loans
equals the expected payo¤ corrected for the marginal cost of loan provision
and the expected future marginal change of the banking cost function in-
duced by the future expected payo¤ from the last unit of loans. Finally, the
optimal central bank money demand is determined by (4.33), which relates
the marginal contribution of the last unit of reserves to the reduction of the
banking cost m;t; to t; the multiplier on the collateral constraint (4.26),
and the policy rate Rmt .
4.2.4 The government
The government raises lump-sum taxes  t and purchases goods gt. It is-
sues short-term bonds, where we follow Schabert and Reynard (2009) by
assuming that nominal short-term bond supply grows with a constant rate
BTSt =  B
TS
t 1, with    1. It further issues nominal long-term debt secu-
rities BTLt which are modeled as perpetuities with coupon payments that
decay exponentially at the rate t 2 (0; 1]. Since bonds issued in period
t   s are equivalent to st bonds issued in t, we assume without loss of
generality that all long-term bonds are of one type (which implies that
the government redeems all old bonds) in each period.
The governments real goods purchases and the supply of long-term
bonds are exogenously determined by AR(1) processes. Government goods
purchases follow an autoregressive rule for deviations of gt from the steady
state value g: Following Chen, Curdia, and Ferrero (2012), we assume that
the government controls the supply of long-term bonds by an autoregressive
rule for deviations of long-term bondsmarket values in real terms pLt b
TL
t ;
from their steady state level pLbTL:
gt
g

=

gt 1
g
g
e"g;t, (4.34)
pLt b
TL
t
pLbTL

=

pLt 1b
TL
t 1
pLbTL
b
e"b;t, (4.35)
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where b, g 2 (0; 1) ; and "b;t, and "g;t are i.i.d. innovations.
The treasurys budget constraint reads
BTSt
RSt
+ pLt B
TL
t = B
TS
t 1 + p
L
t Y TMtB
TL
t 1 + Ptgt   Pt t   Ptmt . (4.36)
The left-hand side of (4.36) is the market value of the total amount of short-
term bonds and long-term bonds issued by the treasury at time t, expressed
in nominal terms. The right-hand side is the total decit at time t, which is
the cost of servicing bonds maturing in period t plus government providing
net of taxes and central bank transfers mt . Further it is assumed that the
government has access to non-distortionary lump-sum transfers, which can
be adjusted to balance the budget. Let BTSt denote the total stock of newly
issued short-term bonds, which is either held by banks BSt , or the central
bank BCSt ; then: B
TS
t = B
S
t + B
CS
t . Analogously let Let B
TL
t denote the
total stock of newly issued long-term bonds which is either held by banks
BLt , or the central bank B
CL
t , then: B
TL
t = B
L
t +B
CL
t .
4.2.5 The central bank
The central bank supplies money outright, MHt =
R 1
0
MHi;tdi, and in open
market operations via repurchase agreements against short-term bonds,
MRt =
R 1
0
MRi;tdi. Newly issued money thus sums up to It = M
H
t  MHt 1 +
MRt , for which the central bank receives government bonds. Hence, in pe-
riod t the central bank gets ItRmt units of bonds for It units of cash, such
that its budget constraint reads
BCSt
RSt
 BCSt 1 + pLt BCLt   pLt Y TMtBCLt 1 + Ptmt
=
 
MHt  MHt 1

Rmt +M
R
t (R
m
t   1) :
Following Schabert and Reynard (2009), we identify seigniorage revenues
as interest earnings from issuing money via repos or from holding interest
bearing assets:
Pt
m
t = B
CS
t  
BCSt
RSt
+ pLt Y TMtB
CL
t 1   pLt 1BCLt 1 +MRt (Rmt   1) :
The central bank is assumed to transfer Ptmt directly to the public sec-
tor. When substituting out central bank transfers, bond holdings evolve
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according to
BCSt  BCSt 1 + pLt BCLt   pLt 1BCLt 1 = Rmt (Mt  Mt 1) : (4.37)
For the policy rate Rmt we follow Smets and Wouters (2007) by applying
a simple feedback rule, which describes how the central bank adjusts the
policy rate in response to deviations of Rmt 1 from its steady state level
Rm, to deviations of ination from its steady state level , to real output
deviation from its steady state y, and to the contemporary output growth:
Rmt =
 
Rmt 1
r Rm t

 yt
y
y(1 r) yt
yt 1
dy
exp "r;t; (4.38)
where Rm > 1, r  0,   0, y  0, and dy  0; and the "r;ts are
normally and i.i.d. with Et 1"r;t = 0.
We follow Christo¤el and Schabert (2013) by assuming that the cen-
tral bank further controls reserves injections by deciding on the fraction of
eligible assets to be purchased in period t, i.e. it sets St and 
L
t . Both vari-
ables a¤ect the size and the composition of the central bank balance sheet.
There are many possible ways to set St and 
L
t . We will consider di¤erent
regimes for Lt , for the quantitative analysis. Finally it has to be specied
how money is supplied either outright or via repos. For this purpose, it is
assumed that the central bank exogenously sets the fraction of repos
Mt = M
R
t ; with  > 0:
4.2.6 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, there will be no arbitrage opportunities and markets clear. A
complete equilibrium denition can be found in appendix C.1. In the follow-
ing, we describe some particular properties: We will restrict our attention to
equilibria where the liquidity constraint (4.14) and the collateral constraint
(4.26) are binding, which requires RLt > R
E
t ) t > 0, Rmt   1 <  m;t.
Both requirements will be ensured in equilibrium, by an appropriate choice
of parameters for the cost function of nancial intermediation (4.27).
We further use that the total stock of short-term bonds and long-term
bonds outstanding is either held by banks or the central bank, BTSt =
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BSt + B
CS
t , and B
TL
t = B
L
t + B
CL
t , and (4.37) to identify how banksbond
holdings evolve over time:
BSt  BSt 1 + pLt BLt   pLt 1BLt 1
=BTSt  BTSt 1 + pLt BTLt   pLt 1BTLt 1  Rmt (Mt  Mt 1) ; (4.39)
where
BSt
RSt
=
BTSt
RSt
  St BSt 1; (4.40)
pLt B
L
t = p
L
t B
TL
t   Lt pLt Y TMtBLt 1: (4.41)
Condition (4.39) thus describes how banks bond holdings increase with
bond supply and decrease with money supply Rmt (Mt  Mt 1), while a
higher the price of money Rmt tends to raise the central banks bond holdings
(see 4.37).
Appendix C.2 provides the steady state of the model for a binding collat-
eral constraint ( > 0) where variables without time indices denote steady
state values.
4.3 Calibration and estimation
4.3.1 Calibration
In order to derive quantitative results, the model is partly calibrated and
estimated with Bayesian techniques. Table 4.2 summarizes the calibrated
parameters and Table 4.3 summarizes the estimated parameters. Most para-
meters a¤ecting the steady state are calibrated while key parameters driving
the dynamics of the model are estimated. For the study presented in this
chapter, we try to use standard parameter values as far as possible. The
models interest rates are calibrated to match the average values of their
empirical counterparts.55 These are calculated for the time period covered
by the underlying data sample ranging from 1964:Q3 to 2012:Q3. Hence,
we calibrate the steady state value for the quarterly gross policy rate to
equal Rm = 1:0142, the gross deposit rate RD = 1:0145, the gross loan
rate RL = 1:0214, and the gross yield to maturity of long-term bonds
Y TM = 1:0163. Note that we calibrate Y TM to match the average yield
to maturity of 7-year U.S. Treasuries. As depicted in Table 4.1 the Federal
55See Appendix C.8 for a data description.
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Table 4.1: Distribution of LSAP 2 Treasury purchases by maturity range
Nominal Coupon Securities by Maturity Range TIPS
21=2   4 4  51=2 51=2   7 7  10 10  30 11=2   30
Years Years Years Years Years Years
20% 20% 23% 23% 6% 3%
Notes: Beginning with the operations included in the tentative schedule announced on
July 13, 2011, the Desk planed to distribute purchases across the following seven maturity
sectors based on the approximate weights above. The on-the-run 7-year note will be
considered part of the 51=2- to 7-year sector, and the on-the-run 10-year note will be
considered part of the 7- to 10-year sector.
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Open Market Committees Trading Desk distributed its LSAP 2 purchases
across seven maturity sectors covering largely Treasury securities with ma-
turity lengths of 51
2
to 10 years.56 For the household preferences we follow
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) by calibrating the inverse of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution to equal  = 1 which indicates a
log utility function. Due to the the assumption that deposits directly enter
households utility we have to dene a value for the scaling parameter %. We
calibrate % such that the steady state value of RD implied by (4.10) matches
the mean of its empirical counterpart (see Appendix C.2, equation C.24).
The steady state elasticity of substitution between di¤erentiated labor types
is calibrated as # = 6, implying a steady state value of w = 1:2.57 The
steady state elasticity of substitution between di¤erentiated goods is cali-
brated as " = 6, implying a steady state value of p = 1:2. The quarterly
time discount factor  is set to 0:9935 and the quarterly steady state price
ination is 0:93 percent58, implying by RE = 

a quarterly steady state
Euler equation rate of 1:0159 percent. The capital depreciation rate is set
to  = 0:03, the steady state capital utilization rate is u = 1. We follow
Christo¤el and Schabert (2013) by setting the steady state working time to
56U.S. Treasuries which mature in more than one to up to ten years are denoted
as Treasury Notes, U.S. Treasuries maturing after more than ten years are denoted as
Treasury Bonds.
57For the estimation we use output data but refrain from a further decomposition in
order to keep the model and the number of structural shocks small.
58The observed annualized average U.S. ination rate for the data sample, 1964:Q3 to
2012:Q3, is 3.77 percent.
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n = 1=3 and the fraction of money held outright to  = 0:1. The average
duration measure of a 7 year U.S. Treasury is assumed to be of 51
2
years59
for the time period under consideration, implying a steady state decay fac-
tor for the perpetuitys coupon rate of  = DurationY TM Y TM
Duration
= 0:83.60 By
the assumed functional form of the nancial intermediation cost function
which is given by equation (4.27), the model includes three additional para-
meters. We calibrate the steady state scaling parameter  in order to match
the steady state value of the spread RL   RD which is implied by (4.32)
minus (4.29) with the mean of its empirical counterpart (see Appendix C.2,
equation C.26). The parameters rc and rc which are the elasticities of
the banking cost function with respect to reserves and loans are estimated.
The calibration of the model parameters implies the following ordering of
the steady state interest rates: RL > Y TM > REuler > RD > Rm. Fol-
lowing Smets and Wouters (2007) we calibrate an exogenous government
spending-to-GDP ratio G=Y . For the present data sample G=Y is found to
be equal to 0:2:
Monetary policy in the model operates via two margins. The standard
monetary policy channel operates via the interest rate rule. Note that we
estimate the parameters governing this policy reaction function. In addition
to the policy interest rate there are further monetary policy variables which
are directly or indirectly a¤ecting the cost of nancial intermediation (4.27).
One of those is the fraction of reserves that the banks have to hold to manage
the deposits t: We estimate the parameters of the AR(1) which is driving
t. For the estimation we set the fraction of short-term bonds eligible for the
asset exchange against central bank money S to unity implying that money
injections vary with the real value of short-term bonds. The fraction of long-
term bonds eligible for repo agreements Lt basically captures the models
channel for nonstandard balance sheet policy measures, namely LSAP 2. In
absence of such a policy measure the parameter Lt is equal to zero. For
the policy simulation experiment we analyze the models predictions for a
specic path of Lt which takes non-zero values as a policy reaction to a
severe crisis scenario.
59This is calculated as the mean of the average values of the duration measure series
for U.S. Treasury securities with 5 to 7 years remaining to maturity (Datastream series
USSB57L.R) and for U.S. Treasury securities with 7 to 10 years remaining to maturity
(Datastream series USSB70L.R).
60For the derivation of the relationship between the bond duration measure and the
decay factor of a perpetuity see Appendix C.7.
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Table 4.2: Values assigned to the calibrated parameters
Parameter Value Denition
 0:9935 Discount factor
 0:03 Steady-state capital depreciation rate
u 1 Steady-state capacity utilization rate
w 1:2 Steady-state wage mark-up
p 1:2 Steady-state price mark-up
G=Y 0:2 Steady-state ratio of gov. consumption to GDP
n 0:33 Steady-state of hours worked
S 1 Share of short-term bonds purchased
L 0 Share of long-term bonds purchased
 1:0093 Steady state price ination
RM 1:0142 Steady state main renancing rate
RL 1:0214 Steady state loan rate
Y TM 1:0163 Steady state yield to maturity
Duration 5:5 Duration of long-term bonds
RD 1:0145 Steady state deposit rate
 0:1 Fraction of money held outright
Notes: This table shows the values for the calibrated parameters and the steady state
ratios.
4.3.2 Data and shocks
For the estimation we use in this chapter quarterly U.S. data ranging from
1964:Q3 to 2012:Q3, including data on the recession which followed the
subprime crisis. The macroeconomic time series are taken from the Federal
Reserve Economic Database (FRED) which is maintained by the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis. We use real per capita GDP which is the
empirical counterpart to the models variables ct + it + gt, real per capita
consumption ct, real per capita investment it, hours worked nt, real wages
Wt=Pt, ination calculated from the GDP Implicit Price Deator deator
Pt
Pt 1
, real per capita bank reserves Mt
Pt
, and real per capita deposits Dt
Pt
. We
use interest rate data on the federal funds rate to proxy for Rmt , the 3-month
certicate of deposit rate for RDt , the 7-year treasury constant maturity rate
for Y TMt, and on Moodys Baa-rated corporate bond rate for RLt . All time
series are detrended, except for the interest rates, hours worked, and real
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deposits.61 We use a linear trend, as our model does not explicitly consider
growth.
In order to estimate the model we have to introduce as many shocks as
observable variables to the model. We employ eight macroeconomic shocks
that are used in comparable studies. A time preference shock (";t), a total
factor productivity shock ("a;t), a price markup shock ("p;t), a markup shock
on wages ("w;t), an interest rate shock ("r;t), a government spending shock
("g;t), an investment-specic technology shock (";t), and a shock to the
fraction of reserves required to manage deposits (";t). Further, we introduce
a decay factor shock ("s;t), and a shock to the long-term bond supply ("b;t).
In addition to these shocks we introduce a shock that a¤ects the cost of
nancial intermediation (";t) and a shock driving a wedge between the real
value of short-term bonds and the collateral constraint in the provision of
money via repos ("t;Coll). This can be interpreted as a money supply shock
and is required to account for the fact that previously to late 2008 only
roughly 50 percent of the observed asset holdings by the Fed were short-term
government securities.62 Furthermore, due to reasons of data availability we
set the fraction of long-term bonds purchased under repos Lt over the whole
data sample range equal to zero. Therefore, the estimation residual "^t;Coll
should capture the extra money injections required to match the share of
the observed variation in the data on reserves which can not be explained
by (4.26) with Lt = 0:
It = 
S
t
BSt 1
Rmt
+ "^t;Coll; with "^t;Coll = Lt
pLt Y TMtB
L
t 1
Rmt
+ "t;Coll. (4.42)
Hence, we expect "^t;Coll to capture the increase in reserves supply which was
induced by unconventional balance sheet policies such as LSAP 2. All shocks
except the policy rate shock and the money supply shock are modelled as
AR(1) processes.63
61See Appendix C.8 for a complete data description and the description of the mapping
of these variables to the states.
62From the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED databank we use monthly data
on the face value of U.S. Treasury securities held by the Fed, maturing in within 15 days
(TREAS15), maturing in 16 days to 90 days (TREAS1590), and maturing in 91 days to
1 year (TREAS911Y) which sums up to the current face value of the Feds holdings of
Treasury bills. This is divided by the total face value of U.S. Treasury securities held by
the Fed (TREAST).
63See Appendix C.1.
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4.3.3 Estimation
As pointed out by Coenen and Straub (2005), employing Bayesian inference
methods allows formalizing the use of prior information from earlier studies
at both the micro and macro level for estimating the parameters of a possi-
bly complex DSGE model. This seems particularly appealing in situations
where the sample period of the data is relatively short, as it is the case
for the present chapter. It is further pointed out, that Bayesian inference
may also help to alleviate the inherent numerical di¢ culties associated with
solving the highly non-linear estimation problem.
The log-linearized DSGE model leads to a rational expectations system
(see Sims (2002)) which is given by
 0 () st =  1 () st 1 +	() t +() t, (4.43)
where st is a vector of model variables, t is a vector of exogenous shocks,
t is a vector of rational expectations errors, and  is a vector of struc-
tural parameters. Further  0,  1, 	, and  are matrices that are nonlinear
functions of structural parameters of the model. Typically standard per-
turbation techniques are employed which lead as a solution to the linear
state-space representation64
st=1 () st 1 + " () "t; "t  NID (0;") , (4.44)
Yt= 0 +  1 () st + ut; ut  NID (0;u) . (4.45)
The rst equation is the state transition equation. In particular, 1 and "
are functions of the matrices  0,  1, and 	. The second equation is the
observation equation with measurement errors being collected in ut; where
Yt corresponds to the vector of observables at time t. The matrix  1 which
contains zeros and ones, relates the models denitions with the data. The
vector  0 is required to match the means of the observed data.
Let p(jm) denote the prior distribution of the parameter vector  2 ;
for some model m 2 M , and let L(YT j;m) denote the likelihood function
for the observed data, YT = fytgTt=1 ; conditional on parameter vector 
and model m. The Kalman lter is employed to construct the likelihood of
the model under consideration. The joint posterior distribution p(jYT ;m),
conditional on the sample data YT and the model m, equals the model
64The following description is based on Schorfheide (2000).
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likelihood, multiplied by the priors on the model parameters, up to a factor
of proportionality which is known as Bayes rule
p(jYT ;m) / L(YT j;m)p(jm): (4.46)
The Kalman lter generates projections of the state of the linear approxi-
mate solution of (4.43) for the model, given an information set of observed
macro time series.
The posterior is evaluated by applying the Random Walk Metropolis
(RWM) algorithm which belongs to the class of Metropolis-Hastings algo-
rithms (see An and Schorfheide (2007), Schorfheide (2000)).65 For that pur-
pose rst a numerical optimization routine is used to maximize the log pos-
terior.66 The RWM algorithm constructs a Gaussian approximation around
the mode of the posterior kernel L(YT j;m)p(jm) and a scaled version
of the asymptotic covariance matrix which is the inverse of the negative
Hessian computed numerically at the posterior mode. The latter serves as
a covariance matrix for a proposal distribution. By applying rejection sam-
pling, the algorithm then generates a sequence of dependent draws from
the posterior that can be averaged to approximate posterior moments of
interest, such as location measures and measures of dispersion.67
65This algorithm is used by DYNARE.
66The log posterior kernel is maximized using Dynares Covariance Matrix Adapta-
tion Evolution Strategy (CMA-ES) algorithm. This algorithm is applied in the case if
derivative based methods, e.g. quasi-Newton BFGS or conjugate gradient, fail due to a
rugged search landscape, i.e. a search landscape with high variability in the evaluation
function value between neighbouring search positions. The CMA-ES is a second order
approach estimating a positive denite covariance matrix within an iterative procedure.
Specically, on convex-quadratic objective functions the covariance matrix of the search
distribution is set to the inverse Hessian matrix. In contrast to quasi-Newton methods,
the CMA-ES does not use or approximate gradients and does not require their existence
(See Hansen (2006), Hansen and Ostermeier (1996)).
67Let ~m denote the inverse of the (negative) Hessian computed at the posterior mode
~. A starting value (0) is drawn from N

~; c20
~m

. For s = 1; :::; S: draw # from the
proposal distribution N

(s 1); c20 ~m

. The jump from (s 1) is accepted

(s 1) = #

with probability min
n
1; r

(s 1); #jYT
o
and rejected

(s) = (s 1)

otherwise. Here
r

(s 1); #jYT

=
L(YT j~;m)p(~jm)
L(YT 
(s 1);m)p((s 1)jm) :
We use S = 1000000 and drop the rst 500000 to let the Markov chain produced by the
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4.3.4 Parameter prior distributions
In Table 4.3 we summarize the prior distributions for the estimated parame-
ters. We follow Chen, Curdia, and Ferrero (2012) to chose the parameters
prior distributions according to whether their supported intervals are in line
with economic theorys implications regarding the parameters value ranges.
Specically, we employ a gamma distribution for the parameters that should
be positive to constrain their support on the interval [0;1], we employ a
beta distribution for those parameters that span on the unit interval, and
we use the inverse-gamma distribution for the standard deviations of shock
innovations.
We chose the prior distributions for the parameters which are generally
found in applications of the canonical DSGE model by closely following
Smets and Wouters (2007). The utility functions habit parameter h is
assumed to be beta distributed uctuating around 0:7 with a standard error
of 0:1; and the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply ; is assumed
to be gamma distributed with mean 2:0 and standard error of 0:75. The
prior on the labor share in production  is beta distributed with the mean
set around 0:7 and with a standard deviation of 0:05. Following Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) we assume that the prior on the adjustment
cost parameter for investment I ; follows a gamma distribution with a mean
of 4:0 and a standard deviation of 1:5; and the inverse of the steady-state
elasticity of the capital adjustment cost function is assumed to be gamma
distributed with mean of 1:0 and a standard error of 0:25. For the priors
of the parameters which govern the indexation of wages and prices to past
ination w, and p; we follow Smets and Wouters (2007) and Justiniano,
Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2008) by choosing beta distributions with means
set to 0:5 and standard errors of 0:15. We chose the priors for the parameters
measuring the degree of price and wage stickiness !p and !w; similar to
Gerali et al. (2010). Both priors are gamma distributed with mean of 60
and a standard error of 20.
Regarding the parameters governing the Taylor rule we follow Justini-
ano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2008) who assume that r which governs
the central banks adjustments of the policy rate in response to changes in
its own lags, is beta distributed with a mean of 0:6 and a standard devia-
RWM algorithm converge. The scaling factor c0 is set to 0:3 which is intended to achieve
an average acceptance rate per chain of approximately 25% (See An and Schorfheide
(2007), Schorfheide (2000)).
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tion of 0:15. The parameters capturing the policy rate response to steady
state deviations of ination , to steady state deviations of output y, and
to contemporary output growth dy; are assumed to be gamma distributed
with means of 1:5, 1:25, and 1:25; where standard deviations are assumed
to be 0:15, 0:05, and 0:05.
Following Smets and Wouters (2007) we let the priors of the standard
errors of the innovations to the exogenous shock processes be inverse-gamma
distributed. Further we try to harmonize the priors on the stochastic
processes as much as possible. Specically, the priors for the standard
deviations of the shock processes known from the canonical DSGE model,
which are the standard deviation for the process of production technology
innovations a, preference innovations , government spending g, invest-
ment specic technology I , and the wage markup w, are set at a mean
of 0:005 with a standard deviation of 2. For the standard deviation of the
price markup innovation process p, the prior mean is set at 0:001 with a
standard deviations of 2. We set the prior mean of p lower as the prior
mean of w in accordance with the results by Gerali et al. (2010) and Benati
(2008).68
We set the mean of the standard deviation of the innovation to the policy
rate rm at 0:001 with a standard deviation of 2: Note that the innovation to
the policy rate does not follow an AR(1) process in logs as it is the case for
most of the models innovations. Hence, to harmonize the ex-ante expected
contributions of the shocks to the variability of the observed variables we
have to resize the mean of this standard deviation. As there is no previous
experience regarding the prior choice for the standard deviations of the
innovation processes governing the banking cost  , the fraction of reserves
required to manage deposits , the coupon decay factor s , the money
supply Coll, and the long-term bond supply b, we mainly adapt the same
choices regarding distribution, means, and standard deviations as for the
other innovation processes. Here we made an exception for the prior on
Coll, by setting its mean at 0:01. This is done because the shock is required
to contribute to the explanation of the observed signicant variation in the
68Gerali et al. (2010) introduce a banking sector to a DSGE model with nancial
frictions to analyze the role of banking intermediation in the transmission of monetary
impulses and shocks which are originated in the credit markets to the real economy. Wage
stickiness is found to be more important than price stickiness while the degree of price
indexation is relatively low. This result is in line with Benati (2008) who documents a
reduction in indexation for the U.S. in the post WWII sample.
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U.S. monetary base over the sample period. This seems to be an appropriate
approach as these priors can be regarded as being loose. Following Smets
and Wouters (2007), the priors of the persistence parameters of the AR(1)
processes are beta distributed with mean of 0:5 and standard deviation 0:2.
Further, the model is estimated with additional three nonstandard para-
meters. These are the parameter governing the marginal utility of deposits
'd, and the elasticities of the banking cost with respect to loan provision
rc; and with respect to reserves and injections rc. Note that these para-
meters are at the heart of the study presented in this chapter. The latter
two parameters govern the models mechanism which explains an important
channel through which the 2008/2009 nancial crisis and later the nonstan-
dard balance sheet policy measures worked. We estimate those parameters
to avoid biasing the estimations and simulations in either direction. As
there is no guidance about the prior shapes we decided to assume loose
gamma distributed priors.
4.3.5 Estimation results
Table 4.3 summarizes the posterior means of the estimated parameters, as
well as the 90% probability intervals.
For most structural parameters the mean of the posterior distribution
is found to be relatively close to the mean of the prior assumptions. Ex-
ceptions are !w and p. The mean of the parameter measuring the degree
of wage stickiness !w is estimated to be far higher than 60. The mean of
the degree of price indexation to ination p is estimated to be much less
than 0:5: Together with the posterior estimates for the parameters measur-
ing the degree of price stickiness !p, and indexation of wages to ination
w; results imply that the labor market nominal rigidity is more important
than the goods market nominal rigidity. These results are in line with the
estimations of Gerali et al. (2010). The posterior means of the investment
adjustment cost I , and the labor share in production , are close to the
estimates which Smets and Wouters (2007) nd for their canonical medium
scale DSGE model. As in Smets and Wouters (2007) the estimate of the
investment adjustment cost is notably higher than assumed a priori, sug-
gesting a response of investment to the changes in the value of capital which
is even slower than expected. Further, the posterior mean of the consump-
tion habit parameter h is higher than assumed for the prior distribution,
indicating a signicantly higher desire to smooth consumption. However,
h is higher than in Smets and Wouters (2007) and with a mean value of
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Table 4.3: Parameter estimates
Prior Posterior
Parameters Type Mean STD Mean [5%  95%]
Structural parameters
Labor share in production  B 0.7 0.05 0:71 [0:70  0:73]
Investment adj. cost I G 4.0 1.5 5:67 [4:13  7:11]
Banking cost elast. loans bc G 6.0 3.46 0:38 [0:32  0:43]
Banking cost elast. reserves bc G 6.0 3.46 0:25 [0:19  0:31]
Consumption habit h B 0.7 0.1 0:91 [0:89  0:93]
Inverse of Frisch elast.  G 2.0 0.75 0:89 [0:41  1:32]
Deposit utility 'd G 6.0 3.46 3:36 [0:56  6:04]
Inv. elast. of capital util. cost { G 1.0 0.25 1:02 [0:62  1:38]
Degree of price stickiness !p G 60 20 87 [69  104]
Degree of wage stickiness !w G 60 20 153 [105  198]
Price indexation to past in. p B 0.5 0.15 0:04 [0:02  0:07]
Wage indexation to past in. w B 0.5 0.15 0:63 [0:43  0:82]
Taylor Rule Parameters
Interest rate smoothing r B 0.6 0.15 0:76 [0:72  0:79]
Resp. to ination  G 1.5 0.15 1:80 [1:62  1:98]
Resp. to output y G 0.125 0.05 0:06 [0:04  0:09]
Resp. to output growth dy G 0.125 0.05 0:18 [0:14  0:21]
Autocorrelation of shocks
Technology a B 0.5 0.2 0:91 [0:88  0:95]
Preference  B 0.5 0.2 0:50 [0:42  0:59]
Gov. spending g B 0.5 0.2 0:93 [0:89  0:96]
Invest. spec. tech.  B 0.5 0.2 0:23 [0:13  0:33]
Price mark-up p B 0.5 0.2 0:03 [0:01  0:05]
Wage mark-up w B 0.5 0.2 0:39 [0:27  0:52]
Banking cost  B 0.5 0.2 0:04 [0:01  0:09]
Deposit management  B 0.5 0.2 0:85 [0:82  0:87]
Coupon decay factor s B 0.5 0.2 0:92 [0:89  0:96]
Long term bond supply b B 0.5 0.2 0:98 [0:97  0:99]
Standard deviation of innovations
Technology a IG 0.005 2 0:007 [0:006  0:008]
Preference  IG 0.005 2 0:059 [0:047  0:071]
Gov. spending g IG 0.005 2 0:017 [0:015  0:018]
Invest. spec. tech. I IG 0.005 2 0:164 [0:126  0:203]
Price mark-up p IG 0.001 2 0:059 [0:047  0:071]
Wage mark-up w IG 0.005 2 0:319 [0:214  0:423]
Banking cost  IG 0.005 2 1:554 [1:404  1:699]
Deposit management  IG 0.005 2 0:078 [0:058  0:086]
Coupon decay factor s IG 0.005 2 0:006 [0:004  0:008]
Long term bond supply b IG 0.005 2 0:018 [0:017  0:019]
Interest rate shock rm IG 0.001 2 0:002 [0:002  0:003]
Money supply shock Coll IG 0.01 2 0:140 [0:122  0:157]
Note: B;G; and IG correspond to Beta, Gamma, and inverse Gamma distributions. Posterior densities
were computed by creating a sample of 1000000 draws with initial burning sample of 500000 draws.
Average acceptance rate of the chain was roughly 25%. The estimation sample is 1964:Q3 - 2012:Q3.
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0:91 even out of the range of the estimates of Justiniano, Primiceri, and
Tambalotti (2008). The inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply ,
and the inverse elasticity of capacity utilization are estimated to be close
to unity which is for both cases lower compared to the estimates by Smets
and Wouters (2007). In general, the data are found to be informative on
the structural parameters.
Regarding most of the exogenous disturbances the data appear to be
informative as well. This is however, not the case for the standard devia-
tions of the innovation processes for the price markup and wage mark-up,
p and w, as well as for the AR(1) coe¢ cient of the wage markup process
w. The AR(1) coe¢ cients for the processes governing technology a, gov-
ernment spending g, fraction of reserves required for deposit management
, coupon decay factor s ; and long-term bond supply b, are estimated
to be highly persistent. In contrast to that, the persistence parameter for
the AR(1) process governing the banking cost innovations is found to be
close to zero.
Regarding the parameters describing the central banks policy rate rule,
we estimate a relatively high value for the posterior mean of the coe¢ -
cient governing the reaction to steady state deviations of ination  (1:81).
Further, the estimate of rm implies a considerable degree of interest rate
smoothing (0:76). The estimates of y (0:06), and dy (0:17), imply that
interest rate policy reacts weaker than expected to deviations from the out-
put steady state, but stronger than expected to changes in output growth.
These results are in the range of the estimates of Justiniano, Primiceri, and
Tambalotti (2008).
For the estimates of the parameters governing the cost of nancial inter-
mediation, namely the loan provision elasticity rc, and the elasticity with
respect to reserves and injections rc, the data appear to be informative.
The posterior means for these parameters are estimated to be 0:38 and 0:25.
This provides evidence that the models mechanism for nancial intermedia-
tion contributes to explain variation in real macroeconomic variables. Note
that data do not seem to be informative about the utilitys parameter 'd.
4.3.6 Business cycle moments
To assess the empirical t of the model we calculate in this section the
model-implied moments at the posterior mean conditional on the structural
shocks and compare them to the observed moments of the data sample.
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Here we focus on the models business cycle implications in terms of
selected moments.69 Table 4.4 compares the standard deviations, correla-
tions with output, and autocorrelations of the observed data with the corre-
sponding model-implied moments. Comparing the model-implied standard
deviations with the observed datas standard deviations shows that output,
consumption, investment, ination, hours worked, wages, the policy rate,
the loan rate, and the 7 year Treasury yield are more volatile in the model,
whereas deposits, reserves, the deposit rate are less volatile in the model.
Note that the high standard deviation of the reserves time series is mainly
a result of the large unconventional reserves provision induced by the LSAP
programs.70 Output and consumption volatility in the model exceed the
observed volatilities in the data by the factor 1.5. The implied volatility of
investment, ination, and hours worked exceed the observed volatilities by
roughly the factor 2. These implications are except for ination volatility
close to the results by Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2008). How-
ever, the implied volatility of the policy rate exceeds the observed volatility
by almost the factor 3. Note that the model-implied standard deviations
calculated relative to the output standard deviation are very close to the
respective moments calculated for the data sample. This however, is not
the case for the model-implied volatility of reserves and the volatility of
deposits relative to output.
We nd some signicant discrepancies for the comparison of the model-
implied variables correlations with output versus the observed variables
correlations with output. While the model-implied correlations of consump-
tion, investment, hours worked, and deposits, match the observed correla-
tions with output rather well, implied correlations of the models interest
rates with output have positive signs compared to their empirical counter-
parts which have negative signs.71 Furthermore, the observed correlation
between ination and output is negative while the model-implied correla-
tion coe¢ cient is positive. However, the models of Smets and Wouters
(2007) and Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2008) are able to repli-
69The evaluation of a models empirical t by such a moment comparison is widely
applied in the literature on DSGE models (see Prescott (1986), King and Rebelo (1999),
and Gali and Rabanal (2004)).
70For the data sample ranging from 1964:Q3 to 2007:Q4 the standard deviation of
reserves is 14.12. Compared to that the model estimated for the same data sample
implies a standard deviation of 12.63.
71Note that it is particularly problematic to match the observed second moments of
interest rates and ination.
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cate this negative correlation. The model-implied autocorrelation patterns
match the observed autocorrelation patterns rather well although there are
again some exceptions. Notably, the implied autocorrelation coe¢ cients
for reserves and the loan rate are signicantly di¤erent from their observed
empirical counterparts.
4.3.7 Variance decomposition
To assess the relative contributions of the models structural shocks to the
variation in the observed data we conduct an unconditional posterior vari-
ance decomposition. Results reported in Table 4.5 imply that in terms of
driving forces we can distinguish between variables which are usually ana-
lyzed within the canonical macroeconomic model framework and variables
newly introduced for the purpose of the present study. The former group
is comprised of output, consumption, investment, hours worked, ination,
and the policy rate. Results show that these variables are mainly driven
by shocks which are as well commonly employed in the canonical approach.
In this regard the shocks are namely on preferences ", technology "a, price
markup "p, wage markup "w, investment specic technology ", the mone-
tary policy rate "r, and government spending "g. Overall, the decomposition
of driving factors for the variation of these macroeconomic variables yields
results which are in line with previous evidence (see Smets and Wouters
(2007)).
Regarding the variables which are not part of the canonical model frame-
work, we nd that the observed variation of reserves is almost completely
explained by the money supply shock "Coll. Note that for the present model
estimation, where we assume that the parameter governing the share of
short-term bonds eligible for open market operations St is unity, and that
the fraction of long-term bonds eligible for repos Lt is equal to zero, an
unconventional central bank money supply can only be explained by inno-
vations to "Coll (see 4.42). The variation of the observed series on deposit
holdings is found to be mainly driven by the shock on the supply of long-
term government bonds "b. This is due to the close relationship between
nancial intermediariess assets and liabilities captured by the bank balance
sheet constraint (4.25). Further, results show that shocks to technology, the
price markup, and the wage markup, explain roughly 82 percent of the vari-
ation in the loans series. This reects that the model-implied loan demand
mechanism is closely connected to key variables of the models rm sector.
The banking cost shock " contributes about 7:5 percent to the variation in
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loan supply and almost 40 percent to the variation in the loan rate. This
implies that loan supply and the loan rate are to a signicant extent driven
by the present models proposed banking cost channel.72 Further " con-
tributes about 7 percent to the variation in hours worked which reects the
models link between loan supply and labor demand (see 4.14). The shock to
the fraction of reserves required for deposit management " explains more
than 45 percent of the variation in the deposit rate, about 25 percent of
the variation in the loan rate, and about 18 percent of the variation of the
7-year Treasury notes yield. The relative importance of the shock to the
fraction of reserves required for deposit management is due to t which di-
rectly governs the cost of nancial intermediation in (4.27). The variation
in the observed 7-year Treasury Notes yield is to roughly 45% driven by the
decay factor shock "s which is due to the relationship (4.24).
The analysis of the unconditional posterior variance decomposition im-
plies that the nonstandard shocks except for the banking cost shock yield
no signicant contribution to the variation of the model variables which
are commonly found in the canonical approach. The shocks known from
the canonical model are found to only contribute a sizeable share to the
variation of loans.
4.3.8 Forecasting performance
In Figure 4.2 the time series of the observed macroeconomic variables are
plotted together with their respective one-step ahead forecasts implied by
the model. The computation of the posterior distribution of one-step ahead
forecasts, i.e. Etyt+1, is done by applying the Kalman lter at the posterior
mean. By visual inspection one can easily assert that the model provides
relatively small one-step ahead forecast errors for output, consumption, in-
vestment, ination, hours worked, wages, deposits, the policy rate, deposit
rate, and the 7yr Treasury securities rate. In contrast to that the model-
implied one-step ahead forecasts for the expected deviations of the loan
rate from the long-run mean considerably overpredict and underpredict the
actual deviations for most periods. Furthermore, expected model-implied
deviations of reserves injections from their linear trend hardly match the
actual dynamics of reserve injections at any period. This is due to the fact
that the model has to generate highly autocorrelated sequences of positive
72Note that we use data from 1964:Q3 to 2012:Q3 to estimate the model. We expect
the contribution of the credit cost shock to the variation of loan supply and the loan rate
to increase during the nancial crises relative to the pre-crisis period.
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Figure 4.2: Observed data and one-step ahead forecasts
Notes: The one-step ahead forecasts for the period 1964:Q3 - 2012:Q3. Real variables are
measured in percentage deviations from their linear trend. Ination and interest rates
are measured in annualized percentage deviations from their sample mean.
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and negative money supply shocks "Coll; in order to match the dynamics
of observed reserve injections. This however, comes at the expense of bad
forecast performance for reserves. We further compute the mean forecast er-
rors (MFEs) as a measure of how accurate the model forecasts the observed
percentage deviations of key macroeconomic variables from their trends and
means. Further, the MFE is a means to assess whether a variable is sys-
tematically overpredicted or underpredicted. Results which are calculated
based on the one-step ahead forecasts are reported in Table 4.6.73 They indi-
cate that the present model tends to considerably underpredict investment.
Further, it is implied that output and hours worked are slightly underpre-
dicted. Most of the mean forecast errors are however, close to zero implying
generally an accurate forecasting performance of the model. Note that the
zero value of the MFE for reserves holdings is due to the construction of
the measure. Forecast errors may sum up to zero despite of the fact that
forecast errors might be large and show a highly autocorrelated pattern (see
Figure 4.2).
4.3.9 Model dynamics
In this section of the present chapter we examine the short-run dynamics
of the estimated model. In particular, we compute impulse responses to
unexpected innovations to the models stochastic processes. We analyze
the impact of changes in policy variables on the equilibrium allocation and
prices. For that purpose the model is solved by using a rst-order local ap-
proximation of the models equilibrium conditions around the deterministic
steady state.74 The percent deviation of each of the models real variables
zt from its steady state value z is given by z^t = 100  [log (zt)  log (z)].
Nominal interest rates and ination are calculated as annualized absolute
deviations R^t = 400 

R^t   R^

; implying that R^t = 1 is an increase of
the respective gross interest rate by 100 basis points. Note that we assume
for the subsequent analysis that Lt = 0:
Response to a monetary policy shock Figure 4.3 shows estimated
mean impulse response functions to a monetary policy shock, measured by
an innovation to the policy rate (see 4.38). An increase in the policy rate
73Note that zero MFE values are due to rounding error.
74The full set of (non-linearized) equilibrium conditions can be found in Appendix C.1.
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Table 4.6: One-step ahead forecast errors
Mean forecast
error MFE
Output 0.04
Consumption 0.02
Investment 0.16
Ination 0.00
Hours worked 0.08
Wages 0.00
Reserves 0.00
Deposits 0.02
Policy rate 0.01
Loan rate 0.00
Deposit rate 0.00
7yr. Treas. yld. 0.00
Notes: The forecast errors Ft are computed as the di¤erence between the observed
variable xt and its one-step ahead forecast x
f
t as Ft = xt   xft . The MFE is calculated
by MFE = T 1
PT
t=1 Ft.
(i.e. the main nancing rate) reduces the amount of real central bank money
that can be acquired by banks in open market operations (see 4.26). Ac-
cordingly the monetary tightening increases the real cost of central bank
money acquisition. This induces the banks to gradually decrease loan pro-
vision and to decrease their deposits holding. Therefore, the hump-shaped
responses of deposits and loans to a monetary policy shock are due to the
reduced amount of reserves acquirable in equilibrium. The decreased loan
provision induces a reduction of the wages which have to be paid up front
by the rms. This leads in turn to a decline in hours worked, and thus to
a decline in output and consumption. Hence, the monetary policy shock
exerts a contractionary e¤ect on the allocation of resources. Furthermore,
the slope of the yield curve which is dened as the di¤erence between the
long-term bond rate and the short-term bond rate declines on impact of
the shock. This is caused by a positive response of the short-term bond
rate and a decline in the long-term bond rate. As short-term bonds are
eligible for repos in open market operations their price carries a liquidity
premium. Due to the assumption that Lt = 0; the price of long-term bonds
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does not carry a liquidity premium. The liquidity premium declines as the
policy rate shock lowers the short-term bonds value as a means for the
real reserves acquisition. The long-term bond rate declines as the monetary
tightening increases the expected marginal contribution of reserves to a re-
duction in the cost of loan creation Et [m;t+1] (see 4.31). This reects the
notion that banks as investors value the fact that future expected payo¤s
from holding long-term bonds might be used to acquire reserves. This im-
plies an increased demand for long-term bonds which drives up their prices
and decreases their yields. This reects a shift in investorsportfolios from
short-term bonds to long-term bonds. Note that after the impact of the
innovation, the policy rate decreases with a fast pace which is leading af-
ter a few periods to a negative deviation of the policy rate from its steady
state value. This is due to the strong decline in ination and output which
is induced by the monetary policy rate shock. This forces the Taylor rule
type of policy reaction function to gradually lower the policy rate. This in
turn increases the amount of reserves that can be acquired in open market
operations which leads to a quick recovery of output towards the steady
state.
Response to a banking cost shock Figure 4.3 shows impulse responses
estimated for a shock to the cost of nancial intermediation, measured by
an innovation to the scaling factor t which governs the cost of loan creation
t (see 4.27). The increase in the bankscost of nancial intermediation
induces a decline in loan provision and deposit holdings. Both variables
respond in a hump-shaped way similar to the pattern described in the para-
graph above on the models response to a negative monetary policy shock.
The notable di¤erence between the impact of a banking cost shock and the
impact of a monetary policy shock on the models variables is that the for-
mer does not exert a negative e¤ect on the value of short-term bonds for the
asset exchange against real central bank money. Therefore, immediately af-
ter the shock to t occurs, the nancial intermediary can acquire additional
real reserves to alleviate the increase in the cost of nancial intermedia-
tion. Specically, the banking cost shock induces reserves and injections
to respond positively on impact while these variables respond negatively
on impact in the case of a policy rate shock. This implies that in absence
of the asset exchange mechanism of short-term bonds against reserves, the
banking cost shock would have a way stronger negative impact on the real
macroeconomic variables. This seems to be even more likely when turning
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Figure 4.3: Estimated impulse responses to contractionary shocks
Notes: Estimated impulse responses are calculated at the posterior mean. Real economic
variables are in percentage deviations from the steady state. Ination and interest rates
are in percentage point deviations from the steady state.
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to the impulse response functions for the interest rates. Accordingly, the
banking cost shock induces on impact a rise of the loan rate by 297 basis
points which would have been even stronger in the absence of the models
asset exchange mechanism. The implied loan rate returns back to its steady
state value after only two periods. In addition to the correspondent increase
in real reserves one important reason for this observation is a low estimated
persistence parameter  for the process governing t. Further, the banking
cost shock induces the slope of the yield curve to increase. The long-term
bond rate decreases at maximum by less than 3 basis points induced by
the shock. Hence, the rise in the slope of the yield curve is mainly due to
a large negative response of the short-term bond rate. As for the present
analysis only short-term bonds are eligible for open market asset exchange
operations, the increased demand for reserves will increase the demand for
short-term bonds. This drives up short-term bond prices and therefore,
increases their liquidity premium.
Response to a total factor productivity shock Figure 4.4 shows im-
pulse responses for a shock to total factor productivity. The unexpected
increase in total factor productivity induces a positive response of produc-
tion, consumption, investment, hours worked, and wages. The increased
wage rate and the increase in hours worked require the rms to demand
more loans (see 4.14). Further, an increase in expected output growth leads
to a positive response of ination (see 4.23). By the central banks monetary
policy reaction function an increasing ination induces a rise in the policy
rate. This in turn reduces the amount of real reserves that can be acquired
by banks in open market operations. A higher provision of loans together
with a reduced reserve acquisition rises the cost of nancial intermediation
and induces the loan rate to increase gradually. By this mechanism the loan
provision will be dampened which forces production and the other macro-
economic variables back to their steady state values. This further explains
the hump-shaped paths of impulse responses. The positive response of the
slope of the yield curve basically follows the long-term bond rate which
outweighs the positive response of the short-term bond rate. The latter is
driven by a diminishing liquidity premium which is due to the decreased
real value of short-term bonds for reserves acquisition.
Response to a money supply shock Figure 4.5 shows impulse re-
sponses for a money supply shock, which is measured by an innovation
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Figure 4.4: Estimated impulse responses to expansionary shock I
Notes: Estimated impulse responses are calculated at the posterior mean. Real economic
variables are in percentage deviations from the steady state. Ination and interest rates
are in percentage point deviations from the steady state.
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Figure 4.5: Estimated impulse responses to expansionary shock II
Notes: Estimated impulse responses are calculated at the posterior mean. Real economic
variables are in percentage deviations from the steady state. Ination and interest rates
are in percentage point deviations from the steady state.
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to "Coll (4.26). The money supply shock a¤ects the bankscost of loan pro-
vision by a direct injection of additional central bank money. This is done at
no cost for the banks and without requiring short-term bonds in exchange.
Therefore, the shock induces a negative response of the loan rate and the
deposit rate which leads to an increase of loan provision. By this, output,
consumption, investment, hours worked and wages respond positively. In
turn, ination increases which induces a monetary tightening in terms of
an increasing policy rate. Further, the slope of the yield curve decreases on
impact as the open market operation shock decreases the liquidity premium
on short-term bonds.
4.3.10 Observed variables decomposition
Figure 4.6 shows the model-implied contributions of the macroeconomic
shocks to the observed historical variations of real per capita output around
its linear trend. The black line depicts the deviations of the value of the
corresponding endogenous model variable from its steady state at the poste-
rior mode. The colored bars correspond to the contribution of the respective
smoothed shocks to the deviation of the endogenous variable from its steady
state. The length of the bars refers to the absolute value of the shock con-
tributions. These values are expressed in percentage deviations from the
steady state. They are derived by using the Kalman smoother to compute
the most likely shock realizations that lead to the observed values of the
data.
Analyzing the contributions of the models macroeconomic shocks for
the pre-crisis period from 1964:Q3 to 2007:Q4, implies that total factor pro-
ductivity, policy rate, and the markup shocks are the main drivers of output
deviations from its steady state. This is in line with the results by Smets and
Wouters (2007). These shocks are common for the canonical DSGE model
analysis framework. According to the historical variable decomposition pre-
sented in Figure 4.6 the model explains the recession which is observed
following the emergence of the 2008/2009 crisis, by a di¤erent set of shocks.
Specically, there is a simultaneous contribution of shocks known from the
canonical model and shocks which are introduced for the purposes of the
present study. In detail, the main model-implied contributors to the nega-
tive trend deviation of real per capita output which followed the 2008:Q3
collapse of Lehman Brothers are the total factor productivity shock, the
investment-specic technology shock, the markup shocks, and the shock to
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the cost of nancial intermediation.75 At the same time there are several
implied sources of positive contributions to output. The most important
among them are the government spending shock, a shock to preference for
contemporary consumption, a money supply shock, and with some delay,
a positive total factor productivity shock. With the beginning of 2010:Q4,
which was the quarter where LSAP 2 was initiated, the observed trend de-
viation of real per capita output was  5:60 percent. The model-implied
contributions of the single shocks to that observed value are for the com-
bined markup shocks  3:26 percent, for the investment-specic technology
shock  0:68 percent, for the policy rate shock  1:05 percent, for the bank-
ing cost shock  3:12 percent, for the preference shock 0:87 percent, for the
total factor productivity shock 0:92 percent, and the money supply shock
1:43 percent. Note that the implied contributions of the money supply shock
and the banking cost shock to output variation become even larger follow-
ing 2010:Q4 while those shocks do not signicantly contribute to output
deviation prior to 2008:Q3.
There are two conclusions we draw from this evidence. First, shocks
to nancial intermediation increase the models ability to explain the drop
of real per capita output following the 2008/2009 crisis. These shocks sig-
nicantly contribute to the recession but at the same time they are not
the single source of it. Second, for the quarters following 2010:Q4, which
is the quarter when LSAP 2 was launched, the model implies a signicant
positive contribution of the money supply shock to the variation in real
per capita output. The collateral constraint (4.26) governs the acquisition
of extra central bank money and constitutes the models mechanism for
the central banks non-conventional balance sheet policies. As we set the
share of long-term bonds purchased Lt equal to zero so far, we interpret the
model-implied contributions of the money supply shock to output variation
as the e¤ects of LSAPs.
Figure 4.7 shows the evolution of U.S. real per capita GDP, real per
capita consumption, real per capita investment, ination, hours worked,
real wages, the long-term treasury rate, and the loan rate from 2007:Q4 to
2012:Q3. We follow Del Negro et al. (2013) and calculate the deviations
75Furthermore the model implies that the policy rate shock is a source of negative
output deviation. Note that the observed data on the policy rate which are included in
the estimation reach the zero lower bound by 2008:Q3. At the same time the endogenous
model mechanisms would require the policy rate to drop even stronger. Therefore, the
policy rate shock has to absorb the gap which leads to a negative contribution to output.
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Figure 4.6: Observed variable decomposition
Notes: Observed deviations of real per capita output from its linear trend. Variations
are explained by the contributions of the twelve included shocks.
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Figure 4.7: Dynamics of key macro variables following the crisis
Notes: Evolution of real GDP, real consumption, real investment, ination, hours worked,
real wages, long-term Treasury rate, and loan rate following the 2008/2009 crisis. This
is compared to the implied variablespaths excluding the money supply shock.
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of the variables from their long-run trend which is extracted from the pre-
crisis data subsample ranging from 1964:Q3 to 2007:Q4. This is done except
for hours worked, ination, and the interest rates, for which we calculate
deviations from their respective means. In 2010:Q3 which was the quarter
before LSAP 2 was launched the observed trend deviation of real GDP
was  5:56 percent, of real consumption  4:93 percent, of real investment
 27:71 percent, of hours worked  7:66 percent, and of real wages  0:38
percent. By 2010:Q3 the decrease of ination relative to its long-run mean
was  0:43 percentage points. The long-term treasury rate decreased by 45
basis points relative to 2007:Q4 to a  102 basis points deviation from the
long-run mean. Further the loan rate decreased by 17 basis points relative
to 2007:Q4 to a  72 basis points deviation from the long-run mean.76
The dashed lines in Figure 4.7 represent the model-implied paths of
the endogenous variables which are calculated from the linear state-space
model where the residual of the reserves injections "^Coll is set equal to zero.
Note that the model-implied negative deviation of output from the steady
state then exceeds the trend deviation of the observed variable by  1:28
percentage points. By the end of the last observed quarter 2012:Q3, the
model-implied trend deviation of output exceeds the observed by  2:26
percentage points. This evaluation implies that the recession following
the 2008/2009 nancial crisis would have been more severe without cen-
tral banks unconventional balance sheet policy interventions. Further for
the quarter 2012:Q3 we nd that the model-implied deviation of real per
capita consumption exceeds the observed by  1:99 percentage points, the
drop in real per capita investment exceeds the observed by  5:47 percent-
age points, hours worked decline exceeds the observed decline by  0:89
percentage points, and the drop in real wages exceeds the observed drop by
 1:03 percentage points. Further in the absence of the money supply shock
the model-implied ination rate is lower than the observed. For 2012:Q3
the di¤erence between implied ination rate and the observed is at  0:39
percentage points. Hence, the model implies inationary e¤ects of non-
conventional balance sheet policies. Further, in the absence of the money
supply shock the implied long-term Treasury bond rate and the implied loan
76Over the period 2007:Q4 to 2012:Q4 the maximum peak e¤ect for real GDP is  7:16
percent, for real consumption  6:99 percent, for real investment  31:21 percent, for
ination  1:24 percentage points, for hours worked  9:08 percent, and for real wages
 2:34 percent: The long-term treasury rate falls at maximum by 82 basis points relative
to 2007:Q4 and the loan rate increases at maximum by 55 basis points relative to 2007:Q4.
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rate are higher than the observed rates. For 2012:Q3 the implied long-term
bond rate exceeds the observed by 17 basis points and the implied loan
rate exceeds the observed by 225 basis points. Note that unconventional
monetary policy measures such as LSAP 2 were intended to lower market
interest rates by large-scale asset purchases. This should in turn have been
transmitted to private borrowing rates e.g. the loan rate. Therefore, the
di¤erence between the observed interest rates and the ex-post calculated
implied rates captures the model-implied e¤ect of unconventional monetary
policies.
4.4 Simulating LSAP II
The main purpose of the study presented in this chapter is to identify the
macroeconomic e¤ects of LSAP 2 on the U.S. economy. As pointed out in
Section 4.3.10 from an ex-post point of view the model explains the varia-
tion of real per capita output following 2010:Q4, which is the quarter when
LSAP 2 was launched, to a signicant extent by a shock to money supply. In
this section of the chapter we investigate whether this model-impled e¤ect
of the money supply shock captures the impact of unconventional balance
sheet policies such as LSAP 2. Therefore, in a next step the present study
intends to analyze the e¤ects of balance sheet policies as a structural feature
of the model while focussing on large-scale purchases of long-term Treasury
bonds. For this purpose we employ the model to simulate the recession and
the Feds unconventional balance sheet policies following 2010:Q4. Speci-
cally, we use information on the macroeconomic shocks which was derived in
Section 4.3.10, to make the models simulated endogenous variables match
the observed trend deviations of key macroeconomic variables in 2010:Q4.77
At the same time the model simulation accounts for the LSAP 2 uncon-
ventional monetary policy intervention which is comprised of large-scale
purchases of long-term Treasuries. In particular, we calibrate the path of
Lt , which is the share of long-term bonds purchased under repo contracts,
so as to match the observed evolution of the U.S. Feds long-term trea-
suries holdings relative to long-term treasuries outstanding. To assess the
e¤ectiveness of the large-scale Treasury purchases we follow Del Negro et
al. (2013) by analyzing the counterfactual responses of key macroeconomic
variables. In particular, responses of the models variables are simulated
77Note that the contribution of the money supply shock to the output deviation from
the steady state has to be set equal to zero here.
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in the absence of the policy intervention and compared to the variables
simulated responses under inclusion of the policy intervention.
4.4.1 Recession scenario
We simulate a recession scenario where the implied dynamics of the endoge-
nous model variables match the observed trend deviations of key macroeco-
nomic variables in 2010:Q4 as presented in Figure 4.7. For this purpose we
use information on the model-implied contributions of the shocks to real
output trend deviation from the historical variable decomposition which
was performed in chapter 4.3.10. Specically, this information is used for
the simulation to determine size and duration of the preference shock, the
total factor productivity shock, the markup shocks, the banking cost shock,
and the investment-specic technology shock. We simulate LSAP 2 as a
series of non-zero values assigned to Lt . Specically, as 
L
t is the share of
long-term bonds purchased in open market trades, we track the share of
the U.S. Feds holdings of U.S. Treasury notes and bonds relative to total
notes and bonds outstanding.78 We calculate this share starting from the
rst available data on the Feds U.S. Treasury notes and bonds holdings
in 2003:Q1 to 2012:Q3. As the observed share of Fed holdings of Treasury
notes and bonds relative to notes and bonds outstanding is positive over
the whole data sample we demean the time series and assume that Lt = 0
before 2010:Q4 (see Figure 4.8).
The share of long-term Treasuries purchased in open market operations
Lt is in the present framework set to zero in the absence of the uncon-
ventional policy intervention. Our experiment is to simulate the model
under the recession scenario together with the policy intervention specied
by nonzero values of Lt . This is compared to a model simulation of the
recession scenario without the policy intervention. The aim of this coun-
terfactual policy analysis is to identify the e¤ects of LSAP 2 on the U.S.
economy. Note that LSAP 1 started in late 2008 and lasted until 2010 while
LSAP 2 was launched in 2010:Q4 and ended in 2011:Q2. Thus, our reces-
sion scenario takes the potential impact of LSAP 1 on the U.S. economy
78We use quarterly time series data on U.S. Treasuries outstanding and on U.S. Trea-
suries held by the Fed. The series on the amount of Treasury Notes outstanding (Code
440109711) and on Treasury Bonds outstanding (Code 440109712) are from Datastream.
From the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED databank we take the series on U.S.
Treasury securities held by the Fed, maturing in 1 to 5 years (TREAS1T5), maturing in
5 to 10 years (TREAS5T10), and maturing in over 10 years (TREAS10Y).
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as given without explicitly specifying this policy measure within the model
framework.
Figure 4.8: Fed holdings of Treasury notes and bonds rel. to total outst.
Notes: Observed share of Fed holdings of Treasury notes and bonds relative to Treasury
notes and bonds outstanding.
Note that we use Dynare to compute a simulation of the model. As
explained above we specify deterministic paths for exogenous shocks. Hence,
we employ Dynares forecast command for the simulation. In this case, the
trajectories of the endogenous variables are computed conditionally on the
agents knowing the future values of the deterministic exogenous variables.
Therefore, we would have to presume that agents know the entire path of
the share of long-term Treasuries purchased in open market operations Lt
for the whole duration of the LSAP program. However, there is no clear
information about the future path of Lt following the last observed value in
2012:Q3. Therefore, we assume that after the last observed value, the share
of U.S. Treasury notes and bonds held by the Fed relative to total notes
and bonds outstanding is in each following quarter reduced by roughly 25
percent. This value matches the decrease of the market share of long-term
bonds held by the Fed from the second last observed quarter (7:25 percent)
to the last observed quarter (5:54 percent).
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4.4.2 Simulation results
In this section we simulate and compare the e¤ects of the crisis scenario
on the models endogenous variables for the case of the balance sheet pol-
icy intervention which is interpreted as LSAP2 program versus the case
of no policy intervention. This is done by calculating the trajectories of
the stochastic models variables starting from the steady state. Figure 4.9
shows the trajectories of the endogenous variables and compares them to
the models implied variablespaths in the absence of the LSAP 2 program.
The deviation of each of the models real variables from the steady state
value is denoted in percentage terms. Nominal interest rates and ination
are given in annualized absolute deviations.
The solid lines in Figure 4.9 show the response of output, consumption,
investment, ination, hours worked, real wages, the long-term treasury rate,
and the loan rate to the crisis scenario together with the policy interven-
tion.79 The model predicts a simultaneous drop in output by  5:31 percent
(versus 5:61 percent observed in 2010:Q4), real consumption by 3:33 per-
cent ( 4:83 percent), real investment by  17:49 percent ( 22:43 percent),
hours worked by  5:56 percent ( 7:87 percent),and real wages by  2:74
percent ( 1:12 percent). Comparing the movements of the macroeconomic
variables simulated by the model with their observed empirical counterparts,
shows that the model is capable to reproduce the e¤ects of the recession on
the real economy.80
The dashed lines in Figure 4.9 depict the responses of the endogenous
model variables to the crisis scenario without the policy intervention. In
general the models equilibrium conditions imply that an increase in the
share of long-term Treasuries purchased in open market operations Lt in-
creases the banksamount of acquirable central bank money. This directly
79Same as impulse response functions the trajectories show an expected path of a
given variable from an ex ante perspective, not a particular realized path in the model.
Impulse response functions plot the expected path of variables conditional on the shock
hitting at the beginning of the rst period. Specically, all possible state contingent paths
induced by the Markov process are averaged, while using the associated probabilities as
weights. Therefore it should not be expected that implied variablestrajectories have to
completely match the observed variablespaths. Hence we try to match the observed
variablestrend deviations in 2010:Q4 by the simulation of the recession scenario.
80Del Negro et al. (2013) note that the disparity between model and data regarding
investment may be due to the fact that the model does not account for an explicit
residential sector. Note that by following Smets and Wouters (2007) we exclude durable
goods from our consumption measure and instead treat it as a part of investment.
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Figure 4.9: Simulated impulse responses to recession scenario
Notes: Simulated trajectories of output, consumption, investment, ination, hours
worked, wages, long-term Treasury rate, and loan rate.
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a¤ects the bankscost of nancial intermediation which induces a negative
response of the loan rate and the deposit rate, and therefore increases the
amount of loan provision. By this, output, consumption, investment, hours
worked and wages respond positively. Further, declaring long-term Trea-
suries as eligible for open market operations induces a liquidity premium on
their prices which should c.p. decrease the spread between the long-term
bond rate and the short-term bond rate. Or put di¤erently, this operation
would c.p. decrease the slope of the yield curve. Note that the positive
reaction of real output would increase the monetary policy rate which is
assumed to follow a Taylor-rule type of policy reaction function (see 4.38).
However, we assume that the central bank holds the policy rate close to the
zero lower bound during the simulation experiment.
We expect the simulation which is excluding the balance sheet policy in-
tervention to imply a deeper recession for the real macroeconomic variables
and to imply a sudden and strong increase in the private sector borrowing
rate. In fact, in the absence of the policy intervention the output con-
traction following the simulated crisis event is up to  8:06 percent. This
exceeds the drop in output calculated for the simulation including the pol-
icy intervention by 2:75 percentage points. We nd that compared to the
simulation including the policy intervention in the absence of the policy in-
tervention the drop in consumption is increased by 2:45 percentage points,
the drop in investment is increased by 6:46 percentage points, the drop in
hours worked is increased by 3:52 percentage points, and the drop in the
real wage rate is decreased by 0:11 percentage points. These e¤ects on the
models real variables mainly result from the fact that in case of the asset
purchasing program the loan provision does not decrease as strong as in
the absence of this program. It is noteworthy that under the policy in-
tervention scenario the model predicts a strong decrease of ination. The
models equilibrium conditions imply a strong positive relation between in-
ation and output growth (see 4.23). As the pace of output recovery is in
the case without policy intervention faster than in the case with the policy
intervention, ination therefore will increase stronger in the former case.
The policy intervention signicantly a¤ects interest rates. Specically, in
absence of the intervention the model simulation implies an increase of the
loan rate by 14:40 percentage points on impact and an increase in the long-
term Treasury rate by 8:06 percentage points on impact. Simulating the
model with the policy intervention implies that the rst periods impact
of the crisis scenario on the loan rate is dampened by 560 basis points
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relative to the case of an absence of the program. In the second period
there is a further decrease by 722 basis points driving down the loan rate
to a 154 basis points deviation from the steady state value. The impact of
the asset purchase programs on the long-term bond rate is sizably stronger.
The policy intervention reduces the long-term bond rate on impact by 851
basis points compared to the simulation without the bond purchases. This
number can be interpreted as the model-implied liquidity premium on long-
term bonds, measured in the rst simulation period. Note that on impact,
the model predicts a drop in the long-term bond rate by 44 basis points
in case of the policy intervention. This value lies between the estimates of
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) (33 basis points) and DAmico
and King (2013) (55 basis points) for the impact of LSAP 2 on the ten-year
Treasury Note yield. The response of the loan rate does obviously not match
the observed data in Figure 4.7. This is due to the fact that the simulated
model requires a relatively strong increase of the banking cost shock and
therefore of the loan rate to be able to match the observed evolution of
the key macroeconomic variables. However, it is to note that we actually
do not know how the loan rate would have evolved without any emergency
and short-term policy responses81 as well as without the (announcement-
)e¤ects of the rst round of LSAP. Those measures were launched previous
to LSAP 2 and we de not identify the e¤ects of these measures on the loan
rate in the present chapter. Specically, we do not model any of the previous
emergency policy interventions and focus on explaining the impact of LSAP
2 on real macroeconomic variables and on the long-term bond rate.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we applied a monetary DSGE model with nancial frictions
and an explicitly specied set of central bank balance sheet policy options
to identify the macroeconomic e¤ects of LSAP 2. The model contains a
banking sector which requires central bank reserves to facilitate nancial
intermediation. Reserves are supplied by the central bank in exchange for
eligible assets. Multiple assets, such as short-term bonds and long-term
bonds, are considered which di¤er with respect to their ability to serve as
a mean for reserves acquisition. By employing Bayesian estimation tech-
81See measures like the Term Auction Facility (TAF) and Term Asset-Backed Securities
Loan Facility (TALF).
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niques we nd that the model provides a considerably good t to the data.
We show that the model generates responses to commonly studied macro-
economic shocks which are qualitatively consistent with existing empirical
evidence. Beyond that, we introduce shocks which directly a¤ect nan-
cial intermediation. We nd that the impact on nancial intermediation
is particularly relevant for the size and the persistence of shock responses.
Further, we calculated the model-implied contributions of macroeconomic
shocks to the observed historical variations of the models key variables. We
nd that the shocks to the costs of nancial intermediation and to central
bank money supply explain a signicant share of the deviations of real per
capita output from its trend which is observed following the emergence of
the 2008/2009 crisis.
In a next step we have investigated whether the model-impled e¤ect
of the central bank money supply shock on output captures the impact of
unconventional balance sheet policies such as LSAP 2. In particular, we
analyzed the e¤ects of balance sheet policies as a structural feature of the
model while focussing on large-scale purchases of long-term Treasury bonds.
For that purpose, we employed the model to simulate the recession and the
central banks balance sheet policy intervention following 2010:Q4. From a
counterfactual simulation experiment we conclude that LSAP 2 was likely
to yield a considerable contribution to dampen the adverse impact of the
crisis on the macroeconomy. We nd that output contraction following the
simulated crisis event is dampened by 2:75 percentage points. This poses
evidence in favour of the notion that unconventional balance sheet policy
operations such as large-scale asset purchase programs are e¤ective at stimu-
lating the economy. Further, results support the models proposed transmis-
sion channel of unconventional balance sheet policy operations. Specically,
LSAP 2 successfully lowers the cost of nancial intermediation and interest
rates of longer-termed Treasury securities which is transmitted to private
sector borrowing rates.
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Chapter 5
Testing Uncovered Interest
Parity under the Assumption
of Liquidity Premia
5.1 Introduction
Uncovered interest parity (UIP) implies that, under the assumption that
covered interest parity holds, the di¤erential between two countriesrisk-
free interest rates is an estimate of future changes in the spot exchange
rate. If expectations are rational then the interest di¤erential should be an
unbiased predictor of future bilateral exchange rate changes.82 There is a
large branch of empirical works in the literature on testing UIP which em-
ploys forward premium regressions. These studies regress realized exchange
rate changes on the interest di¤erential or forward premium resp. between
two countries.83 Under rational expectations and risk neutrality, UIP pre-
dicts this regression to yield a positive coe¢ cient of unity on the forward
premium. The empirical failure of UIP has been documented by various
evidence from forward premium regressions.84 The widely quoted result by
82See Bilson (1981), Fama (1984), Froot and Thaler (1990).
83As pointed out by Frankel (1982), employing regression analysis will test the joint
hypothesis of the UIPs implications regarding expected exchange rate changes together
with unbiased expectations both to hold. This is denoted as the "unbiasedness hypoth-
esis".
84For seminal survey articles about the empirical work on testing UIP see Hodrick
(1987), Froot (1990), and Engel (1996). See Burnside et al. (2006) and Chinn (2006) for
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Froot (1990) nds that the average estimate of the mentioned coe¢ cient
across 75 published studies is -0.88. Furthermore, only a few estimates are
positive but none is equal or greater than unity. This result is known as
the forward premium puzzle. It implies that the forward premium predicts
future changes in the spot exchange rate which are inconsistent with UIP,
in terms magnitude and in terms of the direction of the movement.
The present chapter investigates whether liquidity premia can explain
deviations from UIP. Specically, in this chapter I examine the impact of
liquidity premia on international interest rate di¤erentials, namely the U.S.-
U.K. Treasury yield spread.
UIP is a key no-arbitrage condition in international bond markets. Can-
zoneri et al. (2013) explain deviations from UIP by relaxing the assumption
that risk-free bonds which are denominated in di¤erent currencies are per-
fect substitutes. Specically, home and foreign bonds are imperfect substi-
tutes for money in each countriestransaction technology. Canzoneri et al.
(2013) argue that the U.S. dollars role as a key currency in the international
monetary system is the reason for the relatively low U.S. Treasuriesinter-
est rates. It is pointed out that U.S. Treasuries facilitate transactions in a
number of ways: they serve as collateral in many nancial markets, banks
hold them to manage the liquidity of their portfolios, individuals hold them
in money market accounts that o¤er checking services, and importers and
exporters hold them as transaction balances. Therefore, the liquidity of
U.S. Treasury bonds is interpreted as a non-pecuniary return to investors
which poses the rationale for why U.S. Treasuries will be held at a discount.
Hence, the key currency feature of the U.S. dollar can contribute to the
explanation of deviations from UIP.
A recent study by Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) provides
evidence that the corporate-Treasury bond yield spread is to a signicant
extent driven by the total amount of U.S. Treasuries outstanding which
is proxied by the government Debt-to-GDP ratio (i.e. the market value of
publicly held U.S. government debt to U.S. GDP). They argue that investors
value certain features of U.S. Treasuries, namely their liquidity and their
"absolute security of nominal return". This a¤ects prices of Treasuries
and drives down their yields compared to assets that do not to the same
extent share these features. As a theoretical rationale for this observation
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) assume that the holder of a
U.S. Treasury security obtains some services and gains to the subjective level
recent empirical studies and Engel (2013) for a recent survey.
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of well-being. Those benets are summarized as "convenience yield" which
directly contribute to investorsutility and lead U.S. Treasuries to have a
lower yield than they would have in a standard asset-pricing framework.
In this chapter I follow Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012)
by modifying a standard representative agent asset-pricing model by allow-
ing agents to derive utility directly from holdings of U.S. Treasuries. In a
next step I derive no-arbitrage conditions for the international bond mar-
ket which are implied by the modied model. Here I follow Canzoneri et
al. (2013) by relaxing the assumption that U.S. domestic bonds and foreign
bonds are perfect substitutes. Specically, it is assumed that U.S. Treasuries
provide unique liquidity services. Therefore, the model-implied no-arbitrage
conditions allow for liquidity premia induced by the U.S. dollars postulated
key currency feature. The no-arbitrage conditions are further derived for
the cases of explicitly accounting for foreign exchange risk and price risk,
and for neglecting these risk premia. I employ regression analysis to empir-
ically test whether the model-implied no-arbitrage conditions for U.S. data
and U.K. data can explain deviations from UIP. In this context I follow
Fuhrer (2000) by assuming that the householdsexpectations regarding the
dynamics of consumption and the depreciation rate of the domestic currency
can be described by an unconstrained vector autoregression.
In this chapter I nd that investorsvaluation for U.S. Treasuriesliquid-
ity contributes to explain deviations from UIP. Further, estimation results
imply a positive association between the expected depreciation rate of the
U.S. currency relative to the U.K. currency and the U.S.-U.K. Treasury yield
spread or forward premium. However, the point estimate of the coe¢ cient
still is below unity.
There have been many attempts to account for departures from UIP.
One of the most inuential of these is Fama (1984) who attributes devi-
ations of realized exchange rate changes from UIP to a time-varying risk
premium.85 However, studies like Backus, Foresi, and Telmer (2001) and
Brandt, Cochrane and Santa-Clara (2006) conrm the result that risk pre-
mia cannot resolve the forward premium puzzle while assuming standard
preferences. There are recent studies in this eld which are able to ac-
count for deviations from UIP by assuming utility maximizing representa-
tive agents in home and foreign countries with non-standard preferences.
E.g. Verdelhan (2010) employs a utility specication of external habit pref-
85Specically, a risk premium arises in such models due to the degree to which the
exchange rate return covaries with consumption growth.
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erences, and Bansal and Shaliastovich (2012) use Epstein-Zin preferences.
However, these studies rely on simulations of models which are calibrated to
match a set of macroeconomic and nancial data features. Further, small
open economy models commonly include a UIP condition (see Gali and
Monacelli (2005)). Authors like McCallum and Nelson (2000) and Koll-
mann (2005) add an exogenous UIP shock which is calibrated to align the
model-implied volatility of exchange rates with the observed interest rate
di¤erentials. Justiniano and Preston (2010) conduct a Bayesian estima-
tion of a small open economy model with an exogenous UIP shock. They
nd that the volatility in the real exchange rate is almost completely ex-
plained by a risk premium shock. This is interpreted as an extreme version
of exchange rate disconnect. The generally bad empirical performance is
attributed to the failure of the estimated model to link movements in the
exchange rate with macroeconomic fundamentals. Therefore, addressing
the issue of exchange rate disconnect is regarded as a key to improve the
models quantitative performance.
This chapter is organized as follows. In section 5.2 I derive the modi-
ed asset pricing model, no-arbitrage conditions for the international bond
market, and specify regression models which are estimated to test the no-
arbitrage conditions implications. Section 5.3 presents estimation results.
Section 5.4 concludes.
5.2 Yield spread model
In the following section I modify an asset pricing model under the assump-
tion that U.S. Treasuries liquidity services are valued by investors. This
is done along the lines of Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012).
Spreads between the yields of U.S. Treasuries and foreign Treasury securities
which do not provide liquidity services are then explained by a no-arbitrage
condition. The goal is to obtain a model of spread determinants which
can be empirically tested for its ability to explain observed international
Treasury yield spreads.
5.2.1 Households problem
A representative household is assumed to maximize the expected sum of a
discounted stream of utilities
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E0
1X
t=0
tu (ct;  (bt; GDPt; t)) ; (5.1)
subject to the budget constraint
Ptct + P
T
t bt +XtP
T
t b

t  Ptyt + P Tt bt 1 +XtP Tt bt 1; (5.2)
where E0 is the expectation operator conditional on the information set in
the initial period, and  2 (0; 1) is the subjective discount factor. The utility
function is specied by ut = 11 c
1 
t +  (bt; GDPt; t) ; with   1, where
ct denotes consumption and  () represents the agents gained convenience
yield. I follow Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) by assuming
that convenience yields are a function of the U.S. gross domestic product
(GDP) and the investors holdings of real U.S. Treasuries bt:86 The latter
further captures the assumption by Canzoneri et al. (2013), that the U.S.
dollars role as a key currency in the international monetary system induces
holdings of U.S. Treasuries to yield unique non-pecuniary returns to the
investors. The term t is a preference shock. Following Krishnamurthy and
Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) the convenience yield function  () is concave with
 0 () > 0; and  00 () < 0. Further,  () shall be homogenous of degree one
in GDPt and bt.87 The household earns a real endowment income yt, and
carries wealth into the next period by investing into nominal holdings of
U.S. Treasuries P Tt bt; and by investing into nominal holdings of the foreign
countrys Treasuries P Tt b

t . In order to measure the purchasing power of
a foreign currency pay-o¤ in a particular period t, the nominal exchange
rate Xt is introduced. The exchange rate is measured as the price of foreign
currency in units of domestic currency at time t. Assume for simplicity
that the agent buys zero coupon discount bonds which pay out one unit of
currency when being held to maturity. The aggregate price level at date t
is denoted by Pt. The nominal prices for one-period investments into U.S.
Treasuries, and into the foreign countrys Treasuries are denoted as P Tt ; and
P Tt . Real holdings of foreign Treasuries are denoted as b

t .
86Specically, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) assume that convenience
yields are driven by a set of macroeconomic factors which will inuence the households
level of well-being. The U.S. GDP acts as a shortcut to capture these factors.
87Hence  () can be transformed in the following manner:  (bt; GDPt; t) 


bt
GDPt
; t

GDPt:
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Maximizing the objective function (5.1) subject to the budget constraint
(5.2) leads for given initial values and non-negativity constraints for bt; and
bt to the following rst order conditions for consumption ct; and investments
into U.S. Treasuries bt; and foreign Treasuries bt :
c t = t; (5.3)
 0 () P
T
t
Pt
+ Et

t+1
P Tt+1
Pt+1

= t
P Tt
Pt
; (5.4)
Et

t+1
Xt+1P
T
t+1
Pt+1

= t
XtP
T
t
Pt
; (5.5)
and (5.2) holding with equality, and the transversality conditions
limj!1 
jEt
 
t+jP
T
t+jbt+j

= 0; and limj!1 
jEt
 
t+jXt+jP
T
t+jb

t+j

= 0:
The stochastic discount factor for nominal payo¤s is denoted as Mt+1 =
 t+1
t
Pt
Pt+1
; such that (5.4), and (5.5) combined with (5.3) imply
P Tt =
Et

Mt+1P
T
t+1

1   0 () =c t
; (5.6)
P Tt = Et

Mt+1 (1 + qt+1)P
T
t+1

; (5.7)
where I denote (1 + qt+1) = Xt+1=Xt, as the gross return on holding one unit
of foreign currency. Equation (5.6) requires that under the assumption that
U.S. Treasuries provide liquidity services as an argument of the investors
utility function, increasing the amount of U.S. Treasuries held, will decrease
their price P Tt : Specically, increasing the stocks of U.S. Treasuries will lower
the investors willingness to pay for another unit of such assets. This is due
to the assumption of  () being a concave function of bt. Note that foreign
Treasuries do not provide liquidity services.
5.2.2 No-arbitrage condition without risk premium
In this section I derive the no-arbitrage condition for the international bond
market under the assumption that nancial markets are complete.88 Note
that I consider zero coupon discount bonds. Further, I assume that there is
no price risk or default risk for the two Treasury bonds under consideration.
88In a similar way Gali and Monacelli (2005) derive the UIP condition for a small open
economy model.
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Therefore, P Tt+1 = P
T
t+1 = 1. Hence, P
T
t =
1
RTt
, and P Tt =
1
RTt
, where RTt
and RTt are the risk-free gross returns. Equations (5.4) and (5.5) can now
be written as
 0 ()
t
1
RTt
+ Et

t+1
t
1
t+1

=
1
RTt
; (5.8)
Et

t+1
t
Xt+1
Xt
1
t+1

=
1
RTt
; (5.9)
where ination is given by t+1 = Pt+1=Pt: Now denote the left-hand side
of (5.9) as stochastic discount factor in terms of purchasing power in the
foreign currency:
Mt+1 = 
t+1
t
1
t+1
Xt+1
Xt
=Mt+1
Xt+1
Xt
:
Substituting out in (5.8) yields
 0 ()
c t
1
RTt
+ Et

Mt+1
Xt
Xt+1

=
1
RTt
:
Given that 1=RTt = Et

Mt+1

; is the foreign currency rate of return on a
nominally risk-free Treasury, the no-arbitrage condition can be derived
RTt
RTt
Et

Xt
Xt+1

= 1  
0 ()
c t
:
Taking the logarithm of the former expression yields then
rTt   rTt = Et [qt+1]   0 () =c t : (5.10)
This approximation uses that ln (1  y)  y; for small y. Note thatEt [xt+1] 
xt = Et [qt+1].89 Equation (5.10) implies that the investorsmarginal valua-
tion for the U.S. Treasuriesliquidity induces a deviation from UIP. Specif-
ically, this equation implies a positive relation between the holdings of U.S.
Treasuries and the interest rate di¤erential rTt  rTt . Increasing the holdings
of U.S. Treasuries decreases the investors marginal valuation for any fur-
ther unit of U.S. Treasuries  0 (). This in turn reduces the U.S. Treasuries
prices and will therefore drive up the expected returns.
89Note that xt and xt+1 are the logarithms of the period t and period t+ 1 exchange
rates, and that the net returns rTt and r
T
t are the logarithms of the gross returns R
T
t
and RTt .
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5.2.3 Yield spread model with risk premium
In a next step this section employs the modied asset pricing model to ex-
plain international Treasury bond yield spreads while accounting for price
risk and foreign exchange risk. I follow Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen
(2012)90 by computing the  -period yields for U.S. Treasury debt securities
iTt; , and for foreign Treasury debt securities i
T
t; :
iTt; =  
1

lnP Tt ; and i
T
t; =  
1

lnP Tt ;
where  is the number of periods to maturity. By this, the price of a zero
coupon bond is converted into a continuously compounded zero coupon
bond yield. Therefore, for discount bonds with P T = P
T
 = 1, the yield
spread for securities with any number of periods to maturity  , can be
expressed as:
iTt;   iTt; =
1

 
lnP Tt   lnP Tt

:
Now plug in (5.6) for P Tt and (5.7) for P
T
t
=
1


ln (Et [Mt+ (1 + qt+ )])  ln

Et [Mt+ ]
1   0 () =c t

;
 1

 
Et [Mt+ (1 + qt+ )]  Et [Mt+ ]   0 () =c t

:
This approximation uses that ln (1 + y)  y, for small y. Denote the yield
spread as it; = iTt;   iTt; , and rearrange
it; =
1

Et [Mt+ ]Et [qt+ ] +
1

covt (Mt+ ; qt+ )  1

 0 () =c t : (5.11)
Equation (5.11) implies that the  -period spread between the yield of a
U.S. Treasury security and the yield of a foreign Treasury security with
remaining term to maturity  , is determined by the product of the ex-
pected t +  -periods-ahead stochastic discount factor times the expected
t+  -periods ahead exchange rate growth rate, the covariance between the
90This is applied by Backus, Foresi, and Telmer (2001) to calculate prices of bonds
with di¤erent maturities in the context of a¢ ne models of the term structure of interest
rates.
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t +  -periods-ahead stochastic discount factor and the t +  -periods-ahead
exchange rate growth rate, and the period t marginal convenience yield of
U.S. Treasuries divided by c t . The former two terms reect the foreign
exchange risk premium which arises due to the comovement of the future
expected spot exchange rate growth rate with the expected change in the
stochastic discount factor. Note that the third term on the right-hand side
of (5.11) reects the modication of the standard asset pricing model by the
assumption that investors value features of U.S. Treasuries which are unique
to them. By the assumption of the U.S. dollar to be the key currency, these
features are not shared with any other Treasury debt security issued by any
other country.
5.2.4 Estimation strategy
The purpose of the present chapter is to test the hypothesis that investors
value the unique liquidity of U.S. Treasuries which leads to deviations from
UIP. This is done by investigating whether the marginal convenience yield
terms in (5.10) and (5.11) signicantly contribute to the explanation of the
observed yield spreads for U.S. Treasuries compared to U.K. Treasury debt
securities.91 For that purpose I specify the following regression models:
iUS;UKt =
np + np1 log

Debtt
GDPt

+ np2 q^t+1 + "
np
t ; (5.12)
iUS;UKt =
rp + rp1 log

Debtt
GDPt

+ rp2

M^t+1q^t+1
+cov (M; q)

+ "rpt ; (5.13)
whereiUS;UKt denotes the spread between the yields of a U.S. Treasury and
a U.K. Treasury with same maturity length, and "npt and "
rp
t denote error
terms. The dependent variable is a quarterly yield spread measured in
percentage points. Specically, I use quarterly data and 3-month Treasury
bill yields.92 The superscript np denotes the estimation model for the no-
arbitrage condition (5.10), and the superscript rp denotes the estimation
model for the yield spread model (5.11) which accounts for risk premia.
91For the present study I focus on U.S. and U.K. data because Treasury debt securities
issued in both countries can be regarded as close substitutes apart from the postulated
key currency feature of the U.S. dollar. Specically, nancial market integration between
both countries is intense and trading volumes of U.S. Treasuries and U.K. Treasuries are
large.
92See Appendix D.1 for a description of the data.
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The proxy for the marginal convenience yield which is divided by marginal
utility of consumption in the equations (5.10) and (5.11) is the logarithm
of the face value of the outstanding stock of U.S. Treasuries, scaled by U.S.
GDP. This proxy is denoted as log (Debtt=GDPt) : A log functional form
is used because it provides a good t and requires estimation of only one
parameter. Further, the interpretation of a regression coe¢ cient for a log
independent variable on a dependent variables denoted in percentage points
is more convenient.
I follow Fuhrer (2000) by assuming that the dynamics of the stochastic
discount factor and the growth rate of the exchange rate can be described by
an unconstrained vector autoregression.93 In particular, the vector autore-
gression is used to generate the householdsforecasts of the future changes
in consumption and ination, which are required to calculate the expected
changes in the stochastic discount factor M^t+1; and forecasts of the ex-
change rate q^t+1: These variables enter the right-hand sides of the yield
spread regression models (5.12) and (5.13).94 Note that I regard the co-
variance between the stochastic discount factor and the growth rate of the
exchange rate cov (M; q) which enters the right hand side of (5.13), as being
constant.95
93This approach is similar to the one applied in Campbell and Shiller (1987) for present
value models, such as consumption functions that relate consumption, income, and inter-
est rates. Campbell and Shiller (1987) point out that employing an unconstrained vector
autoregression to generate forecasts implies the choice of the information set which in-
cludes all relevant information of market participants at the time when expectations are
formed.
94Canzoneri et al. (2007) use this approach to generate the forecasts of the future
changes in consumption and ination. Their aim is to compute implied consumption
Euler equation rates under a number of di¤erent preference specications and compare
them to observed nominal and real market rates.
95The conditional moments are obtained form a VAR(p) model with k endogenous
variables which are elements of the vector ~Yt = (Y1;t; :::; Yk;t):
~Yt =A0 +A1~Yt 1 + :::+Ap~Yt p + ~et;
~et  IID (0;e) ;
where A0 and ~et are k  1 are vectors of the constant terms and the independent and
identically distributed random error terms. The kk matrices A1 and Ap contain the re-
gressorsparameters. The conditional expectations for the h-periods-ahead consumption
and exchange rate are derived by computing
Et~Yt+h = A^0 + A^1~Yt+h 1 + :::+ A^p~Yt+h p;
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The VAR is estimated from 1985:Q3 to 2008:Q1 on quarterly U.S. data.
Following Fuhrer (2000) the VAR is estimated for log per capita real non-
durable goods and services consumption, the log per capita real disposable
income, the e¤ective federal funds rate, the log per capita real nonconsump-
tion GDP, the log change in the price index for nondurables and service con-
sumption, and a commodity price index. Further, I follow Eichenbaum and
Evans (1995) by additionally considering the U.S. dollar relative to U.K.
pound exchange rate for the VAR model estimation.96
Note that by employing this VAR model to generate householdsfore-
casts, the exogeneity assumption for the variables q^t+1 and M^t+1 in the
regression models (5.12) and (5.13) might be violated. In this case OLS
estimates would be invalid. To justify the use of OLS for the purpose of
the present study it is assumed that the forecasts of q^t+1 and M^t+1 are
contemporaneously uncorrelated with the disturbances "npt and "
rp
t .
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By estimating (5.12) and (5.13) the present chapter intends to test the
following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 The yield spread models (5.10) and (5.11) require that an
increase in the U.S. Debt to GDP ratio which is a proxy for the holdings
of liquid U.S. Treasuries, increases the observed U.S.-U.K. Treasury yield
spreads. Hence, the regression analysis would provide support in favor of the
assumption that investors value unique liquidity features of U.S. Treasuries
if point estimates for the regression coe¢ cients would imply that np1 > 0;
and rp1 > 0:
where A^0, is the vector of the regression intercepts, and A^1, and A^p contain the estimated
regression coe¢ cients. The conditional second moments are given by the elements of the
estimated covariance matrix
^ =
T
T   kp  1 U^ U^
0
where U^ is the k  T matrix of the regression residuals.
96See Appendix D.1 for a detailed description of the data.
97Following Mehra and Minton (2007), OLS has been employed in contributions like
Orphanides (2001) and Boivin (2006), to estimate forward-looking Taylor rules using the
Federal Reserve Board of GovernorsGreenbook forecasts. As further pointed out, the
use of OLS requires the assumption that the Greenbook forecasts are uncorrelated with
the regression error which is interpreted as a monetary policy rate shock. Boivin (2006)
argues that this exogeneity assumption can not be directly veried but is implicitly made
by studies like Orphanides (2001) when using OLS to estimate forward-looking Taylor
rules with forecast data. As the present study is conceptually similar I follow these
authors and assume that the VAR forecasts are uncorrelated with the disturbances "npt
and "rpt :
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This would imply that liquidity premia can contribute to explain devia-
tions from UIP. Further, I investigate whether foreign exchange risk provides
in this context a signicant contribution to the explanation of the observed
variation in the U.S.-U.K. Treasury yield spread.
Hypothesis 2 The yield spread model (5.13) provides a better empirical
t. Employing the regression model (5.12) to explain the spread between U.S.
Treasury yields and U.K. Treasury yields neglects important information.
5.3 Empirical results
Equations (5.12) and (5.13) are estimated on quarterly data ranging from
1985:Q3 to 2008:Q1. This data sample is chosen for the present analysis as
it covers roughly the period on which recent empirical work testing the UIP
condition is estimated.98 The dependent variable is the spread between the
3-month U.S. Treasury bill yield and the U.K. Treasury bill yield with the
same maturity length.
Estimation results are summarized in Table I. The rst column of Panel
A presents coe¢ cient estimates for the regression of the U.S.-U.K. Treasury
yield spread on the measure for U.S. Treasury holdings log (Debtt=GDPt),
the expected next quarters growth rate of the exchange rate q^t+1, and a
constant term. The mean value of the U.S.-U.K. Treasury bill yield spread
is  266 basis points (bp) for the sample period 1985:Q3 to 2008:Q1. The
coe¢ cient of 11:18 on the log (Debtt=GDPt) variable implies that a one
percentage point increase of the average U.S. Debt-to-GDP ratio, increases
the U.S.-U.K. Treasury bill yield spread by 21 bp. Note that a one standard
deviation increase in the U.S. Debt-to-GDP ratio, from its mean value of
0:52 to 0:65, increases the U.S.-U.K. Treasury bill yield spread by 249 bp.
From the perspective of the no-arbitrage condition (5.10) one would argue
that such an increase in the holdings of Treasuries which are denominated in
the key currency, decreases the investorsvaluation and willingness to pay
for an other unit of such Treasuries. This in turn drives up the yield of a U.S.
Treasury bill compared to the yield of a U.K. Treasury bill. This nding is
consistent with Hypothesis 1 and statistically signicant. Further, it implies
that U.S. Treasury supply is an important determinant of the spread. The
covariate q^t+1 is in this setting estimated to be signicantly related to the
spread. The point estimate for np2 is 0:34 which implies that an expected
98See Burnside et al. (2006) and Chinn (2006).
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depreciation of the U.S. currency relative to the U.K. currency is positively
related to an increase in the U.S.-U.K. Treasury yield spread. Under the
standard specication of the forward premium regression model one would
test the hypothesis whether the estimated coe¢ cient on q^t+1 is unity. This
however, is not found in the present study, but in contrast to most empirical
studies on forward premium regressions, the point estimate of the coe¢ cient
in the present study is signicantly larger zero. In the second column of
Panel A the estimated coe¢ cients are presented for a regression where the
measure for U.S. Treasury holdings is not included. Results imply that q^t+1
has in this case no signicant impact on the spread. Therefore, the positive
association of q^t+1 with the spread found for the regression presented in the
rst column of Panel A, depends on the inclusion of log (Debtt=GDPt) as
covariate to the estimation model. Further, including the log (Debtt=GDPt)
regressor sharply increases the R2 measure.
In the rst column of Panel B results are shown for estimating the re-
gression model (5.13). In this case the U.S.-U.K. Treasury yield spread is
regressed on the proxy for the expected foreign exchange risk M^t+1q^t+1 +
cov (M; q) ; instead of the expected next quarters growth rate of the ex-
change rate q^t+1. Further, a constant and the measure for U.S. Treasury
holdings log (Debtt=GDPt) are included. Again, estimating the model with
the log (Debtt=GDPt) regressor increases the R2 measure. Further, by com-
parison with the results presented in the second column of Panel B, it ap-
pears that by inclusion of the U.S. Treasury holdings proxy the coe¢ cient
on the proxy for the foreign exchange risk becomes signicant. However,
the size of the estimated coe¢ cient implies a small e¤ect of foreign exchange
risk on the spread. Further, comparing the results across the rst columns
of Panel A and Panel B shows that the values of the point estimates for the
coe¢ cients on log (Debtt=GDPt), the regression constants, and the values
of the R2 measures lie very close together. Hence, the proxy for foreign
exchange risk does not seem to contain important information for the U.S.-
U.K. Treasury yield spread regression. Hence, I consider Hypothesis 2 to
be rejected by this result.
5.4 Conclusion
For the present chapter I modied a representative agent asset-pricing model
by assuming that investors value liquidity services which are unique features
of U.S. Treasuries. Further, the assumption that U.S. domestic bonds and
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Table 5.1: Impact of US Debt/GDP on U.S.-U.K. Treasury bills yield spread
Period 1985:Q3 - 2008:Q1
(A) (B)
log(Debt=GDP ) 11:180 11:122
[5:491] [5:354]
q^t+1 0:339 0:091
[2:526] [0:520]
M^t+1q^t+1 0:002 0:001
[2:200] [0:223]
Intercept 3:168  2:665 3:122  2:665
[2:930] [ 11:419] [2:838] [ 11:387]
R2 0:263 0:004 0:250 0:001
N 89 89 89 89
Notes: The sample period is 1985:Q3 - 2008:Q1. t-statistics are reported in brackets.
foreign bonds are perfect substitutes was relaxed. In a next step model-
implied no-arbitrage conditions for the international bond market were de-
rived. These are interpreted as UIP conditions which are adjusted for liq-
uidity premia. Estimation results provide support for the hypothesis that
investors value the liquidity of U.S. Treasuries which yields a signicant con-
tribution to the explanation of the U.S.-U.K. 3-month Treasury bill yield
spread. This implies that investorsvaluation for U.S. Treasuries liquid-
ity contributes to explain deviations from UIP. Estimation results however,
imply that foreign exchange risk can only explain a very low share of the
observed variation in the U.S.-U.K. 3-month Treasury bill yield spread. In
contrast to most forward premium regression estimations I nd a positive
association between the expected depreciation rate of the U.S. currency rela-
tive to the U.K. currency and the U.S.-U.K. Treasury yield spread. However,
the point estimate of the coe¢ cient is below unity.
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Chapter 6
Concluding Remarks
This thesis has presented several essays on the problem of modelling the
notion of aggregate liquidity as a potential driver of asset returns and of
macroeconomic evolutions.
Chapter 2 has demonstrated that an asset pricing model which is mod-
ied to allow liquidity services to enter investorsutility can contribute to
explain observed corporate-U.S. Treasury bond yield spreads. Chapter 3
has shown that observed data on investorsconsumption and liquid asset
demand are consistent with revealed preference conditions for utility max-
imization and weak separability. However, estimation results have either
implied rejection of proposed specications of household preferences or pa-
rameter values that indicate misspecication. Chapter 4 has addressed the
identication of the e¤ects of the LSAP 2 longer-term Treasury purchase
program on the U.S. economy. This chapter has found that shocks to nan-
cial intermediation have signicantly contributed to the evolution of U.S.
key macroeconomic variables following the 2008/2009 crisis. A counter-
factual policy simulation has estimated that in the absence of LSAP 2 the
U.S. real per capita GDP would have dropped by additional 2:75 percentage
points. Chapter 5 has estimated forward premium regression models which
are modied by assuming that investors value U.S. Treasuriesliquidity ser-
vices induced by the U.S. dollars role as a key currency. Estimation results
have indicated that implied liquidity premia can explain deviations from
UIP, and a positive association between the expected depreciation rate of
the U.S. currency relative to the U.K. currency and the forward premium.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1 Regression variables
Aaa-Treasury yield spread: This variable is constructed as the monthly
spread between Moodys Aaa-rated long maturity corporate bond yield and
the average yield on long term Treasury bonds measured in percentage
points. The Moodys Aaa index is constructed from a sample of long ma-
turity ( 20 years) industrial and utility bonds (industrial only from 2002
onward). The yield on long maturity Treasury bonds is the average yield
on long-term government bonds. The Treasury bonds included are due or
callable after 10 years for the period 1971-1999. For 2000-2008 the yields
on 20-year maturity Treasuries are used. All three data series are from the
Federal Reserves FRED database (series AAA, LTGOVTBD, and GS20).
Monthly data for April 1971 up to September 2008 is used leaving out the
sub prime crisis market turmoil and scal and GDP response.
CP-Bills yield spread: The yield spread between commercial paper
and Treasury bills measured in percentage points. For the whole period
1971-2008 the commercial paper yield is from the FRED database. The
period 1971-1996 is covered by the series CP3M (the average of o¤ering
rates on 3-month commercial paper placed by several leading dealers for
rms whose bond rating is AA or equivalent) and for 1997-2008 by the
series CPN3M (the 3-month AA nonnancial commercial paper rate). The
Treasury bill yield is for 3-month Treasury bills from 1971-2008 (FRED
series TB3MS).
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Debt/GDP: This variable is intended to proxy the holdings of Trea-
suries scaled by GDP. This variable is calculated from April 1971 until
September 2008. I use time series data on the total amount of Treasury
securities outstanding from Datastream (series USSECMNSA). Quarterly
GDP data is from Federal Reserves FRED database (series GDP). To de-
rive monthly GDP data I used a cubic spline interpolation on the time series
of quarterly U.S. GDP. Unlike KVJ I do not calculate Debt/GDP at market
value. However, KVJ show that over the period 1949-2008 the correlation
between Debt/GDP at face value and Debt/GDP at market value is 0.992.
MB/GDP: This variable is intended to proxy for the holdings of money
and close to money substitutes scaled by GDP. From FRED I use the series
BOGAMBSL, "Board of Governors Monetary Base, Adjusted for Changes
in Reserve Requirements". Therefore, notes and coins (currency) in circu-
lation (outside Federal Reserve Banks, and the vaults of depository institu-
tions), currency in bank vaults, and Federal Reserve Bank credit (minimum
reserves and excess reserves) are included which is widely interpreted as
base money or total currency. MB/GDP hence, is derived from the most
liquid measure of money supply actually leaving out close to money assets
like demand deposits and savings deposits.
(M3-M2)/GDP: This variable is intended to proxy for the holdings of
long-term close to money substitutes, and long-term assets with the highest
possible degree of liquidity, scaled by GDP. M3-M2 covers the positions of
large time deposits, institutional money market funds, repurchase agree-
ments and other larger liquid assets. Data on the two empirical measures
for aggregate money supply M3, and M2 are from FRED (series M3SL and
M2SL). Data for M3 is only available until February 2006. Hence, this
variable is calculated for the period April 1971 until February 2006.
CD/GDP: This variable is intended to proxy for the holdings of corpo-
rate debt securities scaled by GDP. I use the FRED series CPLBSNNCB,
"Commercial Paper - Liabilities - Balance Sheet of Nonfarm Nonnancial
Corporate Business", for the face value of outstanding commercial paper and
the series CBLBSNNCB, "Corporate Bonds - Liabilities - Balance Sheet of
Nonfarm Nonnancial Corporate Business", for the face value of outstand-
ing corporate bonds. The sum of both series is assumed to measure the
total holdings of corporate debt securities.
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Volatility: This measure is based on standard deviations of weekly log
stock returns on the S&P 500 index. Weekly returns are calculated on the
value-weighted S&P 500 index based on daily returns obtained from Federal
Reserves FRED database (series SP500). As a volatility measure for a given
month, the standard deviation of the weekly log returns are calculated up
to the end of the month. The standard deviation of weekly log returns is
then multiplied by the square root of 4.
Slope: The slope of the Treasury yield curve measured as the spread
between the 10-year Treasury yield and the 3-months Treasury bill yield.
The interest rate on Treasuries with 10 year maturity is from FRED (series
GS10). The interest rate on Treasuries with 3 month maturity is from
FRED as well (series TB3MS).
ASW: The measure for the di¤erence in asset-swap spreads between cor-
porate debt securities and Treasury securities. From Datastream the time
series ICUSS2Y is used which captures the asset-swap rate of benchmark
securities over the 2-year Treasury rate.
Agency: This is the measure for the spread between yields of Refcorp
and Treasury securities. Time series data on yields of Freddie Mac securities
due after one year and yields on Treasuries with the same maturity length
are from Datastream (series USMIA1 and FRTCM1Y).
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 3
B.1 Data sources
CnDUR: This variable is constructed as the monthly real per capita con-
sumption expenditures on nondurable goods. Monthly data on aggregate
expenditures on nondurable consumption goods are from the Federal Re-
serves FRED database (series PCEND). Monthly real values are obtained
by a using a deator calculated from a chain-type price index for personal
consumption expenditures (FRED series PCEPI) with 2005 = 100. Further,
per capita data are derived by dividing through monthly total population
(FRED series POP).
M: Measures monthly real per capita money balances. This is proxied
by the data series on the currency component of M1 measure plus demand
deposits from the FRED database (series CURRDD). As for CnDUR, real
per capita balances are derived by using the same price index deator and
by dividing through total U.S. population.
TrBi: This variable is intended to proxy for the real per capita holdings
of Treasury bills (4-week to 52-week maturity). Here, data on the face value
of outstanding marketable U.S. Treasury bills is taken from Datastream
(series name: U.S. Federal Debt - Marketable Securities Treasury Bills Curn,
Id: USSECTRBA). Note that these data do not contain non-marketable
Treasuries i.e. as held in a TreasuryDirect account. Unfortunately I do
not have data on the distribution of maturities among non-marketables. So
I can not quantify the shares of bills, notes, and bonds. Therefore, data
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on the face value of non-marketable bills is left out. The time series is
as well transformed to real per capita values in the same way as CnDUR.
Prices are calculated from the 3-Month Treasury Bill Secondary Market
Rate (FRED series TB3MS) which is assumed to be a holding period return
of a zero coupon bill. Further, from the raw data returns are calculated on
monthly basis and deated by the gross growth rate of the price index
PCEPI. Quantities held are then derived by dividing correspondent real
per-capita values by the implied prices. This is done for all groups of assets
(See TrBo, CP, and CB).
TrBo: This variable is intended to proxy for the real per capita holdings
of Treasury bonds (20 to 30 years maturity). Data is taken from Thomson
Reuters Datastream (series name: U.S. Federal Debt - Marketable Securities
Treasury Bonds Curn, Id: USSECTRDA). The time series is transformed
to real per capita values in the same way as CnDUR. Prices and monthly
net returns are calculated in the same way as for the variable TrBi. Cor-
respondent data is taken from the yields on Long-Term U.S. Government
Securities (FRED series LTGOVTBD for the period 1969 - 2000 and series
GS20 from 2000 - 2008).
CP: Proxies the per capita holdings of commercial paper. Here data
on the face value of outstanding commercial paper issued by nonfarm and
nonnancial corporate business is taken from FRED (series CPLBSNNCB).
As before the time series is converted to real per capita values. Prices
monthly net returns are derived from commercial paper yields in the same
way as for the variable TrBi. Prior to 1971 I use the commercial paper yields
series for prime commercial paper, 4-6 month maturity, from Banking and
Monetary Statistics (Table 12.5 for 1941-1970). For 1971-1996 it is the
3-Month Commercial Paper Rate from FRED (series CP3M) and for 1997-
2008 the 3-Month AA Nonnancial Commercial Paper Rate from FRED
(series CPN3M).
CB: Proxies the per capita holdings of corporate bonds. Here data
on the face value of outstanding corporate bonds issued by nonfarm and
nonnancial corporate business is taken from FRED (series CBLBSNNCB).
As before the time series is converted to real per capita values. Prices
monthly net returns for corporate bonds are calculated in the same way as
for the variable TrBi. Data are taken fromMoodys Seasoned Aaa Corporate
Bond Yield Index (FRED series AAA).
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Further, for the GMM estimation model monthly returns on the nu-
meraire asset rdt are proxied by returns calculated on the S&P 500 Stock
Price Index (FRED series SP500). Further returns are deated by the gross
growth rate of the price index PCEPI.
B.2 Pricing equations
i. Assume that the aggregator function  () is CES, and is further nested
in a CRRA utility function (this is similar to Poterba and Rotemberg
(1986)):
u

ct; 

Mt
Pt
;
Bt
Pt
;
St
Pt

=
1


ctLt

Mt
Pt
;
Bt
Pt
;
St
Pt

;
Lt =

M

Mt
Pt

+ B

Bt
Pt

+ (1  M   B)

St
Pt
 1
;
where  < 0, 0 <  < 1; and 0 < M ; B < 1. Then from equations (3.16) -
(3.18) it follows that
ct
Lt
M

Mt
Pt
 1
+ Et [Mt+1] = 1;
ct
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
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Pt
 1
+ Et [Mt+1] =
1
Rbt
;
ct
Lt
(1  M   B)

St
Pt
 1
+ Et [Mt+1] =
1
Rst
:
For the case of a nested CES aggregator each liquidity services premium
on the assets prices is not only determined by the level of holdings of
the respective asset but also determined by the total holdings of liquidity
services providing assets, aggregated by Lt. Hence, prices decrease with
additional asset holdings as well as in Lt.
ii. Now assume that the aggregator function  () is Cobb-Douglas, which
is nested in a CRRA utility function:
u

ct; 

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Pt
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
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1
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
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
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;
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
;
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Lt =

Mt
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M Bt
Pt
B St
Pt
(1 M B)
;
with  < 0, and M ; B; (1  M   B) summing up to 1: Then from equa-
tions (3.16) - (3.18)
ctM
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ctB
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 1
+ Et [Mt+1] =
1
Rbt
;
ct (1  M   B)

St
Pt
 1
+ Et [Mt+1] =
1
Rst
:
For the case of the nested Cobb-Douglas aggregator each assets liquidity
services premium is driven by the current level of holdings of the respective
asset but not by the total holdings of liquid assets. This implication is not
in line with KVJ and NIE.
iii. Next assume again that the utility function is CRRA with a nested
CES aggregator. However, utility is in this case additively separable in its
arguments:
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 1
;
where  < 0, 0 <  < 1; and 0 < M ; B < 1. Then from equations (3.16) -
(3.18)
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:
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As for a CES function it is assumed that 0 <  < 1; it implies for this model
specication that increasing the holdings of one of the three assets under
consideration increases asset prices. This implication is not in line with the
assumptions by KVJ and NIE.
iv. Assume that the utility function is CRRA with a nested Cobb-Douglas
aggregator and that it is additively separable in its arguments:
u

ct; 

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Pt
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Bt
Pt
;
St
Pt

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1

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
;
Lt =

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Pt
M Bt
Pt
B St
Pt
(1 M B)
;
with  < 0, and M ; B; (1  M   B) summing up to 1. Then from
equations (3.16) - (3.18)
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Pt
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+ Et [Mt+1] =
1
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:
As 0 < M < 1; and 0 < B < 1; the premium on each assets price decreases
with the level of the respective assets holdings. However, the premium on
each assets price increases with additional holdings of each of the respective
other two assets. This implication is not in line with KVJ and NIE.
157
Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 4
C.1 Rational expectations equilibrium
Denition 1 A RE equilibrium is given by a set of sequences fct, nt, dt, t,
wt , wt, mct, mrst, kt, ut, rkt, xt; qt, mt, m
R
t , p
L
t , b
S
t , b
TS
t , b
L
t , b
TL
t ,  t, 
m
t ,
gt, lt, it, t, yt, R
m
t ; R
L
t , R
D
t , R
S
t , R
L
t , R
LB
t , R
Euler
t , Y TMtg1t=0 satisfying
the following conditions summarizing the optimal behavior of households
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with
uc;t = [ct   hct 1]  , ud;t = %d 'dt , un;t =  nt ;
of rms
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of banks
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and of the government
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and aggregate resources
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, as well as the transversality conditions,
a monetary policy setting fRmt  1g1t=0; and   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and the stochastic processes for the shocks
log (t)=  log
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and a given initial values m 1 > 0, l 1 > 0, bLT 1 > 0, b
TS
 1 > 0, k 1 > 0,
x 1 > 0,  1 > 0:
C.2 Steady state
In this appendix, we examine the steady state of the economy. For a given
value of , the following conditions determine the steady state values of
fREuler, k=n, x=n, mc; qg :
Equations (C.4) and (C.9) imply for the steady state marginal cost and
the steady state marginal rate of substitution
mc =
1
p
; mrs =
w
w
.
Combining (C.11) and (C.13), dropping time indices, and assuming for the
steady state an absence of LSAPs with L = 0; yields for the steady state
minimum fraction of reserves required for deposit management
 =

1
RD
  1
Y TM

Y TM
Y TM   1 .
This, as well as calibrating the scaling factors  and % which will be done
below, is required to make the steady state model calibration of interest
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rates match the historically observed means of the interest rates. Further,
the steady state Euler rate is determined by the steady state ination  and
the discount factor , RE = 

. The steady state Tobins q is equal to one,
the steady state investment-to-labor ratio equals the capital-to-labor ratio
times the capital depreciation ratio, x
n
=  k
n
, and the steady state long-
term bond price is, implied by (C.10), equal to pL = 1
Y TM S : Combining
equations (C.8) and (C.6) implies for the steady state capital-to-labor ratio
k
n
=

 mc(1  )
1  (1  )
1=
,
and hence (C.17) implies for the steady state level of output
y = n 

k
n
(1 )
.
Combining (C.5) and (C.7) implies for the steady state amount of loans
l = mc    nk
n
(1 )
REuler. (C.19)
Further, we calibrate the steady state deposit holdings as
d = DL  l, (C.20)
where DL is the historically measured deposits-to-loans ratio. From (C.6)
and (C.7) it is now implied that the steady state capital rental rate and the
steady state wage rate are
rk=mc(1  )n (uk)  ,
w=
l
n
RL.
Now take into account the banking cost function without time indices
= 
lrc
(m (1 +  1)  d 1)rc ; (C.21)
l= rc

l
, (C.22)
m= rc

(m (1 +  1)  d 1) , (C.23)
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where we used that steady state central bank money injections are given by
i = m
 
1   1 +  1 ,
which follows from assuming that money supplied outright is a constant frac-
tion of money reserves m = mR: Now drop time indices in (C.14) and use
(C.22) to substitute out l. Then substitute out m =   (1  Y TM 1)RE
which is implied by (C.13), to get the steady state banking cost
 =

1
Y TM
  1
RL

l
rc
.
Then we can derive the steady state value for the marginal contribution of
loans to banking cost (C.22). Further we dene gdp = y  as steady state
GDP. Where g is calibrated with the historical government spending-to-
GDP ratio, GY , implying g = GY y. Now we can determine the steady state
value of consumption from the steady state aggregate resource constraint
c = y   g   x  .
Further, dropping time indices for marginal utility of consumption yields
uc = ((1  h) c) . Plug the former into (C.1) and combine with the steady
state marginal rate of substitution, mrs = w
w
; we can calibrate the Frisch
elasticity ; and determine the steady state value for marginal utility of
labor un
 =
ucw
wn
,
un= n.
Next is to calibrate the scaling factor % which governs marginal utility of
deposits. For that reason plug (C.3) into (C.2) and set this equal to (C.11).
Now substitute out m from (C.13)
% =

d

'
((1  h) c) 
RE ( (1  Y TM 1) + Y TM 1)  1
 1
. (C.24)
Hence, we can determine the steady state value of marginal utility of de-
posits ud = %
 
d

 '
. To determine the steady state money holdings, solve
(C.23) for m and substitute out m by (C.13) which yields
m =
1
1 +  1


d

+
rc
(1  Y TM 1)RE

. (C.25)
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Now we can determine steady state money reserves mR = m

. Further we
can now calibrate the steady state value of the scaling parameter within the
banking cost function  from (C.21)
 =

lrc
 
m
 
1 +  1
  d 1rc . (C.26)
From (C.15) the steady state multiplier on the collateral constraint is im-
plied by
 =
1  m
Rmt
  1.
This can be used to determine the value of the steady state injections i
i = m
 
1   1 +  1 :
Next we can solve (C.12) for RS. By substituting out m we get the steady
state short-term bond rate
RS =

1
RE
S +
1
Y TM
 1
:
Bankssteady state short-term bond holdings are implied by (C.16)
bS =
iRm
S
:
Bankssteady state long-term bond holdings are derived from the steady
state bank balance sheet condition d = m+ bS + pLY TMbL + l;
bL =
d m  bS   l
pLY TM
:
For the governments steady state long-term bond supply we assume that
bTL = bL; as L = 0. For the short-term steady state bond supply we sum
up the nancial intermediariessteady state holdings and the central banks
steady state holdings
bTS = bS +RSRm
SbS
Rm
:
Further the steady state lump-sum taxes are implied by (C.18)
 t = b
TS

1

  1
RS

+ pLbTL

Y TM

  1

+ g:
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C.3 Derivation of labor demand
Perfectly competitive labor packers (or unions) buy di¤erentiated labor in-
put, aggregate it through the technology n1=
w
t
t =
R 1
0
n
1=wt
i;t di, and supply the
e¤ective labor units nt. They sell e¤ective units of labor to intermediate
goods producing rms at price wt. Prot maximization of labor packers
max
ni;t
"
wt
Z 1
0
n
1=wt
i;t di
wt
 
Z 1
0
wi;tni;tdi
#
,
yields the FOC
wi;t = wt
w
t
Z 1
0
n
1=wt
i;t
wt  1 1
w
n
1=wt  1
i;t ,
and the demand function
ni;t =

wi;t
wt
  wt
wt  1
nt.
C.4 Wage Phillips curve
To derive the rst order condition for the wage rate wi;t, let the household i
maximize the objective function (4.1) subject the budget constraints (4.2)
and the labor demand function (4.7)
E0
1X
t=0
ttu
0@ci;t;wi;t
wt
  wt
wt  1
nt;
di;t 1
t
1A ,
:::+ Ptci;tPtwi;t

wi;t
wt
  wt
wt  1
nt
 Pt!W
2
 
Ptwi;t
Pt 1wi;t 1
 
1 wwt 1
   1!2 yt + :::
Here we plugged in the labor demand function for ni;t and the wage adjust-
ment cost (4.3) for WACt.
The FOC w.r.t. wi;t reads
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Rearranging gives
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For !W = 0 we get
1
wt  1wi;t=
wt
wt  1

 un;i;t
i;t

,
wi;t=
w
t
0@ un;i;t
i;t| {z }
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.
For !W 6= 0, dene wt = PtwtPt 1wt 1 = t wtwt 1 . Note that we assume trade in
contingent claims here. Hence, the MRS is the same across households and
each household will supply labor for the same wage rate wt. Therefore, we
get
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after rearranging
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C.5 Price Phillips curve
The retailer maximizes prots by optimally setting the intermediate goods
price Pk;t, taking into account cost for acquisition mct, price adjustment
cost (4.22), and the markets demand function for yk;t (4.21). The retailers
problem therefore reads
max
fPk;tg
Et
1X
k=0
t
24Pk;t
Pt
yk;t  mctyk;t   !P
2
 
Pk;t
Pk;t 1
 
1 ppt 1
   1!2 yt
35 ,
s.t. yk;t =

Pk;t
Pt
 "
yt.
Plugging in for yk;t yields
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The rst order condition with respect to Pk;t reads
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where we obtain after some rearranging
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Now aggregate over all retailers prices Pt =
R 1
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then de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C.6 Long-term bond prices
Consider the following investment problem. Following Woodford (2001) we
assume that agents can invest in perpetuities BLt s issued in period t   s,
which pay s units of currency in each period t with  2 [0; 1]. Hence,
coupons decay exponentially, such that  governs the duration of a bond.
Newly issued perpetuities exhibit the price pLt
:::+ pLt B
L
t + Ptct + :::  :::+
1X
s=1
s 1BLt s + Ptwtnt + :::
Dene BLt 1 as the sum of all payments from past bond issuances in period
t, like in Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012)
BLt 1 =
1X
s=1
s 1BLt s:
Given that
BLt =
1X
s=1
s 1BLt+1 s = B
L
t +
1X
s=2
s 1BLt+1 s = B
L
t + 
1X
s=1
s 1BLt s;
we get the following relation between BLt and BLt 1 such that
BLt = BLt 1 +BLt :
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Substituting out BLt , the budget constraint can be rewritten as
pLt
 BLt   BLt 1  BLt 1 + Pt (wtnt   ct) + :::,
:::+ pLt BLt + Ptct + :::  :::+
 
1 + pLt
BLt 1 + Ptwtnt + :::
Consider now a secondary market for long-term bonds. The period t price
of a bond issued in t  s is pLt;t s
pLt;tB
L
t;t +
1X
s=1
pLt;t sB
L
t;t s 
1X
s=1
 
pLt;t s + 
s 1BLt 1;t s + :::;
whereBLt 1;t s denotes the beginning-of-period t holdings of long-term bonds
issued in t  s; and BLt;t s its end-of-period t holdings. Compare two bonds
issued in t and t  s. Period t investments in bonds issued in t  s, BLt;t s,
satisfy
pLt;t s = Et

uc;t+1
uc;tt+1
 
pLt+1;t s + 
s 1+1 ;
and in period t+ 1, BLt+1;t s
pLt+1;t s = Et+1

uc;t+2
uc;t+1t+2
 
pLt+2;t s + 
s 1+2 :
Iterating forward we get,
pLt;t s= Et

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
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 
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=Et
"
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uc;tt+1
s 1+1 + 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+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uc;t+1t+2
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#
...
=Et
1X
k=1
k
uc;t+k
uc;tt+k
s 1+k: (C.27)
Applying the same procedure, for a bond issued in t, leads to the rst
order condition pLt;t = Et
h
uc;t+1
uc;tt+1
 
1 + pLt+1;t
i
, implying that its price pLt;t
satises
pLt;t = Et
1X
k=1
k
uc;t+k
uc;tt+1
k 1:
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Hence, that secondary market prices satisfy
pLt;t s = 
spLt;t: (C.28)
Using this price relation, we get
pLt;tB
L
t;t +
1X
s=1
pLt;t sB
L
t;t s 
1X
s=1
 
pLt;t s + 
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, pLt;t
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!

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 
spLt;t + 
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, pLt;t
" 1X
s=0
sBLt;t s
#
  1 + pLt;t
" 1X
s=1
s 1BLt 1;t s
#
+ :::
Note that in period t, the sum of all payments from past bond issuances is
given by BLt 1 =
P1
s=1 
s 1BLt 1;t s; and in period t+ 1 by
BLt =
1X
s=1
s 1BLt;t+1 s =
1X
s=0
s+1 1BLt;t+1 (s+1) =
1X
s=0
sBLt;t s;
where BLt = BLt 1+BLt;t. We can write the budget constraint again as above
:::+ pLt;tBLt + :::  :::+
 
1 + pLt;t
BLt 1 + :::
We now follow Woodford (2001) and apply a simplication, which hugely
reduces the dimensionality of the investors problem. Consider the issuer of
long-term debt, who satises the budget constraint
:::+ pLt;tB
L
t;t +
1X
s=1
pLt;t sB
L
t;t s + :::  :::+
1X
s=1
 
pLt;t s + 
s 1BLt 1;t s + :::
Recall that bonds issued in period t s are equivalent as s bonds issued in t
(see C.28). We assume that in each period the issuer redeems all previously
issued debt by issuing new debt BLt;t.
Assumption 1 Suppose that debt is issued 8t  0 according toP1
s=1 p
L
t;t sB
L
t;t s = 0.
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Assumption 1 implies for period t   1 : P1s=1 pLt 1;t (s+1)BLt 1;t (s+1) = 0.
Then, the term
P1
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 
pLt;t s + 
s 1BLt 1;t s; can be rewritten as
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where we used pLt 1;t (s+1) = 
spLt 1;t 1, p
L
t;t (s+1) = 
s+1pLt;t, and p
L
t;t 1 =
pLt;t. Hence, we end up with
:::+ pLt;tB
L
t;t + :::  :::+
 
1 + pLt;t

BLt 1;t 1 + :::;
where we can simplify notation by dropping the double time index BLt =
BLt;t; etc. Hence, the investors problem can be written as
:::+ pLt B
L
t + Ptct:::  :::+
 
1 + pLt

BLt 1 + Ptwtnt + :::
The rst order condition for holdings of long-term debt BLt is thus given by
1 = Et

uc t+1
uc t
RLt+1
t+1

;
where the one period rate of return on long-term bonds is given by
RLt+1 =
1 + pLt+1
pLt
;
173
which is obviously state contingent. Suppose for a moment that prices are
stable (t = 1) and agents are risk neutral (uc;t = const:). Then, the pricing
condition (C.27) implies pLt;t =
P1
k=1 
kk 1 =  1
P1
k=1 
kk = 
1  ; and
pLt+1;t =
P1
k=1 
kk 1+1 = 
1  , such that the one period rate of return 
1 + pLt+1

=pLt;t =
 
1 + pLt+1;t

=pLt;t; is given by 1=, which satises arbitrage
freeness.
C.7 Duration and yield to maturity
The Yield to Maturity is the internal rate of return of an investment,
taking into consideration all incomes and expenses and their timing. Hence,
the Yield to Maturity makes all future payments of a perpetuity bond equal
to the current market value. For a perpetuity bought in t an investor would
gain the following stream of incomes
P1
s=1 
s 1 discounted by the current
Yield to Maturity Y TMt. Hence, the Yield to Maturity Y TMt is simply
given by
pLt =
1X
s=1
s 1
(Y TMt)
s ;
pLt =
1

1X
s=1
s
(Y TMt)
s =
1


Y TMt
1
1  
Y TMt
;
pLt

1  
Y TMt

=
1
Y TMt
;
Y TMt=

1
pLt

+ :
The problem of an investor then reads
:::+ Ptct + p
L
t B
L
t + :::  :::+ pLt Y TMtBLt 1 + Ptwtnt + :::;
leading to the rst order condition for holdings of long-term debt
1 = Et

uc t+1
uc t
1
t+1
pLt+1Y TMt
pLt

:
The concept of Duration measures the number of periods it takes for the
price of a bond to be repaid by its internal cash ows. A bonds duration
is calculated as a weighted average of the time horizons at which the cash
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ows from a bond are received. Each time horizons weight is the percentage
of the total present value of the bond (bond price) paid at that time. For
that purpose, the bonds yield to maturity is used to calculate the present
values
Dt =
P1
s=1 s
s 1
(Y TMt)
sP1
s=1
s 1
(Y TMt)
s
=
P1
s=1 s
s 1
(Y TMt)
s
pLt
=
1
Y TMt
+ 2 
(Y TMt)
2 + 3
2
(Y TMt)
3 + :::
1
Y TMt
+ 
(Y TMt)
2 +
2
(Y TMt)
3 + :::
;
where pLt =
P1
s=1
s 1
(Y TMt)
s = (Y TMt   ) 1 ; is the bonds present value in
t. Note that
1X
s=1
s
s 1
(Y TMt)
s =
1

1X
s=1
s
s
(Y TMt)
s =
1


Y TMt
1
1  
Y TMt
2 ;
where we used that
P1
s=1 sx
s = x
(x 1)2 ; for x 2 (0; 1). Dividing by pLt =
(Y TMt   ) 1 gives
Dt=
1


Y TMt
1
1  
Y TMt
2  1Y TMt   
 1
;
=
Y TMt
Y TMt   :
Alternatively it can be shown that the duration is the elasticity of the
bonds present value with respect to the discount factor Y TMt : Dt =
  dPt
dY TMt
Y TMt
Pt
, implying Dt = 1(Y TMt )2
Y TMt
1
Y TMt 
= Y TMt
Y TMt  .
C.8 Data
We use quarterly U.S. data ranging from 1964:Q3 to 2012:Q3. Time series
are taken from the Federal Reserve Economic Database (FRED) maintained
by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. We construct real per capita
GDP by dividing the nominal GDP (GDP) series by population (CNP160V)
and the GDP deator (GDPDEF). Consumption is measured by the sum
of private sector nondurable goods consumption (PCND) and private sec-
tor services consumption (PCESV). We measure investment by the sum of
the series "Gross Private Domestic Investment" (GDPI) and durable goods
consumption (PCDG). Bank reserves are proxied by the Federal Reserve
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Bank of St. Louismeasure for monthly Adjusted Reserves (ADJRESSL).
We proxy for deposits by the sum of the series "Total Checkable Deposits"
(TCDSL), "Small Time Deposits" (STDSL), and "Savings Deposits" (SAV-
INGSL) (as part of M2). Real per capita values for the consumption, invest-
ment, reserves, and deposits series are calculated by dividing through popu-
lation (CNP160V) and the GDP deator (GDPDEF). Ination is calculated
as the gross growth rate of the GDP implicit price deator (GDPDEF).
We dene hours worked by multiplying average weekly hours worked in
the nonfarm business sector (PRS85006023) with the series "Civilian Em-
ployment" (CE16OV) and dividing by total population (CNP16OV). Real
wages are derived by dividing the time series "Nonfarm Business Sector:
Compensation Per Hour" (COMPNFB) by the GDP deator. We use the
e¤ective Federal Funds rate (FEDFUNDS) as our measure for the models
money market rate, the 3-month certicate of deposit secondary market
rate (CD3M) as measure for the models deposit rate, Moodys Baa cor-
porate bond yield index (BAA) as a measure for the loan rate, and the
7-Year Treasury constant maturity rate (GS7) as a measure for the yield to
maturity on long-term treasuries. All time series are detrended by using a
linear trend, except for the interest rates, hours worked, and real deposits.
The interest rates are all demeaned. The mapping of the variables to the
states is
y^obst = 100  log

gdpt
gdp

;
c^obst = 100  log
ct
c

;
{^obst = 100  log

it
i

;
n^obst = 100  log
nt
n

;
w^obst = 100  log
wt
w

;
m^obst = 100  log
mt
m

;
d^obst = 100  log

dt
d

;
Rm;obst = 100  (Rmt  Rm) ;
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RD;obst = 100 
 
RDt  RD

;
RL;obst = 100 
 
RLt  RL

;
Y TM obst = 100  (Y TMt   Y TM) ;
obst = 100  (t   ) ;
where all state variables are in deviations from their steady-state values.
The detrended observable y^obst corresponds to the rst di¤erence in the de-
trended log real per capita GDP series, multiplied by 100. Analogously
we determine c^obst , {^
obs
t , n^
obs
t , w^
obs
t , m^
obs
t , d^
obs
t . The demeaned observable
Rm;obst corresponds to the contemporary deviation of the e¤ective Federal
Funds rate from its sample mean. Analogously we calculate RD;obst , R
L;obs
t ,
Y TM obst , 
obs
t .
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Appendix D
Appendix to Chapter 5
D.1 Data
U.S.-U.K. Treasury yield spread: This variable is constructed as the
percentage spread between the U.S. Treasury bill yield for 3-month Trea-
suries extracted from the Federal Reserve of St. LouisFRED database
(series TB3MS), and the U.K. Treasury bill yield with the same maturity
length from Datastream (series UKTBTND).
Debt/GDP: This variable is intended to proxy for the holdings of
U.S. Treasuries scaled by U.S. GDP. Here I use time series Data on the
total amount of Treasury securities outstanding from Datastream (series
USSECMNSA). U.S. GDP data is extracted from the FRED database (se-
ries GDP).
VAR model: The vector of the VAR models endogenous variables is
given by
~Yt =
 
ct; t; y
Dis
t ; i
FED
t ; p
Ind
t ; (yt   ct) ; Xt

:
The endogenous variables are calculated using FRED data:
per capita real nondurable goods and services consumption:
ct =
PCNDGC96t + PCESV C96t
POPt
;
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ination, measured by the log change in the price index for nondurables
and service consumption:
t= log

PCNDt + PCESVt
PCNDGC96t + PCESV C96t

  log

PCNDt 1 + PCESVt 1
PCNDGC96t 1 + PCESV C96t 1

;
per capita real disposable income:
yDist =
DPIC96t
POPt
;
the e¤ective federal funds rate, iFEDt = FEDFUNDSt,
a commodity price index, pIndt = PPIIDCt,
the nominal U.S. Dollar to British Pound exchange rateXt = EXUSUKt,
per capita real nonconsumption GDP:
(yt   ct) = GDP96t
POPt
  PCECC96t
POPt
:
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